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Abstract 
The production and transportation of hydrocarbon from a facilities involves 
complex process system. The components in such a process system are exposed to 
extreme operating and environmental conditions. To ensure safe and continuous 
operation, it is important to identify potential risk sources, and incorporate the risk factors 
in the designing of the process components. 
The present work develops a novel integrated methodology for the risk-based 
design of process components. It may be noted that there are lots of process component 
but specific consideration is given for oil and gas pipeline. Hence, the scope of the work 
is comprised of time dependent failure scenarios. The failure mechanisms considered 
here are: internal corrosion, external corrosion, stress corrosion cracking, fatigue failure 
due to corrosion fatigue and start up/shut down loading for a specific process component. 
The time independent failure mechanisms i.e. third party damage, earth movement, and 
material defects are not considered in this study. 
This research considered uncertainties associated with operational characteristics 
of the process component and included them in the risk-based design framework. The 
study reviewed different design codes/standards for a transportation system. In the 
internal corrosion analysis the defect depth was calculated from corrosion rate equations 
and failure probability was assessed considering the first order reliability method. A 
11 
similar procedure was considered for external corrosion analysis. In the internal corrosion 
analysis, the study compared the performance of different codes and standards and listed 
comparative advantages of one over other. The external corrosion analysis identified the 
causes of the variability of probability of failure for recommended codes/standards. It is 
identified that the difference in parameter contribution in the bulging factor are 
responsible for variability in the bursting formulas. In the stress corrosion cracking (SCC) 
failure analysis, the stress based failure assessment diagram (FAD) was considered. The 
authors also proposed a strain based approach for the same analysis. The stress/strain 
based approach closely calculates the failure probability of the SCC defects. The 
corrosion fatigue analysis mainly considered the effect of variable amplitude loading 
(pressure fluctuation) on small weld defects. The Miners rule and Paris law are 
simultaneously considered for failure assessment. The Rainflow counting method is 
considered in the analysis for stress block and cycles counting. The failure probability is 
calculated from the the damage caused by the pressure fluctuation. 
The failure probability obtained for an individual event is integrated using fault 
tree analysis to obtain the overall risk of the system. 
The unified risk is minimized to design individual components to achieve the 
target safety level of the system. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction and Overview 
1.1 General 
Pipeline systems are integral parts of the offshore or onshore oil and gas industry 
t(H· gathering, distlibution and transportion of hydrocarbon products. At present there are 
3,500,000 km of such pipelines around the world [ 1]. In general, pipelines can be 
classified into three categories depending on the purpose: 
Gathering pipelines: These are small interconnected pipelines with complex 
networks to bring crude oil or natural gas from several nearby wells to a treatment plant 
or processing faci lity. The pipelines in this group are usually short with small diameters. 
Transportation pipelines: These are large diameter, long distance pipelines that 
serve as the main conduit for oil and gas transportation between cities, countries and even 
continents. The transportation networks of pipelines include several compressor stations 
in gas lines or pump stations for crude and multi-products pipelines. Transportation 
pipelines as shown in Figme 1.1 are considered the main topic of interest for this study. 
Distribution pipelines: These are composed of several interconnected pipelines 
with small diameters to take the products to the end user. 
The pipeline network is comprised of several components to move products from 
one location to another. The main elements of a pipeline system are [2]: 
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Figure 1.1: Transportation Pipeline [3] 
Inlet station: This is the beginning of the system, where the product is injected 
into the main line. Storage facilities, pumps or compressors are usually found at these 
locations. 
Compressor/pump stations: Pumps or Compressors (based on oil or gas) are 
located along the line to move the product through the transportation pipelines. The 
locations of these stations are defined by the topography of the terrain, the type of 
product being transported, and the operational conditions of the network. 
Partial delivery station: These facilities allow the pipeline operator to deliver part 
of the product being transported. 
Block valve station: These are the first line of control for pipelines. With these 
valves the operator can isolate any segment of the line for maintenance work or isolate a 
rupture or leak. Block valve stations are usually located every 32 to 48 kilometers, 
depending on the type of the pipeline. 
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Regulator station: These are safety valve stations, where the operator can release 
some of the pressure from the line. Regulators are usually located at the downhill side of 
a peak. 
Final delivery station: These are outlets from which the product is distributed to 
the consumer. 
Oil and gas are highly volatile, flammable and explosive. The safe production and 
transportation of oil and gas is of extreme importance. Many countries have enacted 
legislative requirements to ensure safe and reliable transportation of hydrocarbon by 
pipeline [ 4]. In the US, onshore and offshore pipelines are regulated by the Pipeline and 
Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA). Certain offshore pipelines are 
regulated by the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement 
(BOEMRE), formerly Minerals Management Service (MMS). In Canada, pipelines are 
regulated by either provincial regulators or, if they cross provincial boundaries or the 
Canada/US border, by the National Energy Board (NEB). 
1.2 Design and Operation 
Design: Ttransportation pipelines are designed according to the guidelines of 
ASME B31.8 for gas pipelines and ASME B31.4 for oil pipelines. The design and 
operation of pipelines is usually regulated through national and local regulations. 
Pipelines may experience a variety of loads, including the loads during laying 
them offshore. However, the major load is assumed to come from internal operating 
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pressure. Consequently hoop stress as given in Figure 1.2a is the major design factor 
which most design codes consider in the following equation: 
PD Hoop stress= a-,=- =r/Ja-y 
2t 
where 
P =pipeline operating pressure load, 
D = outside pipe diameter, 
t = pipe wall thickness, 
~ = design factor 
CYY =yield stress 
a) 
Hoop Defect 
b) 
Figure 1.2: Hoop stress of a) Intact Pipe b) Defected Pipe 
(1.1) 
Equation ( 1.1) is a burst expression for an intact pipe. If a defected pipe as shown in 
Figure 1.2b is considered, the burst equation needs to be modified with a reduction factor. 
The reduction factor (RF) in equation ( 1.2) is suggested by different codes and standards 
following different approaches. 
PD 
Hoop stress= CY = - * RF = ""CY * RF 
" 2t 'f/ y (1.2) 
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One important point that may be noted for the safe operational limit of the 
pipeline is that the maximum hoop stress should never exceed 72%-80% of specified 
minimum yield strength (SMYS) or 10% overpressures of79% SMYS. 
Operation: The field instruments (flow, pressure, temperature gauges) are 
installed along the pipeline at specific locations, such as injection, delivery, pump 
(liquid), compressor (gas), or block valve stations. The instruments measure the relevant 
data of flowing oil or gas. The information measured by the field instruments is then 
gathered in a local Remote Terminal Unit (RTU) that transfers the field data to a central 
location using real time communication systems, such as satellite channels and 
microwave links. 
Pipelines are controlled and operated from a remotely located Main Control 
Room. The field data is consolidated in a central database through SCADA (supervisory 
control and data acquisition). The SCADA as given in Figure 1.3 at the Main Control 
Room receives the field data, processes and present it to the pipeline operator showing 
the operational conditions of the pipeline. The operator can monitor the hydraulic 
conditions and can send operational commands (open/close valves, tum on/off 
compressors or pumps, change set points) through the SCADA system to the pipeline. 
Some pipelines use Advanced Pipeline Applications software coupled with 
SCAD A to secure and optimize the operation of the pipeline. These help to perform leak 
detection, leak location, batch tracking (liquid lines), pig tracking, composition tracking, 
predictive modeling and look ahead modeling. 
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Men Control Room 
·-- -~-. ---·----- . .. . -~· -., 
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' 
' : 
: 
I 
~-·---~- -~~-~~-~-~-~ ~-----1 
Figure 1.3: The SCADA System for pipelines [2]. 
1.3 Pipeline Inspection 
Pipeline operators use a variety of methods to ensure that pipelines are not 
damaged, or to detect damage before it poses a problem. Hopkins [3] summarized the 
methods of detection as in Table 1. 1. 
Table 1.1: Pipeline Inspection and monitoring methods [3] 
Defect/Damage SurveiHance Or Inspection Method 
Aerial Intelligent Product Leak Geo-Teeh Cp And Hydro-Test 
Ground Pig Quality Survey Survey And Coating 
Patrol Strain Gauges Survey 
3rd Party p R R Damage 
Ext. Corrosion R p R 
Int. Corrosion R p R 
Fatigue/Cracks R R 
Coating p 
Material/ Const. R R Defct. 
Ground R R 
Movement 
Leakage R p R ' R 
Sabotage p 
where 'P' is 'proactive' means the pipelines do not become defective or damaged. 'R' is 'reactive' 
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and it mean that the damage or defects are detected before they cause serious problems 
Pipelines can be inspected with intelligent 'pigs' as shown in Figure 1.4. The 
'pigs' are sophisticated machines that travel inside the pipe and record the data on the 
condition of the pipe. These pigs can measure metal loss (e.g. corrosion), and geometry 
abnormalities (e.g. dents). Sophisticated pigs can map the pipeline or detect the 
dimensions of defects or cracks which is useful to characterize the defect. Defect 
characterization is important for subsequent pipeline failure probability estimation. 
Figure 1.4: Pig- a pipeline inspection tool [3] used for defect or crack inspection 
1.4 Pipeline Failure Statistics 
Pipelines are a safe mode of transportation for oil and gas. However, like any 
other structure, they do fail. The major causes of failure are [3, 5]: 
• outside force (sometimes called third party damage, mechanical damage or 
external interference) 
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• corrosiOn of the pipe wall, either internally or externally by the surrounding 
environment 
Figmc 1.5 shows the major causes of pipeline failures [3]. Outside force and 
corrosion are the dominant failure causes, followed by construction or material defects, 
equipment or operator error, and 'other' failure causes (e.g. leaking valves). These 
failures have caused tragic casualties in recent years on both oil and gas pipelines [ 6]. In 
the present study the corrosion related defects or cracks will be investigated. 
Figure 1.5: Statistics of onshore pipeline failures, data taken from referred sources [2, 
4] 
1.5 Type and Orientation Defects in Pipeline 
The pipeline fails due to a defect, created by a reduction of wall thickness, or the 
propagation of an initiated crack. A classification of blunt corrosion defects is given in 
Figure 1.6. The pipe wall thereby loses its capacity or strength [7]. It may be noted that 
the orientation and type of defect affect the bursting pressure of a pipeline. 
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Short narrow pit defect Long axial defect 
Circumferential defect Long wide axial defect 
Figure 1.6: Classes ofblunt corrosion defects [8-10] 
Again the defects may be a single defect or interacting defects as given in Figure 
1. 7. This study focused on the single defect. The interacting defect is beyond the scope of 
the present study. Interested readers may consult DNV RP Fl 01 [ 11]. 
a) b) 
Figure 1.7: Defect type a) single defect b) interacting defects [ 11] 
The pipeline may fail either by hoop or axial stress. If the defect is longitudinally 
oriented it is likely to fail by hoop stress. The failure mode is given in Figure 1.8. The 
present study will focus on longitudinal defects or cracks due to internal corrosiOn, 
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external corrosiOn, and Stress Corrosion Cracking (SCC), but the circumferentially 
oriented crack will be considered for Corrosion Fatigue cracking. 
(Jhoop 
longitudinal break 
circumferential break 
(Jiongitudinal 
Figure 1.8: Influence of Applied Load on the Failure Mode of Corrosion Defect 
1.6 Failure Modes of Pipeline 
The failure may happen in the following ways:- burst, leak or puncture, overload, 
structural collapse (buckling), fatigue, and fracture. The pipeline generally don't become 
'unserviceable' due to ovalisation, blockages, distortions, and displacements [3]. The 
failures considered in this study are burst, leak, fatigue or fracture failures. 
10 
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1.7 Problem Statement 
The existing methods of pipeline design consider pressure containment of defect 
free pipe with the usual addition of corrosion allowance in the pipeline wall thickness. At 
the beginning of the design life the pipeline is good in terms of safety record; however, 
the problem starts as the pipeline ages. As the corrosion defects or cracks develop in aged 
pipeline, the integrity of the pipeline becomes a major challenge. 
The guidance 'fitness for purpose' or 'fitness for service' is considered for the 
assessment of the integrity of the pipeline. The assessment itself is a complex, time 
consuming and expensive effort which sometimes require excavation. The repair may 
require the complete shut-down of the transportation system. 
To avoid catastrophic failure in the transportation system, to avoid frequent shut 
downs or to reduce the frequency of repairs, the time dependent failure sources may be 
identified and quantified in advance and incorporated in the early design. Hence, the 
study will focus particularly on the risk-based design of pipelines considering the time 
dependent degradation mechanism. 
In contrast to reliability-based design, risk-based design gives a complete picture 
of damage by simultaneous consideration of consequence and failure probability. In risk-
based design a couple of iterations may be required to find the minimal risk. 
1.8 Scope of the Present Work 
The scope of pipeline failure is categorized according to the behavior of the 
failure rate over time. While the failure rate tends to vary with the changing environment, 
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the underlying mechanism is usually random and exhibits a constant failure rate as long 
as the environment stays constant. For example, the third party damage rate depends on 
the location of the pipeline. While the failure rate tends to increase with time and is 
logically linked with the aging effect, the underlying mechanism is time dependent. In 
this condition the surrounding environment is the governing factor for failure rate 
determination. Some failure mechanisms and their respective categories are shown in 
Table 1.2 for a typical pipeline system. 
Table 1.2: Scope of the work: typical failure mechanism of process system [ 12-1 4] 
Failure mechanism Nature of mechanism Failure rate 
tendenc 
Corrosion Time dependent 
Cracking Time dependent Increases 
Third Party Damage Random Constant 
Earth movement Random Constant 
Material Degradation Time dependent Increases 
Corrosion Fatigue Time dependent Increases 
Figure 1.9 shows the pipeline failure rate curve. Pipeline that survive the bum-in 
phase tend to fail at a constant failure rate. Third-party damages or land movements 
constitute this part of the failure rate curve. After the bum-in and useful life phase, the 
failure rate may begin to increase. This is the zone where pipeline begin to wear-out as 
they reach the end of their useful service life. The effect of time dependent failure 
mechanism (corrosion or fatigue) is observed in this wear-out phase of the curve. 
12 
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Scope of the work= Zone of 
Useful life+ Wear out 
Area of research= Zone of 
Wear out only 
Time 
1•----~~-r---· -----~~-----·-·---~ 
Useful life Wear out 
Infant 
Mortality 
Figure 1.9: Failure rate curve of a process system 
The time dependent degradation mechanisms are the focus of this work. The main 
degradations studied here are: 
1. Internal corrosion 
2. External Corrosion 
3. Stress Corrosion Cracking (SCC) 
4. Fatigue failure due to pressure fluctuation and start up/shut down 
These degradation mechanisms are considered as major sources of failure and 
these are discussed in detail in Chapter 4, Chapter 5, Chapter 6 and Chapter 7. The risk-
based design is studied for the failure modes listed above. 
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1.9 Objectives 
The main objective of this study is to develop a risk-based design methodology 
for pipelines considering time dependent degradation mechanisms. This objective is 
accomplished through the following sub-objectives: 
• to develop a risk-based design methodology for pipelines considering 
probabilistic failures and consequences. Chapter 3 described risk-based design 
methodology. 
• to assess the failure probabilities for individual failure mechanism considering 
recommended burst models and to revise the existing burst models where 
applicable. Chapter 4-7 describe failure probabilities for individual failure 
mechanism. 
• to develop an algorithm to integrate different failure modes. Chapter 8 integrates 
individual failure probabilities considering the algorithm stated in section 3.4 and 
the result obtained from Chapter 4-7 
• to define pipeline design parameters based on allowable maximum risk. Chapter 8 
suggests the revision of the pipeline design parameters. 
1.10 Outline of Thesis 
Chapter 1 provides a brief introduction to pipeline components, design, 
construction, operation, inspection, defects and failures. Chapter 2 discusses literature 
review related to design evolution, reliability methods and defect or crack failure 
assessment techniques. Chapter 3 describes risk-based design methodology. Chapter 4 
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outlines failure assessment due to internal corrosion considering different standards and 
models. Chapter 5 discusses failure assessment for external corrosion. Chapter 6 
examines Stress Corrosion Cracking (SCC) failure probability and Chapter 7 examines 
weld crack failure due to cyclic loading. Chapter 8 provides integration of failure 
probabilities obtained in Chapter 4-7; and determine pipeline design parameters based on 
allowable maximum risk. Chapter 9 outlines major contributions and future research 
topics. 
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Chapter 2 
Background Literature Review 
This chapter provides a background literature review of the work as a whole. The 
literature review for internal corrosion, external corrosion, stress corrosion cracking, and 
weld defect crack assessment are provided in chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7 respectively. 
2.1 Design Evolution 
2.1.1 Overview 
Allowable Stress Design (ASD) is a design philosophy that ensures that the 
developed stress in a structure does not exceed the elastic limit. This limit is usually 
restricted by the use of a safety factor. It is also commonly referred to as Working Stress 
Design (WSD) or permissible stress design. 
In contrast to WSD, a new concept, Limit State Design (LSD) is introduced in 
structural design. A limit state is a condition of a structure beyond which it no longer 
satisfies relevant design criteria. Limit state design requires that the structure must satisfy 
either of the design criteria: the ultimate limit state (ULS) or the serviceability limit state 
(SLS). LSD is also well known as Load and Resistance Factored Design (LRFD). The 
evolution of limist state design is given in Figure 2. 1. 
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Ultimate Limit State: ULS design criteria satisfy that the structure doesn't collapse 
when subjected to a peak load. A structure satisfies ULS criteria if all factored stresses 
remain below the factored resistances. The factored stress is a magnified stress where the 
magnification factor is multiplied with the stress. The reduction factor is multiplied with 
the resistances of the structural section of interest. 
Figure 2.1: Evolution of Limit State Design (LSD) 
Serviceability Limit State: The serviceability limit state criterion satisfies that a structure 
remains functional for its intended use subjected to a routine loading condition. A 
structure is deemed to satisfy the serviceability limit state when the constituent elements 
do not deflect by more than certain limits. The example of serviceability limit criterion 
for a cracked specimen is that the crack width must remain below the maximum specified 
dimension. The purpose of SLS requirements in a structure is to ensure that the users are 
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not frightened by certain deflections of the floor, or vibrations by walking, or sickened by 
certain swaying of the structure during high winds. 
2.1.2 Limit States Design 
It is well known that the reliability theory got momentum after World War II for 
modeling uncertainties related to the performance of structures [ 1 -2]. The reliability 
theory embodied in the limit states design has been used as a basis for many structural 
design codes for the last two decades. The limit states codes are now used almost 
exclusively in North America for designing steel and reinforced concrete structures [3-5]. 
The evolution of the first and second order reliability methods [ 6-7] is a 
significant breakthrough since it resulted in huge reductions of computational effort of 
probability calculation. Hence, the limit states codes have been evolved for many types of 
structures, such as offshore structures [8], bridges [9] , and nuclear containment structures 
[I 0]. 
The application of reliability concepts to the design of pipelines is noted in a 
different study. Henderson and Nessim [1 1] developed a reliability-based design 
approach for pipelines subject to thaw settlement; Sotberg [ 12] dealt with submarine 
pipeline applications; Gresnigt [13] looked at plastic design of buried pipelines; and Row 
et al. [ 14] addressed extreme loading scenarios for Arctic offshore pipelines. Reliability-
based design for conventional pipelines has also been advocated by Zimmerman et. al 
[ 15] . 
19 
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1.3 Rationale for Limit States Design 
The structural design ensures that a structure sustains an adequate level of safety 
during its design life; and that the performance of the structure does not conflict with the 
functional and operational requirements. To retain the design objective the pipeline must 
be designed so that the probabilities of excessive deformations or burst should be 
sufficiently low. 
The existing Canadian and American pipeline codes [ 16-18] are based on 
allowable stress design for flexible pipeline systems. Using this method, failure is 
prevented by limiting stresses determined from an elastic analysis to some fraction of the 
specified minimum yield strength (SMYS). It may be noted that the application of 
existing standards to high-strength or corrosion resistant steels, high-pressure designs, or 
other deviations from conventional practice, could lead to either un-conservative or over-
conservative designs. 
Limit state design criteria, however, provide greater flexibility to pipeline 
engineers to use non-linear characteristics of the structure in the design. 
2.2 Failure Analysis 
There are essentially three ways of assessmg pipeline failure analysis: 
Deterministic Method, Numerical Method and Probabilistic Method 
Deterministic Method: the deterministic approach considers only lower bound 
data (e.g. maximum corrosion rate, minimum wall thickness, peak depth of corrosion, 
minimum material property data) and does not include the uncertainties [ 19]. 
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Numerical Method: The finite element method (FEM) may be employed to reduce 
baseless rejection of defective pipelines' sections by properly characterizing the defect 
and forces acting on the specimen of interest. Safian [20] numbered the steps to be 
followed for strength analysis of pipelines sections by the finite element method. 
Probabilistic Method: Failure analysis by probabilistic method is a method of 
probability analysis resulting from the various sources of uncertainty to produce an 
assessment for a particular engineering design. Sections 2.2.1 to 2.2.2 discuss the details 
of probabilistic methods. 
2.2.1 Reliability-Based Method 
The probability of failure defines the measure of performance function g(X) 
smaller than zero, i.e. P{g(X) < 0} where the random variables, X= (X1, X2, .... , Xn), 
remain in the failure region. The opposite characteristics are observed for reliability. The 
integral form of the probability of failure or reliability can be evaluated with the joint pdf 
of X, i.e f, (x) as given in equations (2.1) and (2.2) 
P r = P{g (x) < 0} = f fx (x)dx (2.1) 
g (x )<O 
R = 1-pr = P{g(x) >O}= Jt,(x)dx (2.2) 
g(x)>O 
The close form integral solution of equations (2.1) and (2.2) is complex but by 
simplification and approximation the solution may be obtained easily. The First Order 
Reliability Method (FORM) and the Second Order Reliability Method (SORM) are the 
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two most commonly used reliability methods. The FORM and SORM methods simplify 
the integrand fx ( x) and approximate the performance function g(X) and solve the 
equations (2. l) and (2.2) . It may be noted that the random variables in X are assumed to 
be mutually independent, but if the random variables are correlated they need to be 
converted to independent variables before simplification and approximation. 
2.2.1.1 First Order Reliability Method (FORM) 
The name 'First Order Reliability Method' comes from first-order Taylor series 
approximation of the performance function g(X). 
Figme 2.2 depicts the visualized three-dimensional case of the probability 
integrations of equations (2.1) and (2.2). It shows the joint pdf f, (x) and its contours 
which are projections of the surface of f, (x) on XI - X2 plane in the figure. All the 
points on the contours have the same values of f, ( x) or the same probability density. The 
limit function g(X) = 0 is also plotted on XI - X2 plane in Figure 2.2. 
The volume underneath the surface f,(x) in Figure 2.2 represents the probability 
integration of equations (2.2). It could be imagined that the surface of the integrand 
f, (x) forms a 'hill', and can be cut by flexible knife ( g(X) = 0) and be parted into g(X) 
< 0 and g(X) > 0. The part g(X) < 0 is removed, and the part g(X) > 0 remains as it is in 
Figure 2.2. The remaining volume, the volume underneath fx (x) on the side of the safe 
region g (X) > 0, is the probability integration of equation (2.2), which represents the 
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reliability. The removed part, the volume underneath f, (x) on the side of failure region 
g(X) < 0, is the probability of failure. 
Figure 2.2: Probability Integration in 3-D [20a, 20b] 
The contours of integrand f, ( x) and the integration boundary g(X) = 0, in the XI-
X2 plane are evident in Figure 2.3. The contours are also parted by g(X) = 0 and the 
reliability is obtained by integrating fx (x) with g(X) > 0 while the failure probability is 
obtained by integrating f, (x) with g(X) < 0. 
As indicated earlier, the direct integration of equations (2.1) and (2.2) is complex 
because the probability integration is multidimensional, as a number of random variables 
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X are involved in f,(x). Again the integrand f,(x) and the integration boundary g(X)=O 
are normally nonlinear multidimensional functions, which invites a new problem. 
Therefore, the analytical solution to the probability integration problem in equations (2. 1) 
m1d 0 .2) is seldom available. The numerical solution is also impractical due to the high 
dimensionality of most engineering problems. Therefore the approximation methods, 
such as FORM and SORM have been used over the years to solve engineering problems. 
pdf contour 
x, 
Figure 2.3: Probability Integration in X-Space 
The approximation methods, FORM and SORM, follow two steps to make 
the probability integration easy. The first step simplifies the integrand, J, (x) , so that its 
contours become more regular and symmetric. The second step approximates the 
integration boundary g(X)= 0. The way of approximation divides the probability 
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integration into two types: the First Order Reliability Method (FORM) and the Second 
Order Reliability Method (SORM). The two steps are described below. 
2.2.1.2 Simplification of the Integrand 
The random variables X= (X1, X2, •••• , Xn) of the integrand fx (x) are transformed 
from X-space to U-space where the transformed random variables are U= (U1, U2, ..•. , 
Un). The transformation from X to U is based on the condition that the cdfs of the random 
variables remain the same before and after the transformation. This transformation given 
in equation (2.3) is called the Rosenblatt transformation [21] where <1>(-) is the cdf of the 
standard normal distribution. The standard normal variable is given in equation (2.4) 
Fx; (x;) = <l>(u;) 
U; = <l>-1 [Fx; (x; )] 
(2.3) 
(2.4) 
It may be noted that the general transformation from a non-normal variable to a 
standard normal variable may be nonlinear after the transformation. 
The performance function is given in equation (2 .5) and the probability 
integration is given in equation (2.6) where¢u(u) is thejointpdjofU. 
Y=g(U) (2.5) 
P t= P{g(U) < O} = f¢u(u)du (2.6) 
g (U)<O 
The joint pdf is the product of the individual pdfs of standard normal distribution 
since all the random variables are assumed to be independent, and is given by 
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¢u (u) = rr ~ exp --u; II 1 ( 1 ) 
i= l -v 2n 2 
(2.7) 
The failure probability becomes 
(2.8) 
It may be noted that equation (2.1) in X-space and equation (2.8) in U-space 
calculate the same probability of failure. However, a change may be noticed in the 
contours of the integrand ¢u which become concentric circles as evident in Figures 2.4. It 
is obvious that the integrand ¢u is easier to integrate. 
pdf contour 
Figure 2.4: Probability Integration after normal transformation 
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2.2.1.3 Approximating the Integration Boundary 
The integration boundary g(U) = 0 is approximated to further make the 
probability integration easier to evaluate. The FORM method uses a linear approximation 
of the first order Taylor expansion as shown in equation 2.9 
g(U) ~ L(V) = g(u*) +'Vg(u* )(U- u* l (2.9) 
where L(V) is the linearized performance function, u' = (u: ,u;, ... , u~ ) is the expansion 
point, Vg(u* ) is the gradient of g(U) at u* , and T stands for a transpose. Vg(u* ) is 
given by 
(2.1 0) 
It is preferable to expand the performance function g(U) at the point that has the 
highest value of the integrand, namely, the highest probability density. The point that has 
the highest probability density of the performance g(U) = 0 is termed the Most Probable 
Point (MPP) or the Design Point. The performance function is therefore approximated at 
the MPP. Maximizing the joint pdf ¢u ( u) at the limit state of g(U) = 0 gives the location 
of the MPP. The mathematical model for locating the MPP is given by 
II 1 ( 1 2) n--exp --ui 
i=l& 2 (2.11) 
s11bject to g(u }=o 
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II 1 (1) 1 ( 111 J since IT r::::- exp --u; = r::::- exp --2>;2 maximizing 
i= l -...; 2Jr 2 -...; 2Jr 2 i= l 
IT ~ exj _ _!_u;2 ) is equivalent to minimizing Iu;2 • Therefore the MPP search can 
i= l -...; 2Jr ' 2 i=l 
be rewritten as 
(2.12) 
,\'ttl~fat lo g( u )= 0 
where llull stands for the length or magnitude of a vector. As shown graphically in Figure 
2.5, the MPP is the shortest distance point from the limit state g(U) = 0 to the origin 0 in 
U-space. The minimum distance fJ = iluli is called the reliability index. 
As at MPP u* , g(U) = 0 , equ ation 2.9 becomes 
(2.13) 
II a (u) a (u) 
where a 0 = - L_g__ u; and a; = g . Equation 2. 13 indicates that L(U) is a 
i = l au; . au; . 
u u 
linear function of standard normal variables. Therefore, L(U) is also normally distributed. 
Its mean and standard deviation are given by 
II ag(V) 
JLL =ao =-2:- - u; 
i= l au; . 
u 
II II ag 
( ]
2 
a - La2- L -
' -~ - \ '"' au, ,; 
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The probability of failure is thereby 
I ag u; 
{ () } (
-f.l J i=l aU;. 
Pr ~ p L U < 0 = <D a LL = <D ----;===" =( =ag==u =J=z 
~ au; u ' 
P1 ~ <l{~a,u; J ~<!>(au '' ) 
where a -; -
ag 
au; u' -( . )- Vg(u*) ~(:~, J , a- a, ,a,, .. ,.a, - ~~vg(u ' J I and 
product of the unit vector a and the vector of the MPP u*. 
Figure 2.5: Reliability index in FORM 
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As the MPP u* is shortest distance point from the origin to the performance 
function curve g(U) = 0 , the MPP is the tangent point of the curve g(U) = 0 and the circle 
with the radius of f3 as shown in Figure 2.6. 
The direction of the gradient is also perpendicular to the curve at the MPP, and its 
direction can be represented by the unit vector a. Therefore 
u • = -fJa (2.18) 
The probability of failure 
Pr ~ P{L(U) < 0} = <t>(au •r ) = <t>(- fJaa r) = <1>(- f3) (2.19) 
g(U)=O 
Figure 2.6: MPP located at tangent point 
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As its name implies, the Second Order Reliability Method (SORM) uses the 
second order Taylor expansion to approximate the performance function at the MPP u*. 
The approximation is given by 
g(u)~ q(u)~ g(u*)+ v(u*Xu -u·y +I_(u - u*)H(u·Xu -u·y (2.20) 
2 
where H(u*) is the Hessian matrix at the MPP, namely, 
a2g a2g a2g 
au 2 I au1U2 au1U" 
H(u· ) ~ 
a2g a2g a2g 
au2U1 au2 au2U" 2 (2.21) 
a2g a2g a2g 
au"U1 au"U2 au,~ 
The performance function is further simplified as 
(2.22) 
where D is a (n -1)x(n - 1) diagonal matrix whose elements are determined by the 
Hessian matrix H(u*), and U' = {U~'U2 , ... u,_J. When f3 is large enough, an asymptotic 
solution of the probability of failure can be then derived as 
II I / 2 
p 1 ~ P{g(X) < 0} = <1>(- p)fl (1 + jJK;) (2.23) 
i=l 
where K; denotes the i-th main curvature of the performance function g(U) at the MPP. 
It may be noted that for statistically independent and normally distributed random 
variables the FORM method or Hasofer-Lind method [6] may be considered. For any 
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other situation it will not calculate the correct reliability index or probability of failure. 
Rackwitz et. al. [7], Chen et al. [22], and others corrected this shortcoming and included 
information on the distribution of random variables in the algorithm for both linear and 
nonlinear limit state equations. Equivalent Normal Variables [2 1] and Two-Parameter 
Equivalent Normal Transformation [6-7] are two methods utilized for non-normal 
variable to normal variable transformation. 
Uz FORM 
SORM 
g>O 
Figure 2.7: Relative accuracy of FORM and SORM 
The SORM approach was first explored by Fiessler [23] using various quadratic 
approximations. A simple closed form solution for the probability computation using a 
second order approximation was given by Brei tung [24] using the theory of asymptotic 
approximations. Hohenbichler et al. [25) have provided a theoretical explanation of 
FORM and SORM using the concept of asymptotic approximations. 
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Since the approximation of the limit state function in SORM, as in Figure 2. 7, is 
better than FORM, SORM is believed to be more accurate than FORM. However, since 
SORM requires the second order derivatives, it is not as computationally efficient as 
FORM. 
2.3 System Risk Evaluation 
Using the reliability theory in the previous section, reliability may be estimated 
for a single performance criterion or limit state using FORM or SORM. In general many 
engineering systems have to satisfy more than one performance criterion. The concept 
used to consider multiple failure modes and/or multiple component failures is known as 
system risk evaluation. A complete risk analysis includes both component level and 
system level estimates. 
Two basic approaches used for system risk evaluation are the cut set or failure 
mode approach (FMA), and the tie set or stable configuration approach (SCA). In the 
FMA all the possible ways a structure can fail are identified. Once the failure modes of a 
stable system are identified, system risk evaluation involves evaluating the probability of 
union and intersection of events considering the statistical correlation between them. 
However in many cases the statistical correlation may be difficult to estimate. Also it is 
difficult to estimate joint probabilities of more than two failure events. These difficulties 
result in an estimation of upper and lower bounds for the system risk evaluation. These 
bounds are usually estimated by assuming that all events are either perfectly correlated or 
statistically independent. 
33 
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Alternatively an event tree which systematically identifies the possible sequence 
of events can also be used to identify the important failure sequences of the structure. 
2.3.1 Fault Tree Analysis 
Fault tree analysis (FTA) is a failure analysis in which an undesired state of a 
system is analyzed using Boolean logic to combine a series of lower-level events. The 
techniques have been extensively used in the aerospace and nuclear industries [26]. 
FT A is basically composed of logic diagrams that display the state of the system 
and is constructed using graphical design techniques. A subsystem of FT A is shown in 
Figure 2.8. In fault tree analysis, an undesired effect is taken as the top event of a tree of 
logic. There should be only one Top Event and all concerns must flow tree down from it. 
Figure 2.8: A fault tree diagram 
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The route through a tree between an event and an initiator in the tree is called a 
Cut Set. The shortest credible way through the tree from fault to initiating event is called 
a Minimal Cut Set. 
2.3.2 Event Tree Analysis 
Event tree analysis is based on binary logic, in which an event either has or has 
not happened or a component has or has not failed. A major limitation of the event tree is 
that components that are partially degraded cannot be considered as such [27]. However, 
it is valuable in analyzing the consequences arising from a failure or undesired event. A 
simple example of an event tree of a Sprinkler System is shown in Figure 2.9. 
Sprinkler system Call to fire Dept. Outcomes Consequence 
Success Ok Success 
I Failure Partial damage 2 
Fire 
Success Partial damage 3 I 
Failure I Failure System destroyed 4 
Figure 2.9: Event Tree for a Sprinkler system 
This event tree was constructed to analyze the possible outcomes of a fire 
prevention system. The system has 2 components designed to handle this event: a 
sprinkler system and an automated call to the fire department. If the fire department is not 
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notified, the fire will be mostly contained by the sprinkler system. If the sprinkler system 
fails as well, the system will be destroyed. By analyzing all possible outcomes, a designer 
can determine the percentage of outcomes. 
2.4 Defect Assessment 
Based on the type of defect, there are different codes and standards for assessing a 
defect in pipelines. For instance, the most common methods for corrosion defects 
assessment are RSTRENG [28] , Modified B31 G [29] and DNV RP F1 01 [30] and the 
most popular codes for crack defect assessment are API 579 [31] and BS7910 [32]. 
Besides these codes and methods, there are numerical programs, such as CorLAS, which 
have been used successfully for assessing cracks in pipelines [33]. A list of codes and 
standards or individual models may be considered for defect or crack assessment. 
2.4.1 Defect Assessment Codes or Models 
The following codes/standard may be considered for defect assessment 
• RSTRENG [28] 
• Modified B31G [29] 
• DNV RP F101 [30] 
• ASME B31 G [34] 
• CSA Z 662-07 [3 5] 
• Netto Model [36] 
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All of the above codes/standards or models are based on the NG-18 equation for 
failure of part-wall flaw, but they differ in approximation of the Folias factor, flow stress 
and the defect profile in the burst formula [29, 3 7]. The Folias factor (M) is a term that 
describes the bulging effect of a shell surface. The conservatism of the original B31 G 
criterion leads to the development of modified B31 G. ASME B31 G assumes that the 
corroded area is a parabolic shape with 2/3 dL, but modified B31 G assumes an arbitrary 
area with 0.85 dL. Again modified B31 G assumes that the corrosion pits are blunt 
defects. It may be noted that sharp surface flaws have a significantly lower failure 
pressure than blunt surface defects [3 8]. The difference between Modified B31 G and 
RSTRENG is the projected area; modified B31 G calculates remaining strength based on 
the parabolic area (0.85 dL) of the corroded area, whereas RSTRENG uses an effective 
area method. 
The burst formulas basically consider the linear elastic fracture mechanics 
(LEFM) or elastic-plastic fracture mechanics (EPFM) for defect assessment. LEFM is 
used when no significant yielding occurs prior to fracture. Depending on the material 
properties, loading conditions and defect shape and size, crack defects may fail either by 
fracture or plastic collapse. In general, the LEFM method can be used when the material 
toughness is low (brittle) and the stress intensity at the crack-tip is high. EPFM is 
considered when there is a significant plastic zone at the crack tip. 
2.4.2 Crack Assessment Code 
The following codes/standards may be considered for crack assessment: 
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• API 579 [3 1] 
• BS7910 [3 2] 
Cracks in high pressure pipelines may result from the interaction of susceptible metallic 
material, tensile stress or an aggressive electrolyte. The crack characteristics can vary 
greatly depending on the cause of the crack, the material, and the environment. Cracks 
can initiate on the external pipeline surface and grow in both the depth and surface 
directions. There are several common methods for assessing crack defects in pipelines. 
The failure assessment diagram (FAD) is widely used for assessing crack-like 
flaws in pipelines. The FAD approach can be used for a wide range of material behaviors, 
from brittle fracture under LEFM conditions to ductile fully plastic collapse in three 
different levels: Level I, Level II and Level III FAD. The level II FAD provides a better 
estimate of the structural integrity of a component than a level I FAD assessment because 
level I FAD considers elastic-perfectly plastic stress-strain curve with no strain 
hardening. Level II and Level III allow more capacity by using the actual shape of the 
material stress-strain curve [32]. 
No effort is made to discuss the codes and standards since the details are available 
in respective references. Again no effort is made to discuss LEFM or EPFM as they are 
discussed in standard fracture mechanics book. The details ofF AD is not discussed since 
this is available in every code for crack assessment. The ideas of fracture mechanics and 
FAD may be obtained from the author's 3rd and 4th work respectively SCC (6th Chapter) 
and the fatigue analysis of the weld crack defect (7tth Chapter). 
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2.5 Pipeline Failure Equations 
The work at Battelle led to the development of strength (flow stress, as in Figure 
2.1 0) dependent and the toughness dependent, through-wall and part-wall NG-1 8 
equations. Flow stress is a concept introduced by Battelle to help model the complex 
plastic flow and work hardening associated with structural collapse. 
Through wall defect [39] 
toughness dependent 
.---~--~2 2 
M = l + 0 { ~) = l + 0 80( Jit) 
M - 1-CY(} = CY strength dependent 
Part wall defect [39] 
C _!3_ EJr 
v A (JrM CY ) 
= In sec 2~ B toughness dependent 8ca2 
M -
l -~(i1) 
p -
where M 
d I - -
t 
Folias factor 
strength dependent 
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E elastic modulus 
D outside diameter of pipe (R=D/2=radius) 
R radius of pipe 
t pipe wall thickness 
d part wall defect depth 
a8 hoop (circumferential) stress at failure (or sf) 
i3 flow stress (function of SMTS and SMYS)) 
2c defect axial length 
Cv upper shelf Charpy V -notch impact energy 
A area of Charpy specimen fracture surface 
It may be noted that the models accommodate a very complex failure process of a 
defect in a pipeline which involves plastic flow, bulging, crack initiation and ductile 
tearing. These models are safe due to inherent conservative assumptions with validation 
for thin walled plane stress, lower grade, low yield to tensile ratio line pipe. Again the 
strength dependent formulas are not applicable to low toughness material [39]. 
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Figure 2.10: Flow stress modeling of stress-strain behavior in pipeline 
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If equation (2.29) is plotted for part wall defects the following curves may be available 
for the ductile linepipe as given in Figure 2.11. These curves are considered ' universal' 
assessment curves where a pipeline with a defect depth of (1-(d/t)) and length of 
(2c/(Rt)0.5) will fail if the applied hoop stress is more than the calculated stress. Figure 
2. 12 is a simple summary of equations (2.25) and (2.26), showing the leak-rupture 
boundary for through wall defect. 
12 
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Figure 2.11: Failure Stress ofPart Wall Defects in Ductile Pipeline[39] 
2.6 Conclusion 
There is not much work done on risk-based design though it represents a 
comprehensive scenario of cost issues of a project which is not truly reflected in 
reliability-based design [ 40]. There has been little work done on risk-based design. Most 
of the work [ 41-46] has considered risk assessment, risk-based inspection, and risk-based 
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design for hydraulic engineering. As the area is still in its infancy stage there is much 
scope to work on ris-based design. The present study will mainly concentrate on failure 
probability assessment of pipeline steel under different degradation mechanism. 
This boundary is not sensitive to pre.ssurising medium 
t 'Jc qrl 
2c/(RW0.5 
Figure 2.12: Leak/Rupture behavior ofThrough- wall Defects in Ductile Pipeline 
[39] 
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Chapter 3 
Risk-based Design 
3.1 General 
The strength of a pipeline deteriorates due to corrosion damage, and becomes 
weaker with increasing age. Hence, the remaining strength of the pipeline needs to be 
estimated by adopting suitable methods. Three levels of structural failure probability [I ,2] 
may be considered to assess remaining strength and associated risk. 
Level 1 - A semi-probabilistic approach where the characteristic values of loads 
and resistance are defined (referred to 95% fractile value) and combined with partial 
safety factors (load or resistance factors). 
Level 2 - A probabilistic design approach with some approximation. The loads 
and resistance are represented by respective distributions (defined in terms of relative 
parameters such as type, mean and standard deviation) and failure probability is assessed 
using First Order Reliability Method (FORM) or Second Order Reliability Method 
(SORM). 
Level 3 - A probabilistic approach where each parameter of load and resistance is 
defined in the limit state with respective distribution and failure probability is assessed 
using the Monte Carlo method. The coding is developed in the MATLAB platform for 
each individual failure analysis. 
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The detail of Level 2 is discussed in Chapter 2. Since Level 1 is a basic approach, 
the risk-based design methodology is discussed based on the level 1 approach. 
3.2 Load And Resistance Categories 
Before starting risk based design it is important to categorize loads and resistances 
related to a pipeline system. The loads for pipeline design may be classified into the 
following categories: 
• Permanent loads, G 
• Operational loads, Q 
• Environmental loads, E 
• Accidental loads, A 
Permanent loads, G: these are loads that remain constant for long periods of time. 
The material properties and geometry described in the design may be considered in the 
determination of the permanent load. The following permanent loads may be considered 
in the limit state [ 1 ]: 
(a) pipeline self-weight; 
(b) the weight of pipe coatings; 
(c) the permanent overburden loads; 
(d) external hydrostatic pressure; and 
(e) pre-stressing (cold-sprung induced forces). 
Operational loads, Q: these are loads associated with operational activities in the design 
phase. Operational loads may be determined with due consideration to relevant design 
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documentation, operational requirements, and the seasons. These are generally variable 
with respect to time and include [ 1]: 
(a) internal pressure, 
(b) the weight of contained fluids, 
(c) thermal forces due to construction-operation temperature differential, 
(d) the weight of temporary equipment, 
(e) the variable portion of overburden loads. 
Environmental loads, E: these are caused by environmental processes. They are 
generally variable with respect to time and include [1]: 
(a) variations in the ambient temperature 
(b) ground movements (differential settlement or heave, slope failure etc.) 
(c) wind 
(d) waves, tide and currents 
(e) earthquakes and earthquake related effects 
(f) snow and ice accumulation 
(g) marine growth 
(h) icebergs and sea ice. 
The determination of the environmental load requires careful selection. The 
details are available in the codes; however, a comprehensive understanding is also 
available in the reference mentioned earlier. Consult [3] for geotechnical load, [4,5a.5b] 
f()r wind load, [ 4,6. 7] f()r wave and current loads, [ 6] f()r ice load. and [3] f()r seismic 
load. 
Accidental loads, A: these are based on accidental events. They include loads 
caused by outside forces during construction and operation. They include: 
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(a) outside force during construction and operation, 
(b) fire and explosion, and 
(c) loss of pressure control. 
In addition to these four load categories, loads may be divided into primary loads 
and secondary loads. 
Primary Loads: These loads are independent of structural deformations and 
induce the internal force necessary to satisfy the law of static equilibrium. The internal 
forces act as long as the loads are applied and do not diminish when yielding occurs. 
Some examples of primary loads are: internal pressure, external pressure, self weight of 
the pipe and its contents, soil overburden etc. 
Secondary Loads: These loads are induced by structural deformations (or the 
prevention thereof) and satisfy the laws of compatibility of strains and deformations. The 
internal forces induced by secondary loads diminish when yielding occurs. Examples of 
secondary loads include differential temperature loads in restrained pipe sections and 
bending caused by ground movements. 
3.3 Risk-Based Design Methodology 
The risk based design methodology of the present research work is framed in the flow 
chart shown in Figure 3.1. The flow chart in Figure 3.1 may be divided into four 
segments. 
Part 1: Define Load and Resistance 
Part II: Risk Estimation 
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Part III: Component Risk Evaluation 
Part IV: Detail design 
3.3.1 Part 1: Define Load And Resistance 
The load and resistance may be defined considering the level 1 design approach 
commonly known as limit states design (LSD) or load and resistance factored design 
(LRFD) as given in Figure 3.2. In the limit states design the factored load and resistance 
are obtained by multiplying characteristic load and resistance values with safety factors a 
and ¢ respectively. The basic design equation is given by: 
II 
¢R ?_ Ia;L; (3.1) 
i= l 
where ¢R represents the factored resistance, and a;L; represents the factored load 
effects. It may be noted that many loads may act simultaneously on the structure. The 
characteristic values of load and resistance are selected on the basis of probabilistic 
criteria. The load factor, a , is generally > 1.0 and the resistance factor, ¢ , is generally < 
1.0. Many limit states design codes include class factor r to account for the severity of 
the consequences of the failure. The class factor introduces the criticality to reduce the 
chance of damage to human life or the environment. The basic design equation becomes: 
II 
¢R ?_ r ia;L; (3.2) 
i= l 
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Part 1: Define Load and 
Resistance 
------ Part II: Risk Estimation 
· · - Part III: Component 
Risk Evaluation 
- ·- -- ·- Part IV: Detailed design Is 
Calculate system 1isk by 
integration of all risk factors 
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Figure 3.1: Flow chart for risk based design methodology. 
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Higher safety class factors are considered for densely populated areas than for low 
density areas. Again the pipelines that transport toxic or explosive gases have a higher 
safety class factor than those oflow vapor pressure fluids. 
Load 
Distribution 
shift due to 
a 
shift due to 
...1!-1 Resistance Distribution 
Figure 3.2: Load and Resistance factor and frequency distribution [1] 
Equat ion (3.2) may be further expanded to show the individual component ofload: 
(3.3) 
where ¢ = resistance (strength) factor 
R = characteristic resistance or strength 
y = safety class factor 
aG, aQ, aE, aA = load factors for G, Q, E and A load effects, where G, Q, E, and A = 
permanent, operational, environmental and load effects respectively. 
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Figure 3.3 depicts the limit state design methodology used in the Canadian Code 
[2]. The safety class factory is given in Table 3.1 and Table 3.2 and partial load factor aG, 
aQ, aE, a A in Table 3.3 . The resistance factor ¢is given in Table 3 .4. The safety class 
factor can vary along the length of the pipeline. Figure 3.4 is a possible relationship 
between the safety class factor, human exposure and target values of annual reliability 
[2]. 
Table 3.1: Safety Class [1] 
Table 3.2: Safety class factors for ultimate limit states [2] 
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Select desim loads 
Select load factors 
Calculated factored desi2:n load 
Conduct analvsis 
Calculate sectional stresses 
and strain 
Check limit states 
Class 
.~~ 
A 
Figure 3.3: LSD method [2] 
Table 3.3: Load factor values [2] 
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Table 3.4: Resistance factor [1] 
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Figure 3.4: Safety class factor related to target annual reliability [2] 
3.3.2 Part II: Risk Estimation 
Assessment of Structural Failure Probability (P_j): The distribution of stresses, 
strains, or any other kind of displacements in the pipeline should be determined from 
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principles of statics, dynamics, or kinematics. The selection of a model (elastic or plastic 
analysis) should be based on specified material properties and material behaviors. In 
many design situations the primary load is the internal pressure and the other loads are 
considered secondary load. The elastic analysis therefore, may be conservative, as it does 
not recognize the ability of the pipe to plastically deform and still maintain pressure 
integrity. A plastic design approach does recognize such behaviors, and can therefore be 
used to get an advantage. The analysis also should consider the restraint boundary 
conditions if available in an axial or lateral direction. 
Consequence Analysis (C;): the consequence analysis is concerned to see the 
severity of adverse effects of accident on people, property, the environment, or 
combination of thereof. Consequence analyses predict the magnitude of the effects 
resulting from release of toxic or flammable fluids and disruption of pipeline throughput. 
Risk Estimation: risk estimation involves combining the results of frequency and 
consequence analysis to produce a measure of risk. The risk associated with a pipeline 
failure can be expressed as: 
Risk= PI X c / 
where R is the annual risk, P1 is the annual failure probability considering all causes, and 
CJ is a measure of the consequences of failure. A risk matrix may be constructed as given in 
based on the calculated probability of failure and consequence. 
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Significant 
Action: Refine analysis/evaluate 
options/implement action 
Less Significant 
Action: Refine analysis/consider 
options 
D Not Signilicant Action: Monitor/Control 
Figure 3.5: Sample Risk Matrix 
3.3.3 Part III: Component Risk Evaluation 
Risk analysis provides the most consistent and rational basis for selecting target 
reliability levels, based on criteria such as economic optimization, safety, and 
environmental protection. On the basis of probability and consequence analyses, a target 
reliability can be selected either to meet a predetermined acceptable risk level or to 
optimize the total cost considering the cost of failure. The details of economic 
optimization, life safety, and environmental protection may be consulted from 
Zimmerman et. al. [ l ] and references [8,9]. Zimmerman et. al. [ 1] recommend the 
following steps for risk evaluation 
Consequence optimization. This includes the initial cost associated with a given 
level of reliability and the expected cost of possible failures. An optimum value of the 
failure probability is determined by minimizing the total expected loss. 
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Fixed cost versus benefit ratio. This is a cost benefit ratio approach where the 
incremental cost and incremental reduction of failure probability are considered. Thus the 
reliability level is selected based on an acceptable cost-benefit ratio. 
Fixed risk level. This approach is based on acceptable level of risk which can be 
determined by following the acceptability guidelines, or by calculating the societal risks 
that are acceptable. For example, by examining the risk related to the failure of other 
structures, the acceptable level of life risk associated with pipeline failures can be 
reasonably established. 
The best choice among these methods depends on the criteria used to measure 
consequences. For instance, consequence optimization can be used when the analysis is 
carried out in economic terms. On the other hand, a fixed risk level may be more suitable 
for the analysis of safety. If the estimated Risk =PI x C l is not convincing, the process 
parameters (D, t, and r7 for pipeline) may be revised to meet the target safety level. 
3.3.4 Part IV: Detailed Design 
Up to this point the methodology calculates risk for a single mode of failure. 
Like- wise the risk for all modes of failure will be determined to calculate combined risk. 
Once the risks for all failure modes are evaluated, FT A will be considered to calculate 
system risk. Thus, unified risk will be minimized for individual components by achieving 
the target safety level of the system. 
If the designer is not satisfied with the system risk overall, the next option is to 
review the process component parameters. Find the most detrimental risk component 
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responsible for system risk. Change the design parameters. If the designer is convinced 
with the revised overall risk, the next task is to go for detailed design. 
It might be noted that the risk-based design methodology is applicable for both 
onshore and offshore pipeline design with careful consideration of local environmental 
condition, pipeline steel material, loading condition etc. For example, in SCC analysis, 
the local pH at the soil determines whether the pipeline is subjected to transgranular 
stress corrosion cracking (SCC) or intergranular SCC. High strength low alloy (HSLA) 
steel might be more susceptible to SCC compared to carbon steel. 
3.4 Algorithm of Risk-Based Design 
The algorithm is based on the framework developed in Figure. 3.1 
Stepl: generate a random variable considering distribution and characteristics 
values with the required confidence level for both load and resistance. 
Step2: construct the limit state such as Z = g(R,S) = R - S for load and 
resistance and calculate the probability of failure usmg the equations fJ = f.lz and 
O'z 
p I = 1- ~(fJ). The mean and standard deviation will be calculated usmg FOSM, 
AFOSM or the SORM method whichever is applicable 
Step3: Apply Monte Carlo simulation to calculate probability of failure which is 
calculated with a probabilistic approach. 
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Step4: Calculate risk using the equation, Risk = pf X c f 
StepS: If risk is high, review design parameters of the component and recalculate 
the risk. 
Step6: Up to this step, this is a component design for a specific mode of failure. 
Now, likewise calculate all other modes of failure. 
Step7: Integrate the failure modes using FTA with the necessary correlation 
between the failure modes. If there is no correlation, assume independent failure modes. 
Find a single probability of failure for a process system. 
StepS: If risk is not acceptable find the most detrimental failure modes and adjust 
the design parameters of the respective component. Continue the iterative procedure until 
the target safety level is reached. The specified design parameters at this stage where the 
target safety level is meet, will be used for final design and construction. 
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Chapter 4 
Probability Assessment of Burst Limit State Due to Internal 
Corrosion* 
Preface 
This chapter provides an extensive revtew of recommended burst models of 
codes/standards. The internal corrosion defect is characterized and fai lure probability is 
assessed. A version of this manuscript has been published in international Journal of 
Pressure Vessels and Piping. 
The co-authors, Dr Khan and Dr. Kenny supervised the principal author, Hasan, 
to develop the research on the entitled topic. The principal author identified theories and 
techniques available on this topic. The principal author conducted failure analysis and 
analyzed relative conservatism of the recommended models. The co-authors reviewed the 
manuscript and provided necessary suggestions and comments to improve the quality of 
the manuscript. 
*this paper has been published in International Journal of Pressure Vessels and Piping; the 
reference is provided below. 
Hasan, M., Khan, F., Kenny, S., (2012). Probability Assessment of Burst Limit State Due to 
Internal Corrosion, International Journal of Pressure Vessels and Piping 89 (201 2) pp 48-58 
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Abstract: 
The failure probability of an oil and gas pipeline, with longitudinally oriented 
internal corrosion defects, due to burst from internal operating pressure, can be estimated 
through characterization of defect geometry, internal corrosion growth rate, and 
remaining mechanical hoop strength capacity. A number of candidate models to estimate 
the corrosion defect depth growth rate were evaluated. Defining a corrosion defect length, 
the corrosion feature geometry was integrated within burst pressure models, which have 
been adopted by oil and gas industry standards, codes and recommended practices. On 
this basis the burst pressure failure probability of a pipeline with internal corrosion 
defects can be estimated. A comparative analysis of pipe burst limit states and failure 
estimates was conducted, using Monte Carlo simulation and First Order Second Moment 
(FOSM) methods. Results from the comparative analysis closely matched and 
demonstrated consistent trends. Based on the probabilistic assessment, the relative 
conservatism between burst pressure models was analyzed and recommendations 
provided to assist designers in model selection. 
Key words: Internal corrosion, First Order Second Moment, Monte Carlo, Probability of 
failure, limit state function etc. 
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Nomenclature 
uu specified minimum tensile strength ofpipe material, SMTS 
uy specified minimum yi~ld strength of pipe material, SMYS 
f1hip hoop stress of intact pipe -
Uxip axial stress of intact pipe 
Uhdp hoop stress of defected pipe 
C!f flow stress 
D outside diameter of pipeline 
t thickness of pipeline 
l length of internal corrosion defect 
lc characteristic length of internal corrosion defect 
d depth of internal corrosion defect 
de critical defect depth of internal corrosion defect considered for Kale et al [11] 
c width of internal corrosion defect 
F design factor 
P internal pressure 
P yip yield pressure of defect free intact pipe 
Pbdp burst pressure of defected pipe 
Pop operating pressure , 
Ac actuallongitudinalcorroded area 
Ao original area 
M - Folias factor/stress concentration factor· 
da/dt internal corrosion rate mm/yr 
Chapter 4: Probability Assessment of Burst Limit State Due to Internal Corrosion 
4.1 Background 
The production and transportation of hydrocarbon from offshore facilities involves 
a complex process system. The components in such a process system are exposed to 
extreme operating and environmental conditions. Therefore, proper identification of risk 
sources, quantification of their magnitude, and incorporation of risk in the designing of 
the process component are necessary to improve operations and maintenance practices, 
and to mitigate the frequency of catastrophic system failures. 
A research program is currently developing a risk-based design framework for a 
process system. Part of the work scope is to collate available engineering models defining 
time dependent failure mechanisms (e.g. internal corrosion, external corrosion, stress 
corrosion cracking, fatigue) and to conduct a deterministic and probabilistic failure 
assessment of pipeline. The conceptual risk-based design framework is summarized in 
Figure 4 .1. In Figure 4.1 risk, rather than reliability, is optimized in a process system. 
The risk estimate for different failure scenarios will be integrated using fault tree analysis 
to obtain the overall risk of the process system. The unified risk will be minimized to 
design individual components and thus achieve the system target safety level. 
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If required suitable mode of 
equivalent load transfonnation 
from force (V IV, wave etc) 
; Definition o f loading Bas ic 
1 variables and statistical l properties 
i ........ .. ~·-············· · ······················ ·········· ... ·······: ............. 1 
resistance 
in LS equation 
Risk Estimation 
Risk Evaluation 
Detail design 
Figure 4.1: Risk based design methodology 
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Pipe wall thinning due to internal corrosion mechanisms and loss of pressure 
containment function due to burst (i.e. leak or rupture) are significant operational hazards 
for pipelines. This study is focused on estimating the probability of pipe failure due to 
burst associated with internal corrosion mechanisms. There exist a number of engineering 
models characterizing defect geometry, defect evolution and growth rate, significance of 
defects on local stress concentrations, and strength reduction for pressure containment. 
For model selection, the question remains with respect to data and model uncertainty, and 
utility with respect to practical application. For example, Law and Bowie [ 1] examined a 
number of engineering models predicting pipe burst limits for defect-free pipe with high 
yield-to-tensile strength ratio material. The study found significant scatter in comparison 
with experimental data and identified several candidate models for predicting failure 
pressure but no reliable methods for predicting failure strain. One of the key factors was 
variation in the reference stress calculations assumed in each model. Uncertainty in 
existing models, which may be conservative or exhibit significant scatter, in addressing 
failure pressure and pipe burst for higher grade materials has also been identified [2]. The 
analysis presented in this paper illustrates that there exists a variability in the burst 
pressure prediction for a pipeline having the same defect geometry and material 
properties. Since accurate prediction of remaining strength is crucial in the engineering 
integrity assessment of pipelines, there should exist consistency among the models [3] in 
predicting the remaining strength. 
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This study investigates the suitability of available internal corrosion models and 
pipe burst models, as adopted by codes, standards or recommended industry practice, to 
answer these questions and address these issues within a risk based framework. This 
paper focuses on internal corrosion defect models for low grade (X65) ductile pipe 
material and examines the failure probabilities due to the pipe burst mechanism. Similar 
studies have been conducted examining other materials (i.e. AISI 1020 mild steel) while 
focusing on a single code of practice [ 4]. 
4.2 Internal Corrosion 
Subsea pipelines provide an efficient, safe and reliable mode of transportation of 
hydrocarbons. The transmitting product may carry corrosive elements such as water, 
carbon dioxide, hydrogen sulfide and sulphate reducing bacteria. The growth of corrosion 
defects in a pipeline is time dependent and hence may become a potential threat to 
pipeline integrity as the pipeline ages. The knowledge of the remaining pipeline strength 
for hoop pressure containment is required to assess the safe mode of operation of the 
transmitting fluid. Several engineering models have been developed to calculate the 
remaining pipeline hoop strength. These models have been developed through physical 
testing or numerical simulation [5,6]. 
Internal corrosion initiates defects which may be distributed in the radial, 
circumferential and axial directions. In general the internal corrosion defect is defined by 
length (/) and depth (d) as these represents the worst case scenario with respect to the 
applied hoop stress. The circumferential extent of the defect geometry has been typically 
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ignored. The defect profile IS generally idealized rectangular or parabolic geometric 
shapes [7 -1 0]. 
4.2.1 Pressure Calculation of Defect Free Pipe 
Consider a defect free circular pipe as specified by Figure 4.2. Depending on the 
Dlt ratio, the pipe may be generally classified as either thin walled (0/t ;:::: 20) or thick 
walled pipe. Considering the effect of internal pressure P (ignoring the external pressure 
effect), the Barlow's equation calculates tangential or hoop stress a hip as: 
PD 
a = -
!tip 2t 
Inhibitor 
I~ D ~I 
I 000 km pipeline 
length 
Figure 4.2: Force equilibrium in a pressurized thin pipe 
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If ah;p is replaced by yield strength rry and a factor F is introduced, then the yield pressure 
for a defect free intact pipe (Pyip) is 
2ai p =--F 
y ip D (4.2) 
This ts the burst pressure equation for an intact ptpe (defect free) that is 
considered by most of the codes, standards [7 -9] and models [1 0-11] with some minor 
adjustment. The value of F is adjusted to the design condition. For example, ASME 
B31 G [9] assumes the value ofF is 1.1, whereas DNV RP-Fl 01 [8] assigns different 
values to F in relation to the safety class or design condition. It also considers ultimate 
strength instead of yield strength for intact pipe burst approximation, or in other words, 
flow stress approximation, of intact pipe. 
4.2.2 Pressure Calculation for Defected Pipe 
The strength of a pipeline deteriorates due to corrosion damage, and generally a 
pipeline becomes weaker with increasing age. Hence, the remaining strength of the 
pipeline needs to be estimated by adopting a suitable method. 
Kiefner et al. and Shannon [12-13] have developed the following semi empirical 
model to calculate the remaining strength. This is the basic approach considered by most 
international codes and standards. For a longitudinally oriented corrosion defect, the 
remaining hoop stress at failure ( a"dp )can be estimated by 
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(4.3) 
The bracketed term can be considered a strength reduction factor that accounts for 
the reduction in the pipe steel area available to resist internal pressure and the stress 
concentration or Folias factor (M). The corroded area can be approximated by parabola 
~ _ (2 13)/D _ 2d 
lt 3t 
(4.4) 
and the Folias factor defined as 
(4.5) 
The burst pressure of a defected pipe is therefore 
1- Ac 
2t ~rtp = CY" rtp D = CYI A0 2t 1 -~ D 
(4.6) 
AOM 
The flow stress ( CYI ) is usually expressed in specified minimum yield stress times 
the design factor F; such as 1.1 times SMYS. Fabrication processes, material ageing and 
corrosion fatigue mechanisms can influence the flow stress. 
In this paper, an approach has been developed that calculates the burst pressure 
for internal corrosion considering the rectangular and parabolic shaped defect ( l x d ) and 
the corresponding failure probability of the pipeline, using available codes and standards 
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[7 -9] and models [ 10-11, 14). Among the engineering models considered in the present 
study, the RAM PIPE [11] models and Kale et al. [14] models account for the defect 
depth (d) only. 
4.2.3 Corrosion Rate Equation 
Corrosion in the pipeline occurs with the initiation of individual pits or colonies 
of pits, or in general wall thickness reduction. Figure 4.3 shows a single, longitudinally 
oriented, rectangular shaped internal corrosion defect. This type of defect occurs at a 
discrete location and is discontinuous throughout the pipeline length. 
l 
d 
L l 
d 
Figure 4.3: A simplified internally corroded surface flaw in a pipeline 
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4.2.3.1 Depth of Defect (d) 
Different mathematical models for C02 corrosion are used by engineers in the oil 
and gas industry [15]. The NORSOK-model [16] was considered by Gartland et al. [17] 
for internal corrosion rate estimation. Three candidate corrosion rate models were 
considered by Kale et al. [14] including the de Waard-Millams Equation [18], de Waard-
Lotz Equation [19] and SwRI [14] equation The first two equations were found to 
provide comparatively higher corrosion rates with lower correlation with data. Therefore, 
the third equation, developed by SwRI, is considered for rate estimation. 
mm/year (4.7) 
(4.8) 
In Equation (4.7), pC02 is the partial pressure of carbon dioxide in the mixture, 
pH2S is the partial pressure of hydrogen sulfide in the mixture, 0 2 is the concentration of 
oxygen in parts per million, k is the modeling error, and C1 is the inhibitor correction 
factor given by Equation (8). Since the inhibitor's effect diminishes with the pipeline 
length (L), the inhibitor correction factor (C1) uses an exponential model along the 
pipeline length. In Equation (4.8), A is the model parameter, Lis the pipeline length and 
L0 is the characteristic length (hence L 0 = 1000 km) to describe the effect of the inhibitor. 
d d 
The depth of defect (d) to wall thickness (t) ratio, - , and Std of - are presented in 
t t 
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Figure 4.4, which describes the corrosion profile for the l 000 km pipeline length with the 
assumption of no velocity change, and no elevation change or other factors where 
preferential corrosion may occur in the pipeline route. The inhibitor effect is considered 
at the inlet and no other inhibitor injector was considered throughout the remaining 
pipeline length. Table 4.1 presents random variables with probabilistic data responsible 
for internal corrosion in a demonstrative pipeline scenario. The depth of defect (d) was 
calculated considering corrosion rate, da/dt, times T, a 20 years design life in this study. 
2.4E-01 
2 .2E-01 
2.0E-01 • (d/t) • 
1.8E-01 
1.6E-01 
i 1.4E-01 
0 1.2E-01 U5 
~ 1.0E-01 
~ S.OE-02 
60E-02 
4.0E-02 
2.0E-02 
O.OE+OO 
0 200 400 600 800 1000 
Pipeline length, 1000 km 
Figure 4.4: Increasing defect depth profile (injector's effect) over 1000 km pipeline 
length 
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Table 4.1: Probabilistic data for the random variable- depth of defect (d) 
(wet gas pipeline corrosion growth parameters) (partly [14]) 
Variables %Co2 02(pprn) pH . %H2S K, corrosion A, Inhibitor , 
(mole) (mole) model error factor 
TYIJ.e Lognormal Lognormal Lognormal Lognormal Lognormal Lognormal 
· ~ 4. . ,4800 55,. . 0.05 .. - 1.0 1.0 .. . ,,, .. ::... .. , 
CoY 0.25 0.30 0.18 0.08 0.5 0.5 
4.2.3.2 Length of Defect 
The defect depth (d) for internal corrosiOn was estimated considering model 
parameters i.e, %pC02 , %pH2S etc. However, this kind of model, which considers model 
parameters i.e, %pC02, %pH2S etc. is not available for defect length (l) estimation. In fact 
corrosion measurements revealed that there is no correlation between the depth of defect 
(d) and length of defect(!); instead it's observed that for a given depth of defect (d) there 
is a range of associated length of defect (l) [20]. For example, for a depth of 20% wall 
thickness, the length varied (l) from 8 to 608 mm. However, Zimmerman et al [21] 
suggested corrosion defect length (l) can be assumed by Weibull distribution with a CoY 
of 0.50. The CoY 0.50 means the shape parameter (/3') of Weibull is 2.1. The scale 
parameter (B) was calculated considering Equat ion (4.9). The calculation considered 
cumulative distribution F(/)=0.90 and characteristic length (/c) as 80% of the diameter of 
the pipeline. The mean defect length thus evaluated is 340 mm, which represents the 
defect length after the design life, T=20 years. Table 4.2 shows the probabilistic data for 
the defect length (l) 
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(
' ) /}. a 
P(l 2 !J = 1- F(l) = e - 0 = f f(l)dl (4.9) 
I, 
Table 4.2: Probabilistic data for the random variable- length of defect (I) 
Variables 
Iype 
Jl 
CoY 
4.3 Burst Models and Standards 
Weibull 
340 ·, 
0.50 
The pipeline burst pressure IS considered as the remammg strength or the 
resistance in the limit state analysis. The burst pressure calculations are discussed in the 
following subsections. It may be noted that the burst pressure models and standards are 
based on closed end conditions and the hoop stress that governs the bursting process. The 
axial, radial or combined loads such as thermal or bending load are not considered in this 
study. The notations (burst pressure of defected pipe, yield pressure of defect free intact 
pipe etc.) are kept the same in this paper as originally developed and presented in the 
corresponding references. The notations for defect length are specified by l in some codes 
and standards [7, 1 OJ, whereas others [8, 9] specify this parameter by L. 
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4.3.1 CSA Z662-07 [71 
For large leaks and ruptures, the limit state function g2 for plastic collapse at a 
surface corrosion defect with a total axial length (l) in mm, and average defect depth da 
(in mm) is given by CSA Z662-07 [7] standard 
( 4.1 0) 
where ra = the estimated pressure resistance including model error, in MPa 
rc = the calculated pressure resistance, MPa 
= [ 1 -~ ] ro d 
, _ _ a_ 
m x t 
r 0 = the pressure resistance for perfect pipe, MPa 
= 1.8 to-, for SMYS > 241 MPa 
D 
to-
=2.3-y for SMYS < 241 MPa D -
( 4.11) 
( 4.12) 
(4.13) 
SMYS=Specified Minimum Yield Strength and da= d , the depth of defect 
m = the Folias factor 
/ 2 / 4 
1 + 0.6275---0.003375 2 2 for l
2/Dt<=50 
D x t D x t 
= 0.032~ + 3.3 for l2/Dt>50 
D x t 
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e1 = a deterministic multiplicative model error term that equals 1.04 
e2 = an additive model error term, defined by a normally distributed random variable 
with a mean of -0.00056 and a standard deviation of0.001469 
e3 = a deterministic multiplicative model error term that equals 1.17 
e4 = an additive model error term, defined by a normally distributed random variable 
with a mean of -0.007655 and standard deviation of0.006506 
4.3.2 DNV RP-FlOl [8] 
In DNV-RP-F101 [8], the maximum operating pressure for a pipeline with a 
corrosion defect is given by 
(4.15) 
where (d ! t)* =(d ! t)meas + Brl .StD[d ! t] ( 4.16) 
,----.,.----:- 2 
Q = 1 + 0 .3{~) ( 4.17) 
In this study, Ym = 0.77 (as per Table 3.2 of DNV-RP-F101 [8], for normal safety 
class and absolute value), Yc1 = (1 +4.6a-13.9a2) where a is the standard deviation, 
StD(d/t), L is the length of the defect and ecf is considered according to the guideline of 
Table 3.7 ofDNV-RP-F101 [5] , and SMTS is the Specified Minimum Tensile Strength. 
80 
Chapter4: Probability Assessment of Burst Limit State Due to Internal Corrosion 
It may be noted that DNV-RP-FIOI [8] developed two equations for burst 
estimation: one for allowable maximum operating pressure and the other for capacity 
estimation considering the rectangular defect. The capacity equations were not 
demonstrated here, but were considered in the analysis. It may be noted that allowable 
maximum operating pressure is referred as DNV-RP-FIOI MOP [8] and capacity 
pressure is referred to DNV-RP-FIOI CP [8]. In reality DNV-RP-FIOI MOP [8] is more 
conservative than DNV-RP-FIOI CP [8]. 
4.3.3 ASME B31G [9] 
Among the existing criteria for evaluating the residual strength of corroded 
pipeline, the ASME B31 G [9] code is still the most widely used criterion. Kiefner et al. 
[22, 23] recognized that the ASME B31 G [9] code could be too conservative for some 
kinds of defects. They modified the code to develop what is known as the 0.85 dL 
method. Like the original, the defect length and the defect depth are the only parameters 
required to define the defect. 
The burst pressure defined by ASME B31 G [9] is 
P. BJ IG = 2t (t.la { 1- (2 I 3)(d I t) ] 
b D yl1-(2 13)(d l t)M -1 ( 4.18) 
where M = l + O.s(~)\ ~) ( 4.19) 
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4.3.4 Netto et al. [10] Model 
Netto et al. [10] developed a burst pressure equation for external corrosiOn 
considering the depth of defect, length of defect, width of corrosion, pipeline wall 
thickness and pipeline diameter. The effect of external corrosion defects was investigated 
through a series of small-scale experiments using non-linear numerical models based on 
the finite element method. The experimental and numerical results were then used to 
calibrate their equation. The burst pressure for defected pipe Equation (4.20) was 
developed with limiting conditions of corrosion defect depth to wall thickness ratio (0.1 :S 
dlt :s 0.8). 
pb (d)I.6 ( 1 )oA 
- = l-0.9435- -
Pbi t D 
l.!ay 2t 
where P.b. = -----'-----
' D 
4.3.5 RAM PIPE REQUAL [11] 
(4.20) 
( 4.21) 
The Pipeline Requalification Guidelines Project [11] developed an equation for 
burst pressure as 
SMTS 
pb = 2.2(t - d)( ) D - t x SCF (4.22) 
SCF = 1 + 2~ (4.23) 
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where SMTS is the Specified Minimum Tensile Strength and SCF is the Stress 
Concentration Factor. The burst Equation ( 4.22) does not consider the corrosion defect 
length. This may be a significant issue where aspect ratio plays an important role in 
biaxial stress states. 
4.3.6 Kale et al. [14] Model 
The Kale et al. [14] model describes a methodology for predicting the location of 
internal corrosion damage in gas pipelines considering uncertainties in flow 
characteristics, pre-existing conditions, corrosion resistance, elevation data, and test 
measurements. The prediction is then updated using Bayesian techniques based on 
inspection data. The approach computes the probability of critical corrosion damage as a 
function of location along the pipeline length. This procedure helps to focus the location 
of the most probable excavation spot with higher probability of corrosion damage along 
the pipeline length. The Kale et al. [14] model used three candidate corrosion models. A 
weight factor for probability calculation, starting with W 1=W2=W3=0.3333 is used, and 
later the model is adjusted with Bayesian updating techniques using the inspection data. 
However, in this study, only the SwRI equation will be considered to study the Kale et al. 
[14] model. The core concept of the model is whether the defect depth (d) exceeds the 
critical defect depth (de). The critical defect depth (de) was considered as 80% of wall 
thickness (t) in their model. This is not a burst model but rather a model defining the 
probability of defect depth exceeding the critical defect depth. 
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4.4 Failure Model 
The RAM PIPE [11] and Kale et al. [14] models do not account for the corrosion 
defect length ([)but they consider defect depth (d). Other models evaluated in this study 
considered both the defect depth (d) and defect length ([). The main assumptions for the 
analysis conducted in this study are: 
1. Burst pressure equations for external corrosion defects developed by codes and 
standards [ 10, 11 , 12] and individual models [ 10, 11] are considered to be valid 
for the effects of internal corrosion defects. 
2. The rate of corrosion only affects the corrosion defect depth (d). The defect length 
([) is not directly correlated with defect depth (d). Uniform corrosion was 
considered for defect depth (d) evaluation. 
3. The length of defect([) is assumed to be the same as Weibull distribution with a 
CoV of 0.50 over the pipeline length. The inhibitor effect on defect length([) as 
compared to defect depth (d) is considered negligible. 
4. The corrosion defect (I x d) is assumed to have the length ([) oriented on the 
longitudinal axis (axial direction) and depth (d) through the wall thickness (radial 
direction). The circumferentially oriented corrosion defect width (c) is not 
considered in this study. 
5. In this study, the minimum value of reliability index, fJ is assumed to be zero, 
fJ=O. The minimum value could be negative, but is not logically correct. 
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6. The probability of failure of an internally corroded pipe was calculated using the 
burst pressure and operating pressure in the limit state equation considering 
Equations ( 4.24) and ( 4.25 ). Data was generated by the SwRI corrosion model 
equation, Equation (4.7), for defect depth (d) and Equation (4.9), for defect length 
([) . . 
The limit state function for internally corroded pipelines can be written as follows: 
g(X) = ~dp- p op (4.24) 
where P brtp is the burst pressure of the defected pipe, and P op is the operating 
pressure. The burst pressure of defected pipe, P bdp, is considered as the resistance, and the 
operating pressure, P op, is considered as the load in the limit state function defined by 
Equation ( 4.24). The burst pressure of the defected pipe, P bdp, can be calculated from the 
respective models as discussed in Section 4.3 . It may be noted that Equation (1 0) of CSA 
Z662-07 [7] standard is similar to Equation ( 4.24), which is the generalized limit state 
function considered for all codes and standards and models (except for the Kale et al. [14] 
model) where g 2 is g(X), ra is P brtp and Pis P,P in Equation ( 4.24). 
The reliability index fJ may be obtained from load and resistance variables. Hence, 
in this case 
(4.25) 
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Using this equation reliability index, f3 may be calculated for any code and 
standard except the Kale et al. [14] model. 
The Kale et al. [14] model does not explicitly define pipe burst limit state function 
as stated in Equation (4.24). For this study the limit state function can be defined as: 
(4.26) 
where de= 80% of wall thickness (t), and (d) is the defect depth. Using the limit 
state equation, Equation ( 4.26 ), one can now determine reliability index, ~' for the Kale et 
al. [14] model considering Equation (4.27). Thus 
(4.27) 
In this study, it was assumed that the defect depth (d) exceeding critical depth (de) 
is eventually a failure state. Once the reliability index, /3, is calculated for any selected 
model, the failure probability (P1) can be calculated using Equation ( 4.28) 
(4.28) 
One can calculate the risk (R) if the consequence (C) is known for a specific 
material and specific location considering Equation (4.29). 
(4.29) 
A flow chart of calculation procedure is shown in Figure 4.5 . 
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Data generated for defect depth (d) and defect length 
(f) 
Data infused to· codes/standards and individual 
models [7-11, 14] to find the remaining strength 
Development of performance function considering 
operating pressure (Pop) and remaining strength (Pbdp) 
FOSM/MC Simulation 
Reliability l ndex p, probability offailure P1and risk R 
estimation 
Figure 4.5: The flow chart depicts the calculation procedure followed in this study 
4.5 Failure Analysis 
The failure analysis was carried out using the generalized limit state equation, 
Equation (4.24), for the candidate models selected [7-11] except the Kale et al. [14] 
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model. For the failure analysis of the Kale et al. [14J model the limit state equation, 
Equation (4.26) was used. It may be noted that Equation (4.24) is a burst limit state, 
which considers burst pressure (Pbdp) and operating pressure (Pop), whereas Equation 
( 4.26) is a defect depth limit state which considers defect depth (d) and critical defect 
depth (de). The calculation proceeds with follow up equations, Equations ( 4.25) and 
(4.27) to further calculate the reliability index, fJ. Equations (4.28) and (4.29) can be used 
to calculate probability of failure (P1) and to estimate the risk (R) at a specific location 
and for a specific material if consequence (C) is known. 
For example, the Netto et al. [1 OJ model can be considered to calculate the 
probability of failure. The burst pressure is now represented by Equation ( 4.30), which 
considers the basic variables presented in Table 4 .1 (for defect depth (d)), Table 4 .2 (for 
defect length (l)) and Table 4.3 (for diameter (D), thickness (t) and SMYS (O'y) or SMTS 
(0'11)). This burst pressure is used by the limit state equation, Equation (4.24). The new 
burst limit state Equation ( 4.31) was derived for the Netto et al. [ 1 OJ model from 
Equation (4.24). 
(
l.la- 2t) ~dp = ~ = ; [1- 0.9435(d I t )'6 (11 D )04 J (4.30) 
Table 4.3: Probabilistic models of the basic variables for material- API 5L X 65 
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The limit state function for the Netto et al. [7] model is 
[
l.lcr 2t] g(X) = ; [1- 0.9435(d I t )'6 (l ! D )04 ]- Pop ( 4.31) 
In Equation ( 4.31 ), all the parameters are available in Tables 4.2 and 4.3 except 
the defect depth (d). The defect depth (d) is calculated considering probabilistic data 
provided in Table 4.1 and considering the SwRI equation, Equation ( 4. 7). The procedure 
specified above is the same for all candidate models examined [7 -11] except the Kale et 
al. [14] model. The probability of failure (P1) can be calculated considering Equ ation 
(4.25) and (4.28) by the FOSM method. The failure function g(), Equation (4.24), may be 
considered for the direct evaluation of the probability of failure (P1) by the Monte Carlo 
method. 
The Kale et al [14] model considers Equation (4.26) for the limit state analysis. In 
their analysis, Kale et al. [14] have assumed the critical depth, (de), is 80% of wall 
thickness for oil and gas pipelines. Equation (4.27) was used to calculate the probability 
of failure for internal corrosion for the Kale et al [ 14] model. 
In Table 4.3, the mean value of operating pressure (Pop) was calculated from the 
characteristic operating pressure (pcop), which again was calculated from yield pressure 
(Py;p) of defect free intact pipe. The characteristic operating pressure (pcop) was 
considered as 72% of the yield pressure (Py;p). The characteristic values for load (Pop) 
were calculated considering the EURO Code EN 1990 [24] recommendation that the 
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characteristic values should correspond to a 95% upper and 5% lower value respectively 
for load and resistance variables. 
2 X 448 X 20.24 
Therefore, Pcop = P .P x 0. 72 = x 1.1 x 0. 72 = 20.14 MPa ~ 713 
The characteristic value of operating pressure (Pcop) was considered to calculate 
the Gumbel mean and standard deviation. It may be noted that operating pressure can be 
characterized by Gumbel distribution as per the CSA 2662-07 [7] recommendation. 
Equations (4.32) to (4.35) were considered to calculate Gumbel parameters. 
F (p ) = expl- e -aop (Pcop - 11,1' ) J 
pop cop (4.32) 
(4.33) 
(4.34) 
0.5772 (4.35) uop = Jl P,,p -
where 11 """ is the Gumble mean, a P,," is the Gumble standard deviation and Pop is 
the operating pressure, considered as an extreme random variable. The parameters Uop and 
a0p are related to the Gumbel mean and standard deviation. 
C02 partial pressure is calculated from the mole fraction (%C02) presented in 
Table 4.1 and operating pressure (Pop) presented in Table 4.3: 
pCOz = pop X %C02 X 1 o-s bar 
where Pop is in MPa. The partial pressure ofH2S is also calculated in the same manner. 
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4.6 Results and Discussion 
The probabilities of failure of different candidate models were calculated and 
assessed. A pipeline length of 1000 km was considered in the analysis with a single 
inhibitor injector at the inlet. The material considered API 5L X65 for design. The 
analysis used First Order Second Moment (FOSM) and Monte Carlo (MC) simulation 
methods. The results are presented in figure 4.6 for the FOSM method. 
The simulated results by FOSM and Monte Carlo have been compared and it was 
found that they closely match with one another at the tail end of the pipeline length. The 
results are presented in Table 4.4. 
Examination of the failure probability (P1 ) calculated by using different candidate 
models, as illustrated in Figure 4.6 and summarized Table 4.4, indicates a gap or 
discrepancy. RAM PIPE [11] and DNV RP-F101 MOP [8] calculate greater failure 
probability than other models including CSA Z662-07 [7] , ASME B31 G [9] , Netto et al. 
[10] and Kale et al. [14]. It may be noted that in Figure 4.6, DNV RP-F101 MOP [8] 
refers to the failure probability for the allowable maximum operating pressure equation, 
whereas DNV RP-F101 CP [8] refers to the failure probability for the capacity pressure 
equation. There is a significant difference in the estimation of probability of failure: DNV 
RP-F101 CP [8] calculates in the range of 10-6, whereas DNV RP-F101 MOP [8] 
calculates in the range of 10-2 . It may be noted that the DNV RP-F101 MOP [8] equation 
is not a capacity equation like the DNV RP-F1 01 CP [8] equation; rather it is the 
maximum allowable operating pressure equation. 
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Figure 4.6: Failure probability P1 for different standards and models using burst and 
critical depth in the limit state equation a) normal graph b) Semi-logarithmic graph 
excluding Kale et al. [ 14] 
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Table 4.4: Results obtained for different codes/standards 
Codes/Standard FOSM Monte Carlo 
Pr ~ PI ~ 
Kale etal. [14] 1.4*10·lM - - -
DNV RP-F101 CP [8] 3.1 *10-o 4 .51 2.0*10-J 4.10 
Netto eta!. [10] 1.4*10-4 3.63 3.0*10-) 4.01 
ASMEB31G [9] 4.8*10-4 3.29 7.5*10-4 3.17 
CSA Z662-07 [7] .... . ; .... 4.2*10-J .. 2.63 I· .. 2.4*10-J .. .... 2.82 , .. 
DNV RP-F101 MOP [8] 2.7*1o·- 1.92 1.8*10-l 2.09 
RAM PIPE [11] 3.4*10-- 1.82 3.17*1o·• 1.85 
The failure probability estimate for ASME B31 G [9] and Netto et al. [1 0] 
models are consistent and exhibit limited relative variations along the pipeline length. 
Netto et al. [10] concluded that ASME B31G [9] and DNV RP-F101 [8] are conservative 
models, which is consistent with the findings of this study. The analysis of Netto et al. 
[10] indicated DNV RP-Fl01 MOP [8] failure probability in Figure 4.6, which 
considered maximum operating pressure. It could be more accurate if they compared 
their model with the DNV RP-F1 01 CP [8] burst capacity equation. However, in Figure 
16 of their study they compared the result obtained from Netto et al. [1 0] , ASME B31 G 
[9] and DNV RP-F101 MOP [8] with the experimental result. If the present probabilistic 
study is compared with the Netto et al. [8] study, it can be safely said that the 
codes/models that calculate greater failure probability compared to Netto et al. [8] are 
overly conservative. 
A relative ranking of conservatism in the candidate models is illustrated in 
Figure 4.7, where H denote the load (operating pressure), and F and C denote bursting 
pressure of the RAM PIPE [11] and Netto et al. [10] model, respectively. The remaining 
strength or bursting pressure calculated by RAM PIPE [ 11] model is closest to the load; 
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that's why its failure probability is highest. As Cis far away from H , this is why Nettto et 
al [ 1 0] calculate less failure probability. The other codes/standards in Figure. 4. 7 lie in 
between C and F except DNV RP-FlOl CP [8]. To define over conservative or under 
conservative, the position of A is important, which denotes the experimental remaining 
strength. According to the Netto et al. [10] model the position of Cis below the position 
of A. The position of A denotes the true remaining strength, evaluated by experimental 
study. Again, the results of the present study (Table 4.4) suggest that the location point of 
DNV RP-FIOl CP [8] , B, in Figure. 4.7 must be located closest to A since DNV RP-FlOl 
CP [8] calculates the least failure probability among the burst models. Therefore the 
capacity equation developed by DNV RP-Fl 01 CP [8] can be considered as the best 
estimator of the remaining strength. Finally, it can be stated that the codes and standards 
which calculate less remaining strength than actual (experimental) remaining strength 
(line A) can be assumed as over conservative. The relative position presented in Figure 
4.7 is also supported by the experimental data studied by Freire et al., [25]. In their 
analysis they have demonstrated that ASME B31 [9] is over conservative compared to 
DNV-RP-FlOl CP [8] . A deterministic analysis of remaining strength (burst pressure) for 
different codes and standards in Figure 4.8, shows that the relative conservatism scale 
remains true for 0.15 :.:::; d :.:::; 0.42 . 
t 
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Figure 4.7: Relative position of the codes/standards in 'Conservative Scale' considering 
remaining strength (burst pressure) and operating pressure. 
The conservatism of failure or burst pressure estimated by the codes depends on 
the geometry of the pipe, the geometry of the defect, and the material. Past research 
concentrated on the behavior of sharp defects (machined V -shaped notches and slits), but 
subsequently the work was extended to consider artificial and real corrosion defects. 
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Figure 4.8: A deterministic approach of remaining strength calculation shows that the 
conservatism scale remains true for 0.15<d/t<0.42 
Many fai lure criteria such as ASME B31G [9], DNV-RP-F101 [8], CSA Z662-07 
[7] etc. are originally based on the flow stress dependent fai lure criteria of the NG-18 
equations [26] and have been assumed as plastic collapse failure criteria. In many tests, 
failure was preceded by significant amounts of ductile tearing and some of the steels had 
low toughness. The geometry term was empirical and the flow stress was adjusted to fit 
the test results. This leads to an empirical definition of the flow stress which is 
conservative, since it is biased towards the behavior of older steels [27]. The NG-18[26] 
equations were developed from tests of V -shaped notches, not blunt, part-wall defects. 
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Therefore, many methods for assessing the corrosion based on the NG-18 [26] equations 
have a conservative bias when applied to tests of blunt, part-wall defects. 
Efforts have been made to develop the accuracy of failure criteria by better 
describing the effects of reference stress and geometry. DNV-RP-FlOl [8] have used 
finite element analyses of blunt, part-wall defects to determine the form of the geometry, 
and have considered the form of the reference stress in more detail. The failure criteria 
has been validated against burst tests of modem pipeline steels containing blunt, part-wall 
defects or real corrosion defects. Modem pipeline steels have a higher toughness than 
older steels, so that the failure of blunt part-wall defects is controlled by plastic collapse 
(where plastic collapse is defined in terms of the ultimate tensile strength), and hence the 
scope of toughness can be better accounted in burst models. 
DNV RP-F1 01 MOP [8] has a constraint for the standard deviation of defect 
depth to the wall thickness (StD (dl t)) ratio. When the standard deviation exceeds 0.16, it 
cannot calculate partial safety factor, Jld· For the normal safety class, J'd equals 1 +4. 6a-
13.9a2, where a = StD [dl t]. The analysis confirmed that the standard deviation does not 
exceed the boundary condition within the pipeline design specification for this study for 
the DNV RP-FlOl [8] code. 
The Kale et al. [14] model is not a failure model. Rather, it is a model which 
calculates probability of defect depth (d) exceeding the critical depth, (de). In this study it 
was assumed that defect depth represents a failure state when it exceeds critical depth. 
There is a limitation in this assumption, but for simplicity it is nonetheless assumed in 
this analysis. In their analysis Kale et al. [14] assumed the critical depth is 80% of wall 
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thickness for oil and gas pipelines. The other feature in the Kale et al. [14] model is that, 
this model considers only depth of defect (d), and does not consider the length of defect 
(I). The length of defect (I) has due importance in the failure probability of gas pipelines. 
Another feature in the limit state equation of the Kale et al. [ 14] model is that the 
resistance (critical depth (de)) is constant, and the load (depth of defect (d)) is variable; 
the opposite observation is noticed in other models/standards. 
The sensitivity for internal corrosion can be studied by considering any codes and 
standards. If the function g () is considered for sensitivity analysis, the analysis will 
reveal the parametric affect on the failure function. Gardner et al. [28] recommend simple 
correlation coefficients, derived from Monte Carlo simulations, as a reasonable way to 
rank model parameters. Pearson's product moment correlation coefficient is denoted by r 
and is defined as 
(4.36) 
The CSA Z662 07 [7] and DNV RP FlOl [8] model have been considered for 
sensitivity analyses in this study. The sensitivity, in terms of dimensionless parameters, 
was analyzed ( W = d , X= D , Y = 0'" and Z = _l ) of the failure functions g 
t t O'Y or 0'11 D 
() using the Monte Carlo approach. The analysis considered the data given in Table 4.5 
for the dimensionless parameter in the g() function. The analysis also assumed remaining 
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parameters (other than dimensionless) constant m the failure function. The result IS 
D 
presented in Figure 4.9. The sensitivities for the dimensionless parameter X=- are 
t 
found very insignificant for the codes and standards in Figure 4.9. This suggests that a 
change in either D or t has very little effect on the g() function. The other dimensionless 
cl crh l 
parameters (W =-,Y =---"---andZ =-)are observed to be highly sensitive in 
t cr or cr D y II 
the codes and standards. This means that a small change in W, Y, or Z has a significant 
effect on the failure function g(). Dimensionless parameter Y has the most significant 
effect on the failure function g(). It is followed by Wand Z. The negative values indicate 
the dimensionless parameters inversely affect the failure, g(), function. 
Stress, -0 
CSAZ662 
X=D't, 0 0088 
Z=l/0, -0.1886 
W =d/t, -0 1504 
Y=Hoop 
StressfYield 
Stress, -0.943 
DNVRP F101 
Z=l/0, -0 .21 19 
X=D't , 0 0089 W=d/t, -0.1603 
Figure 4.9: Sensitivity analysis of internal corrosion failure probability considering CSA 
Z662 07 [7] and DNV RP FlOl [8] 
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Table 4.5: Probabilistic models of dimensionless parameters. 
Dimensionless d X=D a . Z=_!_ Parameter W=- Y= ,, t aY or a" D 
Type Lognormal Normal Weibull Weibull 
fl 0.2135 35.22 0.5695 0.4717 
CoV 0.2519 0.0014 0.1077 0.5030 
4. 7 Conclusion 
In this chapter, an approach has been developed and demonstrated to calculate 
the burst pressure of internally corroded pipeline. The burst pressure and operating 
pressure are then used to develop the limit state equation. The failure probability of the 
pipeline was determined by different codes, standards and models, and comparisons were 
made. The results revealed that RAM PIPE [11] and DNV RP~F101 MOP [8] calculate a 
greater failure probability, which is followed by a successive decreasing failure 
probability estimated by CSA Z662-07 [7] , ASME B31G [9], Netto et al. [10], DNV RP-
F1 01 MOP [8] codes and standards and the Kale et al. [14] model. 
The present study observed that the RAM PIPE [11] model calculates the highest 
failure probability; therefore, it can be assumed as the most conservative model. The 
reason for this conservative behavior might be the defect length (l), which was not 
accounted in this model; due importance is only given to defect depth (d). Next to the 
RAM PIPE [11] model, DNV RP-F101 MOP [8] calculates greater failure probability. 
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The reason is that the equation estimates allowable maximum operating pressure, not the 
capacity of the defected pipeline. However, among the burst models, DNV RP-F101 CP 
[8] calculates the least failure probability. This is because of its capacity equation, which 
calculates the maximum remaining strength among all codes and standards. At the same 
time there observed much sophistication in the DNV RP-F I 01 CP [8] equation and it has 
been validated by extensive finite element analysis and experimental full scale burst test 
results. The study also supports the claim of Cosham et al. [27] that considering the basis 
of the various criteria and a comparison with full scale test data, DNV RP-F1 01 [8] is 
proven for moderate to high toughness steels, whilst ASME B31 G [9] is applicable to 
low, moderate and high toughness steels (assuming upper shelf behavior). Therefore, 
designing pipelines where the material is tough steel, DNV RP-F1 01 [8] is a good choice. 
A design using older pipeline steel, the design code DNV RP-FlOl [8] might not be a 
good selection. As Netto et al. [10] also calculates greater remaining strength and least 
failure probability (the range of 10-5) after the design life of20 years, this model may also 
be considered for pipeline design using new pipe. Considering irrespective of pipeline 
material toughness, the other standards like CSA Z662 07 [7] and ASME B31 G [9] are 
always good selection for design since they calculate in the safe domain and closely 
match the failure probability of Netto et al. [10] and DNV RP-F101 CP [8] models. A 
scale of conservatism for codes and standards developed in Figure 4.7 and 4.8 may be 
used for prior conception of conservatism of the codes and standards in the design if the 
design scenario is based within the bounds of 0.15 s d s 0.42 . 
t 
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Chapter 5 
Identification of the Cause of Variability of Probability of Failure for 
Burst Models Recommended by Codes/Standards* 
Preface 
Chapter 4 provides failure probability assessment of internal corrosion defect 
whereas this chapter provides failure assessment for external corrosion defect. The 
chapter further provides an extensive analysis for the identification of the cause of 
variability of probability of failure for recommended burst models. The chapter has been 
published in the Journal of Pressure Vessels Technology. 
The principal author conducted sensitivity analysis for the recommended models 
to identify the cause of the variability of failure. The co-authors, Dr. Khan and Dr. Kenny 
supervised and critically reviewed the approaches and provided valuable comments and 
corrections to improve the work and the manuscript. 
An important point may be noted that the codes and standards considered in this 
chapter are also considered in Chapter 4. However, to keep the integrity of the published 
paper the codes and standards were repeated and kept as it was published in the paper. 
*this paper has been published in International Journal of Pressure Vessels and Piping. The 
reference is provided below. 
Hasan, M., Khan, F., Kenny, S., (2011). Identification of the Cause of Variability of 
Probability of Failure for Burst Models Recommended by Codes/Standards, Journal of 
Pressure Vessel and Technology, vol. 133, n. 041101, August, 2011 
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Abstract 
Failure probability of oil and gas pipelines due to external corrosion defects can 
be estimated using the corrosion growth model and the evaluation of remaining strength. 
Codes/Standards have been developed for the assessment of the remaining strength of 
corroded pipeline. The remaining strength and the operating pressure were considered to 
develop the limit state equation and consequently the failure probability of the burst 
models recommended by codes/standards. In the present paper, comparative analyses of 
the failure probability estimated by the codes/standards were conducted, using Monte 
Carlo simulation and First Order Second Moment (FOSM) methods. The analysis 
revealed that the failure probability of the burst models recommended by codes/standards 
varies significantly for the same size of defects. The study further explored the cause of 
variability in failure probabilities. The study observed that different defect shape 
specification (rectangular, parabolic etc.) and different stress concentration factor 
derivation (different contribution of[) for burst pressure estimation are responsible for 
high variability in the probability of failure. It is important to reduce variability to ensure 
a unified risk-based design approach considering any codes/standards. 
Key words: External corrosion, First Order Second Moment, Monte Carlo, Probability of 
failure, limit state function etc. 
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Nomenclature 
au specified minimum tensile strength of pipe material, SMTS 
ay specified minimum yield strength of pipe material, SMYS 
a hip hoop stress of intact pipe 
axip axial stress of intact pipe 
ahdp hoop stress of defected pipe 
a1 flow stress 
D outside diameter of pipeline 
t thickness of pipeline 
l length of external corrosion defect 
lc characteristic length of external corrosion defect . 
d depth of external corrosion defect 
c width of external corrosion defect 
F design factor 
5.1 Background 
The Offshore oil and gas production and distribution involves a complex process 
system, complex piping system and various other equipment systems necessary for 
process operations. The process components are subjected to continuous deterioration 
from the date of operation to the date of design life. Therefore, identification of the risk 
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sources responsible for deterioration of strength, quantification of remaining life, and an 
incorporation of them in the design is necessary to avoid a catastrophic failure of the 
process system. 
The aim of this study is to develop a risk-based design framework for a 
process system. Hence, the scope of this work is comprised of time dependent failure 
scenarios, i.e, internal corrosion, external corrosion, stress corrosion cracking, fatigue 
failure due to start up/shut down, and corrosion defects caused by combined loading 
(combined pressure and axial load) for specific process components. An algorithm of the 
conceptual risk-based design framework is given in Figure 5.1. 
- · - · - Part 1: LS 
- - - - Construction. 
Part II: Risk 
Estimat ion 
Part Ill : Compo. Risk 
Risk-based Design 
Methodology 
Figure 5.1: Risk -based design of process system 
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As external corrosion is one of the dominant cause of failure observed in offshore 
oil and gas work, this study investigates the probability of failure due to external 
corrosion. It may be noted that the failure probability can be evaluated considering 
models recommended by codes/standards developed by classification societies or models 
developed by individuals. For the risk-based design framework, the codes/standards 
should calculate identical failure probability/remaining strength since the reliable 
prediction of remaining strength is crucial in engineering design and integrity assessment 
of process components [ 1]. However, in practice it is observed that codes/standards 
calculate different failure probability and remaining strength. Hence this paper extended 
its study to investigate the cause of variability in failure probabilities estimated by the 
codes/standards, and the pipeline is considered as the illustrated example. 
The study will considerer the First Order Second Moment (FOSM) method and 
Monte Carlo (MC) approach for the analysis. An analytic method like FOSM requires an 
extensive background in probability and statistics, which might be tedious. A simplistic 
tool is the MC approach which calculates the same probability but with not much 
background in probability and statistics [2] . The results obtained by FOSM are difficult to 
verify experimentally, hence MC is the alternative technique to verify the accuracy of the 
results [3]. 
5.2 External Corrosion 
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External corrosiOn 1s an oxidation process on external surfaces which are 
normally exposed to subsea water. It is a two step reaction process in which the loss of 
metal and production of electrons occurs at the anodic area, and the consumption of these 
electrons occurs at the cathodic area. Hence, the overall external corrosion rate is dictated 
by the ratio of the anodic area to the cathodic area, the concentration of the cathodic 
reactant and, to a lesser extent, the resistivity of the local environment, which determines 
the volume of ion transformation between the anode and cathode [ 4]. For the corrosion to 
continue, the electrons remaining on the metal surface must be removed by a cathodic 
reaction. Typical cathodic reactions are hydrogen evolution and oxygen reduction. 
The higher the availability of oxygen to the metal surface, the higher the 
potential rate of corrosion. Oxygen access to the bare metal surface increases as the 
temperature of the water decreases, or as the flow rate over the surface increases. The 
splash zone of offshore process components, like risers, is, therefore, at the highest risk of 
corrosion in cold water moving at a high velocity [ 4]. 
5.3 Defect Growth Model 
The growth of external corrosion defects on the process component (i.e, pipeline) 
surface is time dependent and the trajectory of the growth may be in the radial, 
circumferential and axial directions. In most studies [5,6,7,8], the shapes of these defects 
have been characterized by rectangular geometry defects or parabolic defects. Both types 
of defects have been characterized as two parameters ( l x d ), discussed later in this 
section. 
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Knowledge of the remaining hoop strength of the defected pipeline is required to 
assess the safe mode of operation. Different codes/standards have been developed to 
calculate the remaining hoop strength or the bursting pressure of the defected pipeline. 
These codes/standards were developed and validated by laboratory test data or finite 
element (FE) simulation [7, 9,10]. 
5.3.1 Pressure calculation of defect free pipe 
Considering a defect free circular pipe, as shown in Figure 5.2, the outside 
diameter is specified by D and wall thickness by t. Depending on the Dlt ratio the pipe 
may be generally classified as either a thin walled (D/t ~ 20) or thick walled pipe. In the 
case of a thin walled pipe, at any point of the pipe material two stresses are present: hoop 
stress, a,, . acts in the circumferential direction and longitudinal or axial stress, a . acts ~ · X~ > 
along the length or axis of the pipe. Since hoop stress a, . is twice the axial stress a . , 
I ~ X~ 
hoop stress is assumed to be the controlling stress that is governed by the pipe wall 
thickness (t) . 
tn Figure 5.2 the tangential or hoop stress a hip in the pipe wall is: 
PD 
a = -
hip 2t (5.1) 
where P is the internal pressure, D is the external diameter of the pipe and t is the 
pipe wall thickness. In the above equation, if ah ;p is replaced by yield strength lly and a 
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design factor F is introduced, then the yield pressure for a defect free intact pipe (Pyip) is 
[11,12] 
(5.2) 
Inhibitor 
,~ 
D 
len 11th 
Figure 5.2: Force Equilibrium in a pressurized thin pipe 
This is the burst pressure equation for an intact pipe (defect free) that is 
considered by most of the codes/standards [6,7,8] and models [5,13], with some minor 
adjustment. The value ofF in equation (5 .2) is adjusted to the design condition. For 
example, ASME 8310 [8] assumes the value ofF is 1.1 , whereas DNV RP-F101 [7] 
assigns different values of F in relation to the safety class or design condition. An 
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allowable stress design method considers ultimate strength instead of yield strength for 
intact pipe burst pressure estimation. This is based on flow stress approximation of an 
intact pipe design. 
5.3.2 Pressure calculation for defected pipe 
The strength of a pipeline deteriorates due to corrosion damage, and generally a 
pipeline becomes weaker with increasing age. Hence, the remaining strength of the 
pipeline must be estimated by adopting a suitable method. 
Kiefner et al. [14] and Shanon [15] have developed the following semi-empirical 
model to calculate the remaining strength. This basic approach is considered by most of 
the codes/standards. The remaining hoop stress at failure ( CJ11 dp ) , with a longitudinally 
oriented corrosion defect is estimated by equation (5.3) 
(5.3) 
where CY11 dp is the hoop stress of the defected pipe, CJI is the flow stress, Ac is the 
actual longitudinal corroded area, A 0 is the original area, and M is the Folias factor. The 
bracketed term can be considered as the reduction factor. 
The corroded area can be approximated by a parabola 
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(5.4) 
and the Folias factor is defined as 
(5.5) 
Equations (5.4) and (5 .5) are a basic approach to design the ratio of the corroded 
area to the original area and the stress concentration factor. The codes/standards and 
models developed by individuals have defined the above mentioned two terms (ratio of 
areas and stress concentration factor) in their own way. The basic approach is considered 
by ASME B31 G. 
The burst pressure of a defected pipe is therefore, 
1- Ac 
2t ~rtp = a,rt -= at. 
P D . 
A0 2t 
1-~ D 
(5.6) 
AOM 
where the flow stress (a f" ) is usually expressed in specified minimum yield stress 
or specified minimum tensile stress times the design factor F. 
For corrosion studies, the depth of the defect (d) and length of the defect (l) are 
important factors to be considered. A typical longitudinally oriented, rectangular shaped 
external corrosion defect, as sketched in Figure 5.3, is considered for this study. It is 
assumed that this defect occurs at a discrete location and that it is discontinuous 
throughout the pipeline length. The effect of defect width (c) has been found to have a 
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comparatively insignificant effect on the burst pressure, as indicated by Netto et al. [5], 
while defect depth (d) has the most significant effect and defect length (l) has a moderate 
effect on the pipeline burst pressure. Therefore, the defect depth (d) and length (l) 
parameters are considered for the prediction of burst pressure (Pbdp) for external 
corrosion. Since the orientation of defect depth (d) and defect length (l) are important 
considerations in the structural analysis, the defect depth is considered through thickness 
(radial direction) and defect length is longitudinally oriented (axial direction) in this 
study. This represents the worst case scenario with respect to the applied hoop stress. 
l 
l d 
Figure 5.3: A simplified externally corroded surface flaw in pipeline 
In this Chapter, an approach has been developed that calculates the burst pressure for 
internal corrosion considering a rectangular/parabolic shaped defect ( l x d) and the 
corresponding failure probability of the pipeline is assessed using the available 
codes/standards [6,7,8] and models proposed by Netto et al. [5] and Bea et al. [13]. 
Among the models/standards considered in the present study, the Bea et al. [13] models 
account for the defect depth (d) only. 
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5.3.3 Defect variables specification 
The reliability analysis of corroded pipeline reqmres the probabilistic 
specification of the basic variables d and /, which define the corrosion defect. It may be 
noted that there is no correlation between the depth of defect (d) and length of defect 
(l); instead, it is observed that for a given depth of defect (d), there is a range of 
associated length of defect (l) [16]. For example, for a depth of 20% wall thickness, the 
length varied (l) from 8 to 608 mm. However, depth of defect (d) and length of defect (l) 
can be assumed to be Wei bull distributed with a Co V of 0.50, suggested by 
Zimmerman eta! [17]. Thus the probability of defect depth (d) greater or equal than its 
characteristic value (de) is expressed by 
(5.7) 
where F(d) is the cumulative distribution of defect depth (d), (fJ') is the shape 
parameter and ( 8) is the scale parameter of the distribution and dd is a small change in 
defect depth. In the same way the probability of defect length (l) is greater than or equal 
to its characteristic value (/c) and is expressed by 
ct 00 P(l ?. l J = 1- F(l) = e- e = f f(l 'yit (5.8) 
/c 
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The CoY 0.50 means the shape parameter (/3') of the Weibull distribution for 
defect depth (d) and defect length (l) in equations (5. 7) and ( 5.8) are both 2.1. The scale 
parameters (B) for defect depth (d) and defect length (l) were calculated using equations 
(5.7) and (5.8). The calculation considered cumulative distribution F(d)=F(l)=0.90 and 
characteristic depth (de) as 1.5% of the thickness (t) of the pipeline for each year. 
Similarly, the characteristic length (/c) was considered as 4% of the diameter (D) of the 
pipeline for each year. The mean defect depth (d) is thus 0.1807 mm/yr and the defect 
length (l) is 17 mm/yr. The study also assumed the linear addition of defect depth (d) and 
defect length (l) for each year. These reflect that after the design life of T=20 years, the 
mean defect depth (d) and mean defect length (l) would be 3.61 mm and 340 mm 
respectively. Table 5.1 shows the probabilistic data for the defect depth (d) and defect 
length(!). 
Table 5.1: Probabilistic data for the random variables- depth of defect (d) and length of 
defect (l) 
Variables d-defect depth /-defect length 
(mm/ ) (mm/ ) 
Type Weibull Weibull 
11 0~1807 17 
Co V 0.50 0.50 
----~------------------------L-----------------------~ 
5.4 Burst Models and Standards 
A defected pipe's burst pressure is considered as the resistance in this analysis. 
The equations developed by different codes/standards for pipeline burst pressure 
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estimation for defects are discussed below. It may be noted that the codes and standards 
are based on closed end conditions and considered hoop stress. The codes/standards have 
not considered axial (the other load in the biaxial plane), radial or combined loads such as 
thermal or bending load. Each burst model was discussed with the same notations for the 
parameters (burst pressure of defected pipe, yield/burst pressure of defect free intact pipe 
etc.) as they were originally developed by the codes/standards or individuals. The 
notations maintained by the codes/standards were not repeated in the nomenclature 
provided at the beginning of the paper. The notation for defect length is specified by I in 
some codes/standards [5,6] where others [7, 8] specified it by L. 
5.4.1 CSA Z662-07 [6] 
CSA Z662-07 standard is defined, for large leaks and ruptures, as the limit state 
function g2 for plastic collapse at a surface corrosion defect with total axial length I (in 
mrn), and average defect depth da (in mm) and is given as 
(5.9) 
where ra = the estimated pressure resistance including model error, MPa 
rc = the calculated pressure resistance, MPa 
= ro[~ -~] 1 -~ 
m x t 
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r0 = the pressure resistance for perfect pipe, MPa 
= 1.8 ta-" for SMYS > 241 MPa = 2.3 ta-Y for SMYS < 241 MPa D D -
m = the Folias factor 
12 14 2 
= 1+0.6275---0.003375 2 2 for1
2/Dt<=50 = 0.032-1-+3.3 forl2/Dt>50 
D x t D x t D x t 
SMYS=Specified Minimum Yield Strength and da= d, the depth of defect 
e1 = a deterministic multiplicative model error term that equals 1.04, e2 = an additive 
model error term, defined by a normally distributed random variable with a mean of-
0.00056 and a standard deviation of 0.00146, e3 = a deterministic multiplicative model 
error term that equals 1.17 and e4 = an additive model error term, defined by a normally 
distributed random variable with a mean of - 0.00765 and standard deviation of 0.00650. 
5.4.2 DNV RP-FlOl [7] 
In DNV-RP-F101 , the maximum operating pressure for a pipeline with a 
corrosion defect is given by 
(5.1 0) 
,.--------2 
where Q ~ l + 0.3 { }n,) L IS length of defect and cr,. IS designed Specified 
Minimum Tensile Strength. 
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It may be noted that DNV -RP-F1 01 [7] proposed two equations for burst 
estimation: one is to estimate capacity (CP) considering a rectangular defect and the other 
is to estimate allowable maximum operating pressure (MOP). The MOP equation is not 
demonstrated here, but is considered in the analysis. In the present analysis, allowable 
maximum operating pressure (MOP) is referred to as DNV-RP-F101 MOP [7] and 
capacity pressure is referred to as DNV-RP-FlOl CP [7]. In reality, the DNV-RP-F101 
MOP [7] equation is more conservative than DNV-RP-F101 CP [7]. 
5.4.3 ASME B31G [8] CODE 
Among the existing criteria for evaluating the residual strength of the corroded 
pipeline, the ASME B31 G code is still the most widely used criterion. Kiefner et al. 
[ 18, 19] observed that the ASME B31 G code is over-conservative for specific defects. 
They modified the code to develop what is known as the 0.85 dL method. Like the 
original, the defect length and the defect depth are the only parameters required to define 
the defect. 
The burst pressure defined by ASME B31 G is 
p B31G = 2t(1.1CJ { 1- (2 / 3)(d / t) ] 
b D yll-(2 / 3)(d / t)M-1 (5.11) 
where M~ l + O.s(~)t) 
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5.4.4 Netto et al. [5] model 
Netto et al. [5] developed a burst pressure equation for external corroswn, 
considering the depth of defect, length of defect, width of corrosion, pipeline wall 
thickness and pipeline diameter. The effect of external corrosion defects was investigated 
through a series of small-scale experiments and non linear numerical models based on the 
finite element method. The experimental and numerical results were then used to 
calibrate the equation. The burst pressure equation for defected pipe is given by equation 
(5 .12). In this equation, P b is the burst pressure for the defected pipe, P bi is the burst 
pressure for the intact pipe, l is the corrosion defect length, d is the corrosion defect 
depth, t is the pipeline wall thickness and D is the pipeline diameter. This equation was 
developed with limiting conditions of corrosion defect depth to wall thickness ratio (0.1 ~ 
dlt ~ 0.8) and corrosion defect length to pipeline diameter (LID 2: 0.5) ratios. The 
approach is not valid for narrow defects (c/D ~ 0.0785). 
pb (dJt.6 ( 1 Jo.4 
-=1- 0.9435- -
P&; t D 
l.la Y 2t 
where Rb. = -----'-----
, D 
5.4.5 Bea et at., [13] model 
(5.12) 
The Pipeline Requalification Guidelines Project [13] developed an equation for 
burst pressure as 
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SMTS 
pb = 2.2(t -d) ( ) 
D-t x SCF 
(5.13) 
where SCF = 1 + z/*, SMTS is the Specified Minimum Tensile Strength and SCF is the 
Stress Concentration Factor. The burst equation, equation (5 . 13), does not consider the 
corrosion defect length (£). This may be a significant issue where aspect ratio plays an 
important role in biaxial stress states. 
5.5 Failure Models 
As mentioned earlier, all codes/standards [6, 7, 8] consider defect length and 
defect depth (l x d) and not the defect width (c). The main considerations in the present 
study are: 
1. The growth of defect depth (d) and defect length (f) were assumed to be 
linearly additive for the design life ofT=20 years. 
2. The defect length (£) is not directly correlated with defect depth (d). The length 
(f) and depth of the defect (d) is considered to be Weibull distributed with a 
CoY of0.50 [1 7]. 
3. The orientation of the corrosion defect(! x d ) parameters is assumed to have 
the length (£)in the longitudinal direction and depth (d) through the wall 
thickness or radial direction. The circumferentially oriented corrosiOn 
defect width (c) is not considered in this study. 
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4. In this study the minimum value of the reliability index is assumed to be zero, 
which corresponds to the highest failure probability 0.50 for the limit state 
analysis. 
The limit state function for externally corroded pipelines can be written as 
follows: 
g(X) = ~rtp- P,P (5.14) 
where ~rtp is the burst pressure of the defected pipe, and P op is the operating 
pressure. The burst pressure of the defected pipe, P bdp. is considered as the resistance, and 
operating pressure, P op, is considered as the load in the limit state function defined by 
equation (5 .14). The burst pressure of the defected pipe, P bdp is calculated using 
respective codes/standards or individual models. 
The reliability index fJ is obtained from load and resistance variables 
(5.15) 
Using equation (5. 15) reliability index, fJ may be calculated for any codes and standards. 
Once the reliability index, fJ, is calculated for any codes/standards or models, the failure 
probability (PJ) can be calculated using equation (5 .16). One can calculate the risk (R) if 
the consequence (C) is known for a specific material and a specific location considering 
equation (5.1 7). 
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Data generated for defect depth (d) and 
defect length (l) " 
Data introduced · to codes/standards "and 
. individyal. ~pdels .. to [Uid the J;emaj nit;tg 
strength 
Development of performance function 
considering opi rating' pressure (Pop) and 
· remaing strength (Pbdp) 
Reliability Index. p, probabi~ty offailure Pf ' 
' and risk R estimation ··· ~ 
(5.16) 
(5.17) infuse 
Figure 5.4: The flow chart depicts the calculation procedure followed in this study 
A flow chart of calculation procedures is shown in Figure 5.4. 
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5.6 Failure Analysis 
For the external corrosion model CSA Z662-07 [6], DNV RP-F101 [7], ASME 
831 G [8] code, the Netto et al. [5] model and the 8ea et al. [13] model were considered 
for analysis. 
The failure analysis was carried out considering the generalized limit state equation, 
equation (5.14) for all codes/standards and models [5, 6, 7, 8, 13]. It may be noted that 
equation (5.14) is a burst limit state, which considers burst pressure and operating 
pressure. Once a burst limit state was considered, equation (5.15) and equation (5.16) 
were considered for failure probability estimation. 
For example, the ASME 831 G code is considered to calculate the burst pressure 
ofthe defected pipe. The burst pressure is now represented by equation (5.18). This burst 
pressure is considered by a generalized limit state equation (5. 14). 
p = P, B31G = 2t(l.JO" { l-(2 / 3)(d / t) ] 
bdp b D yt1 - (2 / 3)(d l t)M -I (5.18) 
where M = 1+0.8( ~)\ ~) 
The new burst limit state equation (5.19) is derived for the ASME 831 G code 
using equation (5 .14). The limit state function for the ASME 831 G code is, therefore 
(X)= 2t(1 lO" { 1- (2 / 3)(d / t) ] - P g ; D. yt1 - (2 / 3)(d / t)M -1 op (5.19) 
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All the basic variables in equation (5 .19), are available in Table 5.1 (ford and l) 
and Table 5.2 (for D, t, ayla11 and Pap). There is less uncertainty observed in pipeline 
diameter D and thickness t, compared to yield and ultimate strength. This is because of 
uncertainty in material composition, chemistry and the manufacturing process. This fact 
is captured in the coefficient of variance reported in Table 5.2. The uncertainty of defect 
depth d and defect length l have already been discussed in section 5.3.3. 
Table 5.2: Probabilistic models of the basic variables for material- API 5L X 65 
o"yiMPa 
The procedure specified above to develop the limit state equation and calculation 
of the probability of failure (PJ) is the same for every code/standard. The probability of 
failure (P1) is calculated using equation (5.15) and equation (5.16) by the FOSM method. 
The failure function g() may be considered for the direct evaluation of probability of 
failure (P1) by the Monte Carlo method which will verify the result obtained by the 
FOSM method. 
In Table 5.2, the mean value of the operating pressure (Pap) was calculated from 
characteristic operating pressure (pcop), which again was calculated from the yield 
pressure (Pyip) of defect free intact pipe. The characteristic operating pressure (pcop) was 
considered as 72% of the yield pressure (Pyip). The characteristic values for load (Pap) 
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were calculated considering the EURO Code EN 1990 [20] recommendation that the 
characteristic values should correspond with 95% upper and 5% lower values, 
respectively, for load and resistance variables. 
2 X 447 X 20.24 Therefore, p cop = p yip X 0. 72 = X l . 1 X 0. 72 = 20. 10 MPa. 
713 
The characteristic value of operating pressure (Pcop) was considered to calculate 
the Gumbel mean and standard deviation. It may be noted that operating pressure can be 
characterized by Gumbel distribution as per CSA Z662-07' s [ 6] recommendation. The 
equations (5.20)- (5.23) were considered to calculate Gumbel parameters. 
(5.20) 
(5.21) 
1 [ J[ J a op = J6 - -
6 (J P.," 
(5.22) 
0.5772 (5.23) u op = f..lpop -
a op 
where f.1 P, is the Gumble mean, CJ r>," is the Gumble standard deviation and P op is 
the operating pressure considered as an extreme random variable. The parameters Uop and 
a op are related to the Gumbel mean and standard deviation. 
Once the failure probabilities are determined for different codes and standards, the 
next question that needs to be answered is about the consistency of failure probabilities 
(PJ) calculated by different methods. Because variability is observed in the probability of 
failures (Pj ), identification of the cause of variability is an important area of research for 
128 
Chapter 5: Identification of the cause ofVariability ofProbability of Failure for Burst Models Recommended by 
Codes/Standards 
this study. Sensitivity analysis of the parameters in the failure function, g(), would help to 
identify the cause of variability in the probability of failures (P1). 
5. 7 Sensitivity Analysis 
The sensitivity of the failure function can be studied by a differential approach 
and a Monte Carlo approach. The differential approach to sensitivity requires the 
transformation of the parameters distribution to equivalent normal distribution if the 
distribution is not normal. The transformation calculates the equivalent normal mean and 
standard deviation at the design point. This approach is rather tedious. A readily available 
solution may be available considering only mean and standard deviation; however, this is 
obviously not a good choice. The differential analysis of sensitivity evaluates sensitivity 
at a specific point. The Monte Carlo approach can be applied when all the parameters of 
distribution are known. In the present study, the Monte Carlo simulation approach is 
considered for the sensitivity analysis. 
Monte Carlo Approach 
A quantitative estimate of linear correlation can be determined by calculating a 
simple correlation coefficient on the parameter values of input and output. Gardner et al. 
[21] recommend using simple correlation coefficients, derived from Monte Carlo 
simulations, as a reasonable way to rank model parameters according to their contribution 
to predict uncertainty. Pearson's correlation coefficient denoted by r is used in the present 
study for sensitivity analysis. 
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(5.24) 
5.8 Results and Discussion 
The failure probability of different burst models recommended by 
codes/standard was calculated and compared for external corrosion analysis. The analysis 
used the First Order Second Moment (FOSM) and Monte Carlo (MC) simulation method 
and considered 20 years design life. The results obtained by two solution approaches are 
closely matching as noticed in Table 5.3 . This expresses the accuracy of the results. The 
analytic (FOSM) result of the analysis is presented in Figure 5.5. Analyzing Figure 5.5, a 
significant difference is noted in the value of P1 for different burst models recommended 
by codes/standards and that developed by individuals. The highest value of probability of 
failure 5.5 x 10-2 is observed for the Bea et al [13] model while the lowest probability of 
failure 5.3 x 10-5 is observed for DNV RP-Fl 01 CP [7] model. 
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Figure 5.5: Failure probability P1 for different codes/standards using burst in the limit 
state equation a) normal graph b) Semi-logarithmic graph 
131 
Chapter 5: Identification of the cause ofVariability ofProbability of Failure for Burst Models Recommended by 
Codes/Standards 
Table 5.3: Probability of failure (P1) obtained for different codes/standards at the end of 
the design life, T=20 yrs. 
Codes/Standard FOSM Monte Carlo 
Pr p Pr p 
DNV RP-F1 01 CP 5.3*1 o-:> 3.87 1.5*104 3.62 
Netto et al. 2008 2.4*1 o-" 3.48 1.9*104 3.55 
ASMEB31G 5.3*104 3.27 1.9*10-'1 3.55 
CSAZ662-07 9.9*10-J 2.33 7.6*10-J 2.42 
DNV RP-F101 MOP 3.6*10-L 1.80 2.6*10-L 1.93 
Bea et al., 1999 5.5*10-L 1.59 5.8*10-L 1.56 
The cause of variability may be determined by sensitivity analysis of the failure 
functions g() for different codes/standards. 
The sensitivity ts analyzed m terms of dimensionless parameters 
l 
and Z = - ) of the failure functions g () using the 
D 
Monte Carlo approach. The analysis considered the data gtven m Table 5.4 for 
dimensionless parameters in the g() function. The analysis considered the remaining 
parameters (other than dimensionless) constant in the fai lure function. The results are 
D 
presented in Figure 5.6. The sensitivities for the dimensionless parameter X= - are 
t 
observed to be insignificant for all codes/standards. This suggests that a change in either 
D or t has little effect on the failure g() function. It may be noted that the failure g() 
D 
function for the Netto et. al. model does not truly contain any- ratio, whereas the other 
t 
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D 
codes/standards contain - ratio in the stress concentration factor, M or Q. The other 
t 
d ah l 
dimensionless parameters ( W = -, Y = ----"---and Z =-) are observed to be 
t a or a D y II 
sensitive in each of the codes/standards. This means a small change in (W, Y, or Z) has a 
significant effect on the failure function g(). Dimensionless parameter Y has the most 
significant effect on the failure function g(), followed by Wand Z. The sensitivity for Y is 
rather consistent for all codes/standards, and does not vary significantly from one code to 
another. This indicates that it is not a significant issue whether yield or ultimate strength 
are considered in the burst models. It seems the dimensionless parameters W and Z are 
most responsible for the significant variation in failure probability (P1). The sensitivity of 
dimensionless parameters, Wand Z, corresponds to the sensitivity of d and l respectively. 
It may be noted that the effects of the parameters t and D in W = d and Z = _!_are 
t D 
already identified as insignificant in the failure g() function. 
Table 5.4: Probabilistic models of dimensionless parameters 
Dimensionless li d X=D Y= a h z =_!_ Parameter W= -
t t a Y or a ,. D 
Type Weibull Normal Normal Weibull 
~ 0.1792 35.22 0.6794 (Netto et al., ASME BJIG} 0.4717 
0.5730 (CSA) 
0.5558 (DNV) 
CoV 0.5050 0.0014 0.1130 (Nettoetai.,ASMEBJLG) 0.5030 
0.1157 (CSA) 
0.1123 (DNV) 
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Figure 5.6: Graphical representation of sensitivity analysis of dimensionless parameter 
by Monte Carlo method. 
Considering equation (5 .1 8), the burst pressure of the defected pipe is a function 
of intact pressure and the reduction factor. 
~tp = !{Intact burst, 'reduction factor' Pb;} 
=!{Intact burst f(F,t,aY ,D 1 'reduction factor' f(d ,t,l, D)} 
As it is observed that parameters in the intact burst pressure are not responsible 
for variation in remaining strength estimation of corroded pipe for different codes and 
standards, a further sensitivity analysis of the reduction factor, Pbi, reveals the cause of 
variability in the remaining strength. l:;igure 5.7 shows the sensitivity analysis of the Pbi 
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factor. According to Figure 5.7, the contribution of d and lin the burst model equation 
are responsible for variation in the calculated remaining strength. 'fable 5.5 further 
illustrates the importance of the dimensionless parameters in the failure function. The 
contribution of the parameter din the reduction factor Pbi is found to be most significant, 
which is followed by /. According to Table 5.5, the basic variable d contributes 76% in 
the Netto et. a!. model while 59% is contributed in the DNV-RP-FlOl model. A similar 
observation was noticed for the basic variable /, in which 21% was contributed in the 
Netto et. a!. model, while 59% was contributed in the DNV-RP-FlOl model. The 
insignificant contribution is again observed forD and t. 
Table 5.5: Importance factor in the reduction factor Pbi. 
Individual 
Parameter 
Importance factor (in% contribution) in reduction fact~r, Pbi 
(i) DNVRP BIOI ·· 
In the present study significant variation is observed in probability of failure (Pr) 
for different burst models recommended by codes/standards and also by individuals. The 
variation in probability of failure is due to differences in remaining strength estimation of 
the different models. The cause of variability in remaining strength is contributed by d 
and l in the burst models recommended by codes/standards. 
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Figure 5.7: Graphical representation of sensitivity analysis of Pbi factor by Monte Carlo 
method. 
The Bea et al. [ 13] model is not considered in this analysis as it considers only 
defect depth, d for Pbi factor estimation. The DNV-RP-FIOI MOP [7] model is also not 
considered in the sensitivity study, since this equation is not for designing the pipeline, 
but is rather intended to evaluate the maximum operating pressure in the system. 
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5.9 Conclusion 
The validation of failure probability, calculated by FOSM with experimental tests, 
is difficult to obtain since it requires significant test data to get a standard deviation of 
burst pressure. However, Monte Carlo simulation verifies the results obtained by the 
FOSM method. As the result obtained by the two methods closely match, therefore the 
accuracy of the result is ensured. This paper further investigated the cause of variability 
in probability of failure that must be minimized for a risk-based design approach. It is 
observed that different ways of accounting for the defect geometry in the burst models is 
responsible for variation in estimated remaining strength. This variation is highly 
responsible for significant variability in probability of failure. It is therefore 
recommended that the modelers or classification societies should concentrate on the 
reduction factor, Phi for a unified risk-based design approach. This will provide an 
identical probability of failure (P1) of the burst models recommended by codes/standards. 
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Chapter 6 
Probabilistic Transgranular SCC Analysis for Oil and Gas Pipelines* 
Preface 
Where Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 discussed failure assessment of internal and 
external corrosion defects respectively; this chapter provides a stress corrosion crack 
(SCC) analysis for oil and gas pipeline. This chapter is published in the Journal of 
Pressure Vessel Technology. It may be noted that the result obtained from Chapter 4-7 is 
integrated using FT A in Chapter 8 
The principal author did the literature review and identified codes/standards for the 
analysis. The principal author characterized the SCC crack probabilistically and 
calculated failure probability considering stress/strain based approaches. The co-authors 
provided directions and recommendations to develop validation approaches. The co-
authors monitored the progress, and reviewed the output results. 
The principal author prepared the manuscript, which was consecutively revised and 
improved based on the co-author's comments and corrections. 
*this paper has been published in Journal of Pressure Vessel and Technology. The reference is 
provided below. 
Hasan, M., Khan, F. , Kenny, S., (2012). Probabilistic Transgranular Stress Corrosion Cracking 
Analysis for Oil and Gas Pipelines, Journal of Pressure Vessel and Technology, Vol. 134 I 
051 70 1- l. October, 201 2 
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Abstract 
The crack morphology of Transgranular stress corrosion cracking (TGSCC) 
suggests that the mechanism of growth and the condition at which TGSCC occurs are 
different than that of intergranular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC). Several attempts 
have been made to characterize IGSCC probabilistically; however, a limited effort has 
been dedicated for TGSCC. This paper attempts to analyze TGSCC probabilistically. The 
study includes assessment of the probability of failure for low pH, trans granular SCC by 
the R-6 approach/BS 7910 approach/ API 579 approach which considers plastic yielding 
and linear elastic fracture mechanics, CSA Z 662-07 burst model approach and the 
author's proposed strain based approach. The paper observes that failure assessment 
diagram (FAD) based approaches (R-6 ,BS 7910, API 579) calculate least failure 
probability compared to burst model approaches such as CSA Z 662-07 etc. burst model 
approaches. The authors also observed that their proposed hoop strain based approach 
calculates closely to the CSA Z 662-07 burst model approach. Finally the authors 
justified the rationality of the results obtained by their approach. 
Keywords: Trans granular SCC, failure assessment diagram (FAD), strain based design, 
limit state etc. 
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6.1 Introduction 
Environmentally assisted cracking (EAC) is a generic term that describes all types 
of cracking in a pipeline where the surrounding environment, the pipe material and stress 
act together to reduce the strength or load-carrying capacity of the pipe. Transgranular 
SCC is one form of EAC; the other forms are corrosion fatigue (CF), hydrogen induced 
cracking (HIC) and hydrogen embrittlement etc. SCC and CF depend on the loading and 
environmental conditions. If a deleterious environment is present with cyclic loading, 
then CF is the time dependent mode of failure; otherwise, it is SCC when static loading is 
working. The work of Parkins et al. [ 1, 2] suggests that the loading condition considered 
in their work is cyclic but at the same time it closely matches the static loading condition 
as mostly an average stress was maintained with a high R value. 
SCC is categorized in two forms: near neutral pH SCC (mostly TGSCC) and high 
pH SCC (mostly IGSCC). High pH SCC occurs only in a relatively narrow cathodic 
potential range in the presence of a carbonate/bicarbonate environment and at a pH 
greater than 9. A thin oxide protective film is formed on the pipe surface from the 
electrochemical reaction in the presence of cathodic potential and the potent environment. 
This protective film acts as a barrier to SCC and the corrosion process can not initiate 
unless the film is broken. Hence the microplastic strain rate, related to the rate at which 
the pressure in the pipe changes, acts as a driving force to initiate and expand the crack 
[3]. Though the mechanism of near neutral pH SCC (pH in the range of 5.5-7.5) is not 
well understood, a convincing explanation is made by Parkins [ 4,5]. He suggested that 
the mechanism of crack growth involves dissolution and ingress of hydrogen into steel, 
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facilitating crack growth by promoting reduced ductility. This view is supported by 
Beavers , Leis , Wilmot and Jack , and Lambert and Plumtress [3]. In the present study, 
Parkin's et al. [ 1, 2] work is taken as the basis for probabilistic analysis of failure for API 
X 65 steel. 
It may be noted that three basic conditions must be satisfied for the occurrence of 
near neutral pH SCC : 
a) A potent environment 
b) Tensile stress and 
c) Susceptible pipe material. 
The susceptibility of pipe material to near-neutral pH SCC depends on a couple of 
factors which include the pipe manufacturing process, type of steel, grade of steel, 
cleanliness of the steel, steel composition, plastic deformation characterstics of the steel 
(cyclic softening characterstics), steel temperature and pipe surface condition. Pipe 
grades from 241 MPa to 483 MPa from a range of manufacturers have been found to be 
susceptible to near neutral pH SCC. 
Internal operating pressure is the primary source of stress in the pipe both in the 
axial and circumferential directions and is considered in this study. Residual stress 
created during pipe manufacturing, bending stress resulting from ovalization, or local 
stress resulting from soil settlement or land slides might be other sources of secondary 
stress, but these stresses are not considered in this study. The choice of circumferential or 
axial stress in the pipeline failure analysis is subjected to crack orientation. If the crack is 
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longitudinally oriented, circumferential stress or hoop stress is selected for subsequent 
remaining stress analysis. The reverse is true for a circumferentially oriented crack. 
Considering the criticality of stress in the hoop direction as twice that of axial direction, 
hoop stress and the longitudinal crack are considered for subsequent failure analysis. 
Figure 6.1 depicts a longitudinal crack for general presentation. 
Longitudinal 
crack 
b 
Figure 6.1: Cracks and stresses in pipeline 
Figures 6.2 and 6.3 depict the crack response for a sustained load and cyclic 
loading respectively. Figure 2 reflects the true case of SCC where the loading is sustained 
and Figure 6.3 reflects the true case of crack fatigue (CF) where the loading is cyclic. In 
both cases the environment is deleterious. In the cyclic loading the stress range varied 
with t1K = Kmax - Kmin or stress ratio R = ;min . As the operating condition resembles the 
max 
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slow cyclic loading condition, and material is exposed to hydrogen embrittlement [ 6 ], the 
work of Parkings et al . [ 1, 2] has been chosen to extract the basic data for this study. 
Parkings et al . [ I, 2] created the test environment with cyclic loading associated with 
slow strain rate technique (SSRT) and ensured the test was conducted with liquid 
solutions that closely match to the field. As the stress ratio R is not too low in the 
operating condition and in the test environment mostly an average stress is maintained 
with higher R value in the Parkings et al . [ 1, 2] experiment. Therefore, for simplicity it is 
assumed there is 'no cyclic loading condition' or sustained loading condition for 
subsequent analysis. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------, 
ITT 
l IT l 
~I"' ...., ·  ~ ..., ()J.) 
I;)J) ~ ~ 
I 
Figure 6.2: Typical sustained load (stress corrosion) cracking response in terms of steady 
state crack growth rate (left) and time (right) [7] 
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I 
II 
III 
for a Specific stress 
ration R 
Figure 6.3: Fatigue crack growth phenomenon indicating three regions of crack 
propagation [7] 
The fo llowing assumptions were made for this study: 
1) The test environment of Parkings et al [ l] suggests that it is a case of CF with 
cyclic loading but the result of Parkings et al [ I] suggests that SCC has been 
assumed. This might be due to the fact that the cyclic loading variation is very 
small with higher R values. Again it is also stated in Figure 12 of Parkings et al 
[ 1] that the stress was mostly maintained as an average stress. Hence the data 
from Parkings et al [l] is assumed for SCC crack growth rate as that of a near 
plateau crack growth rate of phase II of Figure 6.2 and the data from Parkings et 
al [2] is assumed for crack initiation time as the time to initiate as in phase I of 
Figure 6.2 for TGSCC evaluation. 
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2) The data is considered for Figure 12 (a) of Parkings et al [ 1] with the assumption 
that the stress level <414 MPa, but mostly 345 MPa is the closest combination of 
17.12 MPa operating pressure considered in this analysis. 
3) Two limits were imposed for crack length and crack depth as suggested by CEPA 
[8] that the maximum length of the crack is 400 mm and the depth of the crack 
does not exceed 80% of the wall thickness. 
6.2 Model Formulation 
6.2.1 Related Research Background 
The flaw growth due to SCC is a function of the material condition, environment, 
the stress intensity factor due to sustained loading, and the total time that the flaw is 
exposed to the environment under sustained loading. The procedure for computing SCC 
flaw growth for nuclear power plant components is based on experimental data for 
sustained load stress intensity factor K1 proposed by ASME [9]. It may be noted that 
ASME [9] also suggested the flaw size determination for the combination of fatigue and 
sec by adding the increment of flaw size caused by fatigue to the regular sec flaw size. 
(6.1) 
where 
a= crack growth rate at temperature T in m/s 
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Qg = thermal activation energy for crack growth = 130 KJ/mole 
R = universal gas constant = 8.314x 1 o-3 KJ/mole °K 
T= absolute operating temperature at location of crack, °K 
T,.e;= absolute reference temperature used to normalize data= 598.15 °K 
a = crack growth rate coefficient = 2.67 x 1 o· 12 at 325 °C for a in units of rn/s and K1 in 
units of MPa ..J;r 
K1 = crack tip stress intensity factor, MPa ..J;r 
K," =crack tip stress intensity factor threshold for SCC= 9 MPa ..J;r 
f3 =exponent= 1.16 
The above formula ts mainly devised for nuclear power plant components 
maintenance and might not be suitable for oil and gas pipelines flaw evaluation. 
Attempts also have been made to characterize the truly mechanical fatigue crack 
growth. Paris, Gomez and Anderson [1 0] suggested that for a cyclic variation of an 
imposed stress field the linear elastic fracture mechanics characterization of the rate of 
fatigue crack growth should be based on the stress intensity factor range. 
Paris, Gomez and Anderson [ l 0] showed that fatigue crack growth rate da/dN is 
related to the stress intensity factor range by the power law relationship. 
(6.2) 
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where A and pare empirical constants, and the equation (6.2) is called the Paris or 
Paris-Erdogan equation. The constants are influenced by material microstructure, cyclic 
load frequency, waveform, environment, test temperature and stress ratio R. 
Besides the simple Paris-Erdogan equation other detailed equations were 
proposed by researchers [ 11 -12]. However, the Paris-Erdogan equation is the most 
desirable one due to its simplicity. These equations characterize the fatigue crack 
behavior of material; however not SCC or CF where a deleterious environment is active. 
Harris, Dedhia, and Lu [ 13] developed the probabilistic fracture mechanics code 
that has recently been modified to evaluate the probability of welds in a nuclear power 
plant piping system. The PRAISE computer code was originally developed by Lawrence 
Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), in United States of America. PRAISE is an 
acronym for piping reliability analysis including seismic events, and has been 
significantly expanded in recent years to allow consideration of both crack initiation and 
growth in a variety of piping materials in a pressurized and boiling water reactor. 
PRAISE has a deterministic basis in fracture mechanics. PRAISE provides a 
comprehensive summary of the deterministic basis along with the description of 
statistical distribution of random variables. However, again, this code is limited to 
application in nuclear power plants. 
To predict the corrosion fatigue (CF) crack growth behavior of metals the 
superposition model was proposed by Wei and Lands [ 14] and was modified by Wei and 
Gao [15]. This model recognizes the fact that mechanical (or pure) fatigue and cycle 
dependent corrosion fatigue proceed by different micro mechanisms and occur 
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concurrently. Modeling was based on the proposition that the rate of crack growth in a 
deleterious environment, (da I dNt is composed of the sum of three components given in 
equation (6.3) 
(!!!!_) _ ( da ) (1 _ ¢) + ( da ) ¢ + ( da ) dN e dN ,. dN c dN sec (6.3) 
In this equation, (da I dN),. is the rate of fatigue crack growth in an inert 
environment, (da I dN)scc ts the contribution by sustained load crack growth; 
(da I dNt represents the cycle dependent contribution which reqmres the synergistic 
interaction of fatigue and environmental attack and ¢ is the fractional area of the crack 
that is undergoing pure corrosion fatigue. 
Due to complexity of the model where individual components are not available, 
the author's motive is to find a simpler approach where experimental data are used to 
evaluate TGSCC in API X 65 steel. 
It has been indicated by researchers, for example, Mollan et al. [16] and Bulloch 
[1 7] that SCC might be possible in an offshore pipeline but many researchers ruled out 
the idea of true SCC in offshore for HSLA steel, or carbon manganese steel. Instead, they 
have suggested the possibility of CF with SSRT in an offshore pipe line. Cigada et al [ 18] 
stated that SCC has not been identified as a cause of failure oflow alloy and carbon steels 
with yield strength below 700 MPa in seawater even under cathodic protection. However, 
it has been observed on steels with yield strength exceeding 1250 MPa. On lower 
strength steels sec has been observed starting from the heat affected zone of welding 
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with high hardness (above 46HRc). It is recognized that SCC may be active on lower 
strength steels in the presence of a sharp defect or under slow straining. Under slow 
straining, cracking in seawater is reported even on steels with 500 MPa yield strength 
[ 18]. It may be noted that cracking starts when plastic deformation is reached. 
Recognizing the fact that limited data are available for SCC in offshore oil and 
gas pipeline the authors decided to choose the data of low pH transgranular SCC with 
cyclic loading and SSRT as the closest combination of offshore pipelines. The results 
obtained by Parkins et a!. [1, 2] were chosen for the analysis of low pH transgranular 
SCC. The data obtained by Parkins et al [1] for crack growth rate suggest a relatively 
constant crack growth rate which permits the assumption of sustained load (stress 
corrosion) cracking response model as explained in Figure 6.2. A simplistic model is 
therefore developed in the present study to calculate the probability of failure for low pH 
transgranular sec. In this model the sec crack is characterized and subsequently the 
probability of failure is analyzed by a different stress/strain based approach. Figure 6.4 
shows the process diagram of the predictive study. 
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The critical crack size 2a1. 6 mm, 
Crack initiation time 10 is defined with Weibull 
distr ibution [2]. 
! 
da 
Crack growth rate a = - is defined with Weibull distribution 
dt 
[I) 
~ 
For T=40 y = r.+ t 
Crack length 
2a=a1 +a2 =a1 +axt::S;400mm[8] Probability of crack initiation 
Crack depth P.ti for the design life ofT= 40 y 
ai a xt ( •) b = b1 +b2 =b1 +- =b1 +-::S; 0.80xh 1 [8] 
k2 k2 
• • CSA Z 662-07 Burst FAD based R6 [21 1 or API 579 [19l!BS 7910 [201 Author's Strain based 
Model approach approach 
.... 
~ J. ~ 
+ 
I pfzlli I 
+ 
I Pf =P~, x Pf lt; I . I 2 . I I 
Figure 6.4: Process diagram of the predictive model for SCC analyis 
6.2.2 SCC Crack Characterization 
Let the period after the crack initiation time, t0 , when the stress intensity factor K 
approaches threshold stress intensity factor K1scc, the crack length is a 1 and the crack 
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depth 1s b1• The ratio of crack length to crack depth IS k1 = 5._. Now the crack 1s 
bl 
subjected to growth. After the growth time t, the crack length is a2 and the crack depth is 
b2• The ratio of crack length to crack depth is k 2 = !!.1_ . Therefore considering the crack b2 
growth rate in the length direction a= da the crack length (2a) and crack depth (b) for 
dt 
the design life ofT= (to + t) years are 
Crack length 2a = a) + a2 = a) +a X t (6.4) 
(6.5) 
In the above equations the crack initiation t0 and the distribution of crack growth 
rate a are two important parameters. Once the crack is characterized in terms of its length 
2a and depth b, the next step is to evaluate the crack criticality. 
6.2.3 SCC Evaluation 
6.2.3.1 SCC Stress Based Evaluation 
SCC stress based evaluation determines the failure pressure of SCC flaws. Several 
analytical models were developed to determine SCC failure pressures. These models rely 
on the relationship between the applied stress, the material properties, and the resultant 
tolerable SCC size. Some of the models allow a rupture or leak as the SCC mode of 
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failure. The axial propagation of the leak may or may not occur depending on the 
applied stress, toughness of the steel and axial length of the steel; however, rupture is 
assumed as the normal mode of failure. Most of the failure pressure models have been 
developed based on the extensive work performed by the Battelle Memorial Institute in 
the 1970s. Other failure criteria have been developed that incorporate elastic-plastic 
fracture mechanics. Available failure pressure methods are: 
• Log-Secant 
• Pipe axial flaw failure criterion (PAFFC) 
• CorLAS™ 
• API 579 [ 19] & BS 7910 [20] 
• R-6 Procedure [2 I] 
p AFFC and Cor LAS TM have shown improved correlations to sec burst test 
results compared to the Log-Secant method [8]. The API 579 [ 19], BS 7910 [20], and R-6 
[21] approaches provide similar results while assessing SCC-like flaws using the failure 
assessment diagram (FAD). The FAD is based on the principle of fracture mechanics. 
CSA Z662-07 [22] also developed a stress based approach for longitudinal defects and 
hence this approach is considered for the present analysis. 
6.2.3.1.1 A. R 6 Approach or API 579 & BS 7910 
API 579 [ 19]/BS 7910 [20] or R6 approach [2 1] are stress based approaches and 
take into account elastic fracture as well as plastic collapse. The flaw is evaluated by the 
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failure assessment diagram (FAD). The FAD diagram is shown in Figure 6.5 which 
provides a schematic illustration of the FAD methodology that determine the failure 
condition in terms of load ratio ( L: ) and fracture ratio ( K,A ). The acceptable boundary is 
defined by the failure assessment curve expressed by equation (6.6). According to the 
FAD failure criterion, if the assessment point A falls inside the failure assessment line, it 
is considered safe. If the point lies outside the curve, it is considered a failure. 
Unsafe domain 
1.0 
K ,. Safe domain 
r 
0 
Figure 6.5: Failure assessment diagram (FAD) according to R6 approach [21] or API 579 
[ 19]/BS 791 0 [20] 
K,. = {1- 0.14L/ Ho.3 + 0.7 exp(- 0.65L,6 )} (6.6) 
The safety margin corresponding to assessment point A(L: ,K,A) is given by 
(6.7) 
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where L: and K,A are coordinates of the assessment point A and r is the distance 08 as 
shown in Figure 6.5. The values of L: and K,A are determined as 
(6.8) 
A (]" ref L,. =-- (6.9) 
a y 
K is the stress intensity factor at any time, K,c is the material fracture toughness, 
a t 
a ,.ef the applied stress. The maximum value of Lr IS gtven by L,., .,x = - · and 
a Y 
for L,. > L,.,.,x , K,. = 0 , where a f is the flow stress of the material. 
The flow stress, a 1 =_!_(a,+ a Y J and a ,.et may be calculated considering API 
· 2 a · 
y 
579 [23], a,.~1 = M sa o where M s is the Folias bulging factor and 0"0 IS the applied 
primary stress. The bulging factor is defined as 
with the parameter M, expressed by 
M = ( 1.02 + 0.441 u ? + o.oo6124..t4 Jo.s 
1 1.0 + 0.02642A2 + 1.533 X 10-6 A4 
where the shell parameter A, is defined as 
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A-= 1.818a 
-J D I 2b 
For more detailed information the readers are encouraged to see references [8, 19, 20, 
21 ]. 
6.2.3.1.2 B. Stress Based Approach (CSA Z 662-07) 
For large leaks and ruptures, the burst pressure Pb at a surface corrosion defect 
with total axial length (2a) in mm, and average defect depth b (in mm) is given by the 
CSA Z662-07 [22] standard. 
[ 
b l 1--CSA burst equation Pb = 1.8 h~" ~ 
1---
m x h 
(6.10) 
The model error is also considered in the analysis. For detailed information the 
readers are encouraged to review the reference CSA Z 662-07 [22] 
Considering burst pressure Pb and operating pressure Po in the hoop direction, the 
limit state equation representing the failure state is 
(6.11) 
6.2.3.2 SCC Strain Based Evaluation 
Strain based design (SBD) encompasses both strain demand (applied strain) and 
strain capacity (strain limit). SBD can be cost effective and sometimes necessary when 
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displacement controlled loading is expected. Such loading may anse from setsmtc 
activity, slope instability, frost heave or mme subsidence for onshore pipelines. For 
offshore pipelines, displacement controlled loading can occur during pipe laying and in 
service. In conventional stress based design, the applied stress is kept below the specified 
minimum yield stress (SMYS). The SMYS is typically defined as the yield strength 
measured at 0.5% total strain. Therefore, stress based design limits the longitudinal strain 
to less than 0.5%. 
A number of recent developments of strain-based fracture assessment approaches, 
including proposals by Budden [24] for a strain-based failure assessment diagram (FAD) 
related to the conventional stress based FAD have been found in the open literature. 
However, recent comparisons with finite element (FE) data have shown that this proposed 
strain-based FAD can be non-conservative in some cases, particularly for deeper cracks 
(b/h>0.20) and materials with little strain hardening capacity [25]. 
Therefore, in this paper the existing strain-based FAD or modified proposed FAD by 
Budden et al. [25] have not been considered for analysis since blh<0.20 is a shallow crack 
and particularly not of interest for this study. Hence the author proposed a strain based 
approach in the hoop direction for defected pipe. 
It may be noted that efforts have been made by some individuals [26] to develop 
hoop failure strain criteria for defect free pipe. However, when the reference is cross 
checked no such formula is seen in the referred papers. Again these formulas calculate 
hoop failure strain for defect free pipe whereas defected pipe is of interest in this study. 
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6.2.3.2.1 C. Proposed Strain Based Approach 
In this study the Ramberg-Osgood equation is considered for developing a strain 
based approach. Burst pressures of intact pipe and defected pipe are converted to 
equivalent strain. After simplification equations, (6.14) or (6.15) or (6.16) may be 
considered for strain based analysis. 
Burst strain of intact pipe 
( )( J
/1 
I II P.D (]" P.D 
£1 =£1 +£1 =-
1
- + 0.005- - y _ I-
2tE E 2tay 
(6.12) 
Burst strain of defected pipe 
( )( J
/1 
I II PD (]" PD 
£2 =£2 +£2 =-
2
-+ 0.005--Y - 2 - where P2 =F~ 2tE E 2tay (6.13) 
Dividing equation (6.13) by equation (6.12) 
5 
_ _ P2D (o.oos- -a y )(-P2D J" 
2 2tE E 2ta y 
~ ---- = ---------
~D 
£---
1 2tE ( )( J
/1 
a y ~D 0.005 - - --
E 2ta Y 
~D 
~£2 -2ti=(~)" 
~D ~ £---
1 2tE 
~ & - p2 D = [£ -~ D ]F" 2 2tE I 2tE 
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F " P2D ~DF" =>& =& +-----
2 I 2tE 2tE 
=>& =&F"+~D(F-F") 2 
I 2tE 
(6.14) 
1.10" ( ) 
=>& =&F"+--y F-F" 
2 I E (6.15) 
(6.16) 
where, 
& 2 is the burst strain of defected pipe which would be considered & 11 in the subsequent 
equation 
& 1 is the burst strain of intact pipe 
I 
& 1 is the elastic part of the burst/flow strain of intact pipe in Ram berg-Osgood equation 
F is the defect factor from stress based design code (CSA Z 662-07 considered in this 
case) = [ 
1 
- * ] = p2 
1- - b- ~ 
m x h 
n is the hardening parameter in the Ramberg-Osgood equation and is assumed 25 in the 
analysis. 
This strain based design is strictly reserved for longitudinal defects. The 
parameter & 1 may be considered as having uniform distribution with min 1.0% to 2.5% 
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[27] and & 1 may be considered 0.0023 for X 65 steel. The following table, Table 6. 1, 
I 
may be considered for other steel for & 1 • 
Table 6.1: Elastic strain property of different steel grade 
Steel 
X52 
X60 
X65 
X70 
X80 
(Jy 
MPa 
359 
414 
448 
483 
551 
1.1 (Jy 
MPa 
395 
456 
493 
531 
606 
Elastic strain part of 
Ramberg-Osgood 
P.D 1.1CY 
equation-1 - = __ Y 
2hE E 
0.0019 
0.0022 
0.0023 
0.0025 
0.0029 
The predicted burst capacity, normalized with the tensile strength hoop pressure 
Pi/Pi, as a function of the corrosion length is shown in Figure 6.6a for a yield strength -
tensile strength ratio of 0.91 using the ASME B31 G code. The same kind of failure strain 
capacity, & 2 I & 1, against normalized corrosion length is shown in Figure 6.6b for the same 
API X 65 steel. In Figure 6a with a higher order of d/t ratios the burst capacity reduces 
gradually and maintains a consistent distance of burst to intact pressure ratios among d/t 
ratios for a given normalized corrosion length. In Figure 6b the burst capacity reduces 
with the higher order of d/t ratios but demonstrates a sharp fall of failure strain at a 
shorter normalized corrosion length (say less than 5). This signifies that the trend of 
failure by strain follows the similar trend of stress (with n=25) but with a higher response 
(sharp decline in strain capacity) at the very beginning of corrosion length. It may be 
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noted that with hardening parameter n=5, the response in Figure 6.6b closely match with 
response in Figure 6.6a. 
;= 
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Figure 6.6: Burst-pressure/failure-strain capacity of defected pipe depending on extent of 
corrosion a) burst pressure ratio, Pt/Pi b) failure strain ratio,&2 I &1 as function of 
normalized corrosion length. 
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In probabi listic analysis, equation ( 6. 13) is considered for equivalent hoop strain 
for operating pressure to maintain the same level of reference with stress based design. 
Equation ( 6.17) is the new form of equation ( 6.13) 
(6.17) 
The failure limit state may be considered as 
(6.18) 
6.3 sec stress/strain based rupture evaluation 
The rupture failure probability, p I, may be evaluated for SCC growth over time. 
If P t; is the probability of crack initiation and P tilti is the probability of failure due to 
growth given that the crack has been initiated the total probability of failure is a 
conditional probability 
P r = P t; x P lilt i (6.19) 
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6.4 Data Considerations 
As stated in section 6.2.2 regarding crack initiation time t0 and crack growth rate 
a, this section discusses the parameters of the distribution for t0 and a as per the 
understanding and results of Parkins and his coworkers [ 1, 2]. 
6.4.1 Crack Initiation Time, to 
Parkins et a!. [2] developed a generalized probabilistic model for crack initiation 
time considering the power law equations for different steels. The critical crack size 
adopted for the crack simulation runs was 6 mm in length. That size was based upon 
laboratory data that showed 6 mm corresponding to the size where the threshold stress 
intensity factor (K1scc) is reached. The time to failure either by the crack penetrating a 
wall thickness and creating a leak or by the crack coalescing to achieve the size for fast 
fracture is relatively short compared to the time occupied in reaching that condition. A 
Wei bull plot of the average times to achieve the critical crack size for the various values 
of the constants was demonstrated in the works of Parkins et al [2]. Examining Figure 22 
of Parkins et al [2] suggests that the average time to reach the critical crack size is 
Wei bull distributed with f3 : /J = 1.416 and B: {J = e - a l fl = e-<-4 012 1141 6> = 17.002 
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6.4.2 Crack Growth rate a = da 
dt 
The transgranular crack velocity with the best approximation of field operating 
conditions is obtained from Parkins et al. [1]. The best approximation of the field 
scenario is necessary since SCC is dependent on many variables. Examining Figure 12 a) 
of Parkins et al [ 1] suggests that the average time to reach the critical crack size is 
Weibull distributed with f3:/J = 0.7066and B:B= e-a!p =e-1332 10·7066 =6.50£ - 9. 
Now the crack length (mm) and crack depth (mm), 2a and b respectively are 
determined considering equations (6.4) and (6.5). The other basic variables given in 
Table 6.2 are considered from previous work [28] of the authors for external corrosion 
for API 5L X 65 pipes. It may be noted that for simplicity, crack depth, b, is calculated 
from aspect ratio, b 12a = 0.1 ~ 0.2 which is in line with the work of [29-3 1]. 
Table 6.2: Probabilistic models of the basic variables for material- API 5L X 65 
Variables crul MPa cry/MPa Dlmm hlmm PapiMPa 
Type Lognormal Lognormal Normal Normal Gumbel 
!l 530 447 713 20.24 17.12 
CoV 0.07 0.07 0.001 0.001 0.08 
6.5 Failure Modes and Analysis 
6.5.1 Design by Current Stress/Strain Based Approach 
An SCC crack is defined in terms of defect length and defect width. At this stage 
the failure modes can be considered for probability of failure given by equation (6.19). 
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Two distinct modes of failure were considered for the analysis: stress based and strain 
based. Table 6.3 summarized the factors considered in the study. 
The probability of failure PJ for the design life of T=40 years is estimated and 
given in Table 6.4 for each fracture analysis mode. Note that the results in ·rable 6.4, are 
calculated considering the stress due to operating pressure P0 • 
Table 6.3: Modes of failure/rupture, crack orientation and stress/strain assumed. 
Nameofthe 
Failure 
/Rupture Modes 
Case A: 
R6 [21, 32] 
approach ( close 
to API 579 [19] 
& BS 7910 
[20]) 
Case B: 
CSA Stress 
based (CSA Z 
662-07 [22]}, 
Case C: 
Author's strain 
based approach 
Orientation 
of Crack 
longitudinal 
crack 
Driving 
Stress/Strain 
Applied stress 
(}"ref = MsO"o 
considered 
, , .... <:.ase4. 
Longitudinal 
crack 
Hoop stress 
0.90'0 F 
Considered· the 
case of B 
Limit load 
Operating pressure, P0 
Standard procedure is Newton-Raphson method to I 
calculate intersection • point, B (the point of 1 
intersection between option 1 curve and line joining 
assessment point and origin). But due to complexity, 
here, the y distance (K: ) is compared for 
assessment point A with y distance (K, ) of : 
assessment point B for the same x distance (r~ I L,. ) 
Operating pressure, Po ' 
Longitudinal Hoop strain Equivalent operating strain from operating pressure 
crack s, = s,F· + ,JF-r ; 
Considered the 
case of C 
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Table 6.4: Failure probabilities for the design life of T=40 years and stress due to 
operating pressure Po 
Name of the Failure 
!Rupture Modes 
Case A: R6 [3, 24] approach (close to API 579 [22] & BS 
7910 [23]) 
Case B: CSA Stress based (CSA z 662-07 [6]) 
Case C: Author' s proposed strain-based approach 
Total probability 
P t = P ti X P til !i 
2.98E-5 
1.15E-3 
8.5E-4 
It may be noted that the Log-secant method is not considered since it is a bit 
conservative [33]. Some commercially available software is also available, such as 
P AFFC or Cor LAS ™ [3 3] but these are not used in this study. The R6 approach is 
basically the same approach, based on API 579 & BS 7910 [ 19, 20]. The severity 
category of SCC recommended by CEPA [33] is examined in this study. The maximum 
operating pressure (MOP) as suggested by DNV RP-F101 [34] and the probabilistic SCC 
failure pressure, SCC1p=Pb, for CSA Z 662-07 [22] have been calculated and found to be 
in agreement with category IV of Table 4.1 of CEPA [33] which indicates imminent 
failure. 
6.6 Results and Discussion 
The failure probability is assessed for the transgranular SCC defect once defect 
depth and defect length are defined for a particular design life. Two distinct failure limit 
168 
Olapter 6: Probabilistic Transgranular SCC Analysis for Oil and Gas Pipeline 
modes (stress/strain) were considered for the assessment of the defect. In strain based 
design the strength of the intact pipe can be assumed to be more than SMYS at 0.5% 
offset strain value or 0.9 SMTS, which is usually assumed in conventional stress based 
design. The authors therefore suggested a revised approach of the strain based design 
which is demonstrated in section 6.2.3.2. The longitudinal crack is considered both in 
stress based design (case A, B) and strain based design (case C). Table 6.4 summarizes 
the result for approaches A, B, and C. The objective is to check the strain based method 
C, for how it calculates failure probability compared to stress based approaches A and B. 
The result indicates A, B and C closely calculate the probability of failure. 
Approach A considers linear elastic fracture mechanics and plastic yielding. Probably, for 
that reason, the probability of failure calculated by A is found to be the least. In the 
estimation of failure probability by approach A or by R6/ API 579 I BS 7910 approach 
[ 19' 20, 21] the fracture toughness, K IC = 180 MPa rm , is considered for oil and gas 
pipelines as suggested by the API RP-579 [23] code. The stress intensity factor, F= 1. 715 
is considered in the analysis. In deterministic selection ofF the priority is given to the 
long defect depth and length which closely match with the last chapter of Table 16 of the 
ASM handbook [35]. Approach B considered flow stress, which accounts strain 
hardening and plastic flow by means of a single hardening parameter [27]. The identical 
calculation of probability of failure calculated by C as that of B indicates the integrity of 
the author's proposed strain based approach, which is simple but rational. The strain-
based calculation depends on the burst strain of the intact pipe, & 1; the elastic part of the 
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burst/flow strain of intact pipe in the Ramberg-Osgood equation, & 1 , the defect factor, F 
and the hardening parameter, n, in the Ramberg-Osgood equation. 
The strain based design is strictly restricted to the longitudinal defect. The 
parameter & 1 may be considered as uniform distribution with min 1.0% to 2.5% as 
suggested by Zimmerman [27]. In real life design a strain based approach requires true 
judgment of the approximation of strain capacity and strain load. 
In the deterministic analysis using Excel the burst strain & 1, calculated by the 
Ramberg-Osgood equation, shows 2.88% strain capacity (with a f = 490 MPa) for intact 
pipe which is in reasonable agreement with the following table, Table 6.5 [36]. The 
experimental result of 3.29% strain corresponds to 492 MPa which only has a 2 MPa 
margin. The elastic part of the burst/flow strain of intact pipe in the Ramberg-Osgood 
I 
equation, & 1 remains almost constant 0.23-0.24% for load variation. 
Table 6.5: Failure Strain results and predictions % [36] 
X42 X6S aged X70 aged X 80 ex mill XSO aged Average Standard error 
discrepancy (% ) !%) 
T<st result 'l .(t'l 3.29 153 2.56 1.0 1 
Gaessler- Voght 8.37 3.39 239 4.70 2 62 J4.7 (18.0) 53.3 (44.0) 
Half unil()nn strain 10.70 4 .40 2.93 4.60 JA S 62.2 (36.4) 63.~ t)O. J) 
Liessem-Gracf 6 .10 3.49 .1.01 4.07 2.27 25.0 (1 2.6) 43.2 (38. 1) 
Zlm· Lcis 7. 59 3.51 3.01 4.24 2.42 .12.0 (1 8.4) 42.9 (.l4.9) 
C IS-ihll 9 07 2.87 1.98 30) 2.66 17.4 (-4.4) 51.0 (17.3) 
C IS· A 9 .87 3.36 2.41 2 .77 264 23 2 (3.2) 45.41 (5.9) 
Cl$-8 9 .52 2. 7 1 2.00 2.61 2.7 1 I S. I (-- 8 .. 1) 53.4 (IH) 
Another exciting work [37] supports the work of this current study. Though the 
study [3 7] is carried out for X52 steel, it is closely related to X 65 steel. In a probabilistic 
defect length of2a= 252 mm=9.92 inch, and the defect depth b= 12 mm the percent wall 
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thickness, %wt= 59.28%, the pipe fails at MOP =72% SMYS. Figure 6.7 shows the work 
of Limon-Tapia et al. (37]. It may be noted that in the whole analysis it is confirmed that 
the random value of 2a satisfies the condition 2a ~ 400mm and b satisfies the condition 
b :::: 16mm which is 80% of wall thickness. The 2a and b values which do not satisfy the 
condition, were not included in the analysis. 
100% 
- 110'\0 SMYS 
90% 
80% 
70% 
~ ~ 60% 
£ 
a. 50% ~ 
.X 40% 0 
"' ... 0 
30% 
~ f---100%SMYS 
1\ 
"" 
-72'% SMYS f--
\ ~ ......___ 
-\ " \ 
"" ' ~ 
..__ 
-
20% 
10% 
0% 
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 
Crack Length, in 
Figure 6.7: Limiting Acceptance Curve for Crack-like Indications (based on Level III 
FAD)[37] 
The strain based approach of Case C is equivalent to the burst model approach of 
Case B where linear elastic fracture mechanics or plastic yielding is not considered as that 
of Case A. Naturally it is expected that the probability of failure calculated by Case C 
would not be as sound as that of Case A. However, the approach still calculates closely 
with less than two orders of magnitude. It may be noted that strain based FAD, which is 
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closely related to stress based FAD, is recently found to be non-conservative with FE 
analysis for deeper cracks (b/h>0.20) and for little strain hardening capacity [25]. Again 
it may be noted that the hoop strain of defected pipe is a function of & , ~1 , & 1 1 , F , n} in 
I 
which & 1 ,&1 are constants for this particular kind of steel. F can be considered from any 
standard or codes and n is the strain hardening parameter that is also constant for any 
kind of steel. The proposed hoop strain failure model considers strain hardening 
parameter, n, which is not considered in the burst model. 
6. 7 Conclusion 
The present study characterized TGSCC flaws in terms of length and depth and 
evaluated the failure probability. The failure probabilities were found to be identical for 
the same crack growth rate and crack initiation time. The result shows that case C, the 
strain based approach, calculates failure probability between A & B. 
In short the novelty of the work is two fold: a) failure assessment of TGSCC of 
X65 steel and b) demonstration of the strain based approach which calculates failure 
probability close to, or lower than the CSA Z 662-07 [22] burst model. 
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Chapter 7 
Fatigue Analysis of Weld Defect Crack Subjected to Combined Effect of 
Variable and Constant Amplitude Loading * 
Preface 
This chapter presents a manuscript which developed weld defect fatigue damage 
assessment for corrosion fatigue. The manuscript has been submitted to International 
J oumal of Pressure Vessels and Piping. The manuscript is current! y under review. It may 
be noted that this chapter considered weld defect cracking under cyclic loading whereas 
the previous chapters, Chapter 4-6, considered defects or cracks under sustained loading. 
The principal author formulated the approaches for developing fatigue damage for 
the combined effect of variable and constant amplitude loading with a small weld defect 
crack in a pipeline. The co-authors supervised the assessment methodology, reviewed the 
technical aspects and investigated the output results. They also provided the essential 
corrections and guidelines to improve the quality of the manuscript. 
*this paper has been submitted to International Journal of Pressure Vessels and Piping. The 
reference is provided below. 
Hasan, M., Khan, F., Kenny, S. , (2012). Fatigue Analysis of Weld Defect Crack Subjected to 
Combined Effect of Variable and Constant Amplitude Loading - submitted to International 
Journal of Pressure Vessels and Piping IPVP-D-1 2-00076 
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Abstract 
Generally it is believed that a pipeline with no defects is not susceptible to failure 
due to regular pressure fluctuation. Pipeline analysis with defects subjected to pressure 
fluctuation is not broadly discussed in open literature, except for some particular loading 
conditions discussed at the introduction section of this paper. This paper examines 
fatigue damage due to regular pressure fluctuation and start up shut down loading for a 
small weld crack. The Miner's rule and Paris law are considered for failure evaluation. 
The analysis does not confirm the general belief that regular pressure fluctuation is not a 
significant source of failure for weld defect cracks at the end flange of the pipeline 
operating in uncertain marine condition. The study observed that the failure probability of 
weld defect crack in pipeline in the marine environment is much higher compared to the 
non-marine environment. The study also observed that the mixed-mode operation 
(pressure derating) of a pipeline may extend the design life by at least 2 years, keeping 
the risk still minimum (below l.OE-5) while operating for the first 15 years at 17.82 MPa 
and successively at an 11% reduction of pressure. The safe life could be increased by up 
to 4 years if an 18% reduction in operating pressure is considered from the 16th year 
when the design life is considered to be 30 years. 
7.1 Introduction 
Defects in the structures and components may act as initiation sites for fatigue 
cracks. Because a fatigue crack grows slowly initially and then accelerates as the crack 
length and the stress intensity range increase, the initial size and shape of the defect have 
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a much larger influence on the total fatigue life than the fatigue crack size at which 
failure occurs. 
The oil and gas pipelines made of API 5 L X 65 steel are joined by welding 
during pipeline construction. The girth weld in the gas pipeline is the most likely site for 
crack initiation. Girth weld is comprised of base metal, weld metal and a heat affected 
zone (HAZ). Figure 7.1 depicts the three zones of a typical girth weld of a pipeline. A 
crack can initiate and propagate in any part of this area or in multiple areas. A crack is 
considered to be propagating in the radial direction in the weld affected zone. 
The fluctuation in operating pressure is considered as the driving force for fatigue 
in oil and gas pipeline steel and again this is broken down to a) variable amplitude 
loading, i.e. regular pressure fluctuation and b) constant amplitude loading, i.e. start up 
and shut down loading. 
Different studies indicate fatigue due to pressure fluctuation might cause serious 
damage to the weld defects [ l -7] when a particular condition is considered. Beltrao et al. 
[ 1] identified that girth welded joints are prone to initiation and propagation of fatigue 
cracks that have been observed mainly at stress concentration points such as inclusion 
and weld defects. Gresnigt et al [2] studied buried pipelines with local buckles and 
indicated that buckle areas associated with significant strain concentrations in the 
presence of repeated loading (e.g. variations of internal pressure or temperature), 
may develop fatigue. Pinheiro et a l. [3] studied the fai lure mode in dented sections [3] 
in which cyclic loadings may be generated by fluid pressure and temperature changes. 
Under the alternating stress caused by random loads, a very tiny flaw in the pipeline span 
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may lead to formation and growth of a fatigue crack [ 4]. Therefore, the fatigue reliability of a 
pipeline span in service life is very essential security for an oil and gas transportation 
pipeline. An FAD based approach is considered for defective pipeline fatigue life prediction 
by Jinheng et al. [5]. Stress corrosion cracking (SCC) is evaluated by Gamboa et al. [6] in 
which the combination of the range of pressure stresses is considered. 
t=20.24 
Weld Metal 
Crack 
Base Metal Base Metal t=20.2 
/j.a x 
Figure 7.1: Girth weld (Butt) through the thickness in pipeline 
Corcoran [7] in 'Corrib Gas Pipeline Design Part 2' reported all typical sources of 
cyclic stresses which should be considered in the fatigue design of the pipeline. Full 
stress cycles (start-up to shutdown cycles) and fluctuations in operational (pressure and 
thermal) cycles are two of them. 
The following considerations were made in the analysis: 
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I) The extreme value distribution (Gumbel, Type I [18]) is considered for the 
operating pressure because all data points (data from data logger) of pressure 
fluctuation does not add much value in the analysis. The data logger may record 
the pressure value every 6 seconds or every 10 seconds, and this is the user's 
choice. Therefore, instead of considering 5 or 3 values in each 30 seconds the 
maximum value is used to see the extreme value distribution. Thus, the operating 
pressure is considered to be an extreme value distribution with a mean of 17.82 MPa 
and CoY of 0.053. The random number of data points generated in one year is 
therefore, l.05 x 106, which includes peaks, valleys and reversals of random 
operating pressure. 
2) The other operating pressure in the pipeline is considered to be 15.82 MPa and 
12.825 MPa with the same CoY 0.053. The extreme value data are again 
generated for every 3 0 seconds, thus in a year approximate! y 1. 05 x 1 06 data points 
are considered. 
3) Start up and shut down loading considered that the number of startups and shut 
downs is 3 for a year, which mainly reflects the start up and shut down for 
scheduled maintenance. The amplitude is considered the difference between max 
(full operating pressure) and min (zero operating pressure) value of axial stress. It 
may be noted that operational shut down may be required for some other reasons 
and in that case the number of start up and shut down may demand revision. 
4) The weld defect is considered at the end flange of the pipeline. 
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7.2 Mathematical Model 
Characteristic resistances are normally given by S-N curves; i.e., stress range 
versus number of cycles to failure. The S-N curve used must be I applicable for the 
particular material, construction details, state of stress and strain, ahd the surrounding 
environment being considered. For constant amplitude loading the number of cycles to 
failure for a given stress range l'!a is determined by the SN cut-ve. The analytical 
expression for the SN curve: 
log N =log a- m'logl'!a (7.1) 
(7.2) 
where m' = inverse negative slope of the SN curve, log a= the intercept of the log 
N axis. Values ofm and a are dependent on different types of welded joints. 
However, variable amplitude loading as given in Figure 7.2 cannot be assessed in 
terms of simply-described stress reversals. The Rainflow-counting algorithm or the rain-
flow counting method may be used in the analysis of fatigue data i1:1 order to reduce a 
' 
spectrum of varying stress to a set of simple stress reversals. The Rainflow assessment 
methodology is discussed in section 7.3. 
Where stress fluctuations occur with varymg amplitude in random order, the 
linear damage hypothesis (Miner' s rule) may be used to determine the cumulative 
damage for the life of the structure. In this case the fatigue criteria are based on the limit 
damage ratio as follows: 
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s n 
D = I-i <_;;, 17 
i = I Ni 
(7.3) 
where D= damage ratio 
s= number of stress ranges; 
ni =number of stress cycles in stress range i; (Rainflow) 
Ni =number of cycles to failure at constant stress range; (S-N curve) 
17 = limit damage ratio, dependent on Safety Class and access for inspection and repair 
7 
Figure 7.2: Spectrum loading 
For variable amplitude loading the long term stress range distribution may be 
divided into blocks with constant stress range shown, in Figure 7.3 . The damage 
corresponding to the number of cycles within each block is calculated and the summation 
can be carried out acording to Miner's rule. 
The Miner's rule in its current form can not be directly considered to calculate 
damage for a defected component or a component that develops a crack. The N/s in 
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equation (7.3) represents the number of cycles to failure at a constant stress range for a 
defect free component. If the N;s can be assessed for defected components as well, the 
Miner's rule still can be considered for damage assessment. Hence the linear elastic 
fracture mechanics (LEFM) may be considered for N;'s assessment of a defected 
component. 
Figure 7.3: Stress distribution divided into stress block 
The Paris law in region II of Figure 7.4 is the main region of interest where a 
crack propagates linearly. In Figure 7.4 the Y abscissa represents the crack growth rate, 
da/dN, in mm per cycle, while the X abscissa represents stress range, M , in MPaFm . 
Paris related fatigue crack growth rate daldN with the stress intensity factor range by the 
power law relationship. 
185 
Chapter 7: Fatigue Analysis of Weld Defect Crack Subjected to Combined Effect of Variable and 
Constant Amphtude Loadmg 
da = C(M)/11 
dn 
where: a= crack depth 
n= number of cycles 
C, m= material constants 
(7.4) 
M = range of stress intensity factor in mode I fracture= K max - K min 
K= CJ&.F 
CJ = nominal stress normal to the crack 
F= correction factor depending on the geometry of the member and the crack. 
II 
III 
I a Specific 
stress ratio R 
Figure 7.4: Fatigue crack growth phenomenon indicating three regions of crack 
propagation [8] 
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The empirical constants, C and m are influenced by material microstructure, cyclic load 
frequency, waveform, environment, test temperature and stress ratio R. The stress ratio R 
can be expressed by 
R = O"min = Kmin 
O"max Kmax 
(7.5) 
Paris suggested that for a cyclic variation of an imposed stress field the linear 
elastic fracture mechanics characterization of the rate of fatigue crack growth should be 
based on the stress intensity factor range 
/1.K = Kmax - Kmin (7.6) 
where Kmax and Kmin are the maximum and the minimum values, respectively, of 
the stress intensity factor during a fatigue stress cycle. For any crack configuration 
(7.7) 
where F is geometrical factor which depends upon the crack configuration and 
<Jmax and <Jmin are the maximum and minimum values of stress respectively. 
If the threshold stress intensity factor M 1" can be sufficiently documented, a 
modified formula can be used for the crack growth in region I 
(7.8) 
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where M 111 is the stress range intensity factor below which no growth take place. 
For region III equation (7 .9) may be considered 
da C(Mt 
dn (1-R)Kc -M (7.9) 
where Kc is the fracture toughness. The crack growth in region III is of minor 
importance for the marine structure [9]. Fom1an et al [16] corrected the simple Paris-
Erdogan power by critical cyclic stress intensity Kc 
(7.1 0) 
7.3 Assessment Methodology 
Stepl: Rain flow counting 
For variable amplitude loading as described in Figure 7.2, the Rainflow-counting 
algorithm allows the application of Miner's rule in order to assess the fatigue life of a 
structure subjected to variable amplitude loading. Though there are a number of cycle-
counting algorithms for such applications, the Rainflow method, described in Figure 7.5, 
is the most popular one and hence considered for the analysis. 
The algorithm 
1. Rain will flow down the roof initiating at the inside of each peak or valley. When 
it reaches the edge it will drip down. 
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2. The rain is considered to stop, and a cycle is completed, when it meets another 
flow from above. 
3. Starting from the peak, the flow stops when it comes opposite a more positive 
peak than that from which it started. Starting from a valley, the flow stops when it 
comes opposite a more negative valley than that from which it started. 
Example 
Stress 
Cycles Half-cycles 
2-3-2' 1-2-4 
4 
8-9-8' 4-5-7 
5-6-5 ' 7-8-10 
) Stress 10 
--L 
... 
... 
.... 
... 
') Counting 
Time 
Figure 7.5: Rainflow analysis of variable amplitude loading 
From the Rainflow analysis, applied stress cycles ni, may be constructed as in Table 7.1 
given in Figure 7.6. 
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Rando m loading cons idered by extreme 
va lue operating pressure. Po. considered da =C 
I dn 
Sueu 
1 -~....,-:,~'!'"\ ..... 
1- m l . r~:' 
~~;:·: :::.~~) . af 5: -- N j= m m 
6 C./o.u .If 
2 l- m / 2 
-ai * 
:~-~-~--:::.. 
8 
9 r 
~. 10 Table 7. 1: Cycles Require 
... 
d for Failure Crack 
Growth 
Time aj n;+l (a; +aJ+ IY'! F._.,, MV 
0.5 2.5 I. 75 1. 15 3.2* 10 
2.5 5.5 4 .0 1.37 0 .29 1 
I 5.5 9.5 7.5 
9 .5 14 11.8 
Table 7.2: Applied Cycles 
1.98 0 .0523 
3.86 0 .0010 
I 
Block I llj 7. 2!1a; Table 3: Required Failure 
Cycles 
l >70 Block I X 
-
2 65-70 X 2 
N; 
to. a; 
3 60-65 X I 75 XX 
4 55-60 X 2 67. 
3 62. 5 50-55 X 4 57. 
6 45-50 X 5 52. 
XXX 
XXX 
XXX 
XXX 
7 40-45 X 6 47. XXX 
8 35-40 X 7 42. XXX 
9 30-35 X 8 37. XXX 
10 25-30 X 9 32. XXX 
11 20-25 XX 10 27. 
12 15-20 II 22. XX 12 17. 
13 10- 15 XX 13 12. 
xxxx 
xxxx 
xxxx 
XX XXX 
14 5-10 XXX 14 7.5 xxxxxx 
IS 0-5 XX I I ' 5 2.5 I ni D · _ .!!_j_ N; 
I I - l\f. I 
xxxxxxx 
Table 7.4 : Damage ratio 
Block n; !1a; N; n/ Ni 
I X > 70 XX O.xx 
2 X 65-70 XXX O.xx 
3 X 60-65 XXX O.xx 
4 X 55-60 XXX O.xx 
5 X 50-55 XXX O.xx 
6 X 45-50 XXX O.xx 
7 X 40-45 XXX O.xx 
8 X 35-40 XXX O.xxxx 
9 X 30-35 XXX O.xxxx 
10 X 25-30 xxxx O.xxxx 
II XX 20-25 xxxx O.xxxx 
12 XX 15-20 xxxx O.xxxx 
13 XX 10- 15 xxxxx O.xxxx 
14 XXX 5- 10 xxxxxx O.xxxxx 
15 XX 0-5 xxxxxxx O.xxxxx 
n,- 50 1 D- O.xxxx 
I 
k 
D = L D; <; 20 I Yr 
i= l 
Figure 7 .6: Calculation process I 
I N = N+ I 
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• if the threshold stress intensity factor M 11, is considered as in equation (7.8) the solution may be 
considered as 
but the problem with this equation C and m value is defined by considering the simple Paris law 
equation and not considering M ,11 • Another problem is integration of this formula which is not very 
straightforward for probabilistic calculation. 
Step 2: Geometry factor 
For the geometry in Figure 7.1 for !!__ ~ 0.70 equation (7.11) is considered 
t 
F= 1.12-0.23.( a/t)+l0.6. (a/t)2-21.7. (a/t)3+30.4. (a/t)4 [7] (7 .11) 
Step 3a: 
s n . 
To calculate the damage ratio, D = 2::-' as in equation (7.3), n; (= number of 
i= l N; 
stress cycles in stress range i) is available from Table 7. 1 which is obtained from rain flow 
counting. The N; (= number of cycles to failure at constant stress range i ) values in equation 
(7.3) need to be obtained. The N; values may be obtained by solving the Paris law equation, 
equation (7.4) for crack defects. For constant or variable amplitude loading with stress range 
to. a- and constant F equation ( 4) can be integrated to 
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Nf = C A Ill . m /2 Fill (1- / 2) 
.uai .Jr . . m 
1- m/ 2 1- m / 2 
ar -ai (7.12) 
where ai is the initial crack depth and a1 is crack depth at an unstable fracture or yield at 
remaining section 
In Table 7.2 as in Figure 7.6, Ni is the number of cycles required for failure in the 
stress range blocks L'lai considering equation (7.1 2). 
Step 3b: 
Equivalent constant amplitude loading approach (this approach will be considered 
to validate the result obtained in 3a). 
Provided that threshold stress intensity factors are not included in the fatigue 
analysis, the following equation, equation (7.13), may be considered to convert variable 
amplitude loading to constant amplitude loading. Then equation (7.14) may be 
considered to calculate failure cycles 
l i m 
(7.13) 
(7.14) 
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where n; and f..CJ; represent the number of cycles and stress range respectively for 
a particular block i, and n0 represents the total number of cycles applied as depicted in 
Figure 7.7. 
-
n~ n; 
Number of cycles, n0 
Figure 7.7: Long term stress range distribution divided into histogram 
Step 4 
Table 7.4 as in Figure 7.6, may be considered for sample damage calculation from 
direct variable amplitude loading instead of equivalent constant amplitude loading. The 
damage may be calculated considering Table 7. 1, Table 7.3 and equation (7.3). 
Step 5 
Limit state 
The limit state is considered as o , , for 20 years design life and it is a case of 
survival as suggested by DNV RP C203 [10] for DFF= l 
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k 
D= LD; o> 20 / Yr 
i= l 
where Yr is the number of years. 
7.4 Example Problem 
(7.14) 
What is the number of stress cycles that the butt connection in Figure 7.1 can endure 
before it fractures? Consider the member is subjected to variable amplitude loading with 
a Gumble mean operating pressure and a standard deviation of 17.82 MPa, 15.82 MPa 
and 12.82 MPa and with CoY 0.053 as given in Table 7.5. Reasonable data may be 
assumed for loading frequency. 
The bilinear model is considered as per the BS 7910 [ 11] guideline. The material 
property or the Paris law constant may be considered for X65 steel from the guideline 
BS 79 I 0 [ 11] for a marine/non-marine environment which is given in Table 7 .6. 
Table 7.5: Operating Pressure Variables 
Distribution Mean, MPa CoY 
Gumble 17.82 0.053 
Gumble 15.82 0.053 
Gumble 12.82 0.053 
194 
Chapter 7: Fatigue Analysis of Weld Defect Crack Subjected to Combined Effect of Variable and 
Constant Amphtude Loadmg 
Table 7.6: Paris Law constants for marine/non-marine steel 
i c .. 
stage m, Distribution Mean value Transition point 
b= mm 
c=(MPa.J;;) 
or 
(MPa.J,;;;;;J'' d = (MPa.J mm) 
BS7910 [11] 1 3.42 Lognormal 5.37 x 1 o-14 b Lll Mean=1098° 
marine condition CoV=-0.16d 
2 l.ll Lognormal 5.67 X }Q_7b 0.158 
BS7910 [11] I 5.10 Lognormal 5.37 x to-14b 2.61 Mean=363ct Non-marine StD=-0.13d 
condition 2 2.88 Lognormal 5.37x10-14b 0.350 
Stress range is calculated considering Rainflow counting with the MA TLAB tool 
developed by Nieslony A. [12] according to the ASTM guideline [1 3]. All the random 
values of the data points (1 x 1 06) of pressure fluctuation are converted to axial stress 
fluctuations and provided as the input value of the Rainflow counting tool. The Rain flow 
counting tool constructs cycles and returns the data of cycles amplitude, the cycles mean 
value and the number of cycles as 0.5 or 1 for each cycle. The cycles are then counted for 
15 stress blocks. The stress block ranges are divided into 0-5, 5-10, I 0-15, 15-20, 20-25, 
25-30, 30-35, 35-40, 40-45, 45-50, 50-55, 55-60, 60-65, 65-70, and >70. 
The damage ratio is calculated considering equation (7.3). 
with a/t =0.7, F=6.0 maximum. 
The maximum stress intensity factor for alt=0.7 
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K = (JJ;;.F = 75 x -J 1r x o.7 x o.o2o24 x 6 = 95MParm . 
K1c may be considered 180 MPa.,J;;; 
As K<K1c for alt=0.7, fatigue crack growth according to equation (7.4) may take 
place up to this depth. The crack depth at failure to a1 = 0.7W= 0.7*20=14 mm will 
therefore give a safe value for the fatigue life. 
In Table 7.2, the crack growth from 0.5 mm to 14 mm has been divided into four 
intervals and f...N calculated for each interval considering equation (7. 11 ). For a typical 
run the result is presented in Table 7.4. 
In the First Order Reliability Method (FORM), fatigue damage D follows normal 
distribution for which the reliability index may be calculated as 
(7.15) 
where f.1 's are mean and CJ 's are standard deviation. 
7.5 Resultss and Discussion 
In fatigue design of the welded steel structure the use of S-N curves is well 
established [ 14]. The S-N curves predict fatigue failure under constant amplitude loading 
but, by virtue of S-N curve definition, cannot incorporate information related to crack 
detection and/or a measurement to revise fatigue life. The use of fracture mechanics 
techniques combined with the S-N curve framework can do the treatment successfully for 
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this type of problem. The study considered standard Paris law approximation to crack 
growth using a bi-linear crack growth model presented in BS 7910 [11]. It may be noted 
that use of the standard linear model can be overly conservative, especially for cases 
where the loading spectrum contains large numbers of low stress ranges. 
The analysis considered BS 7910 [ ll] recommendation for X 65 steel Paris law 
constants (C and m) in marine/non-marine environments. The loading phenomena 
considered regular pressure loading (variable amplitude type) and start up shut down 
loading (constant amplitude type). The operating pressure loading is considered by 
extreme value distribution with a different mean ( f.1) magnitude of 12.82, 15.82, and 
17.82 MPa and a standard deviation (a) of 0.68, 0.84 and 0.94 MPa respectively. The 
extreme value distribution is considered from extreme values of every 30 seconds for 
each loading case. This makes the loading cycles consistent. Thus, in each year the 
number of extreme values of operating pressure is considered to be 1 x 106, which returns 
on the order of 3.45 x 105 cycles after Rainflow counting. This gives the concept of loading 
frequency considering extreme values of the operating pressure. A design fatigue factor 
(DFF=2.50) is also considered in the analysis. 
It may be noted that the analysis considered the end cap effect, which is the 
longitudinal stress in the axial direction, as the primary load influencing fatigue crack 
propagation. The end cap effect occurs in an end or in blind flanges, 90° bend, T branches 
(limited) etc in the pipeline. The pipeline stress state was evaluated with two limiting 
conditions that included hoop pressure, with a design factor of 0.8 and an incidental 
overpressure factor of 1.1 , and an equivalent stress check with a design factor of 0.9. It 
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may be noted that the marine environment may be considered for the subsea pipeline with 
shallow depth where no compressive stress has developed. The subsea pipeline, when 
approaching the shore with a blind flange, and containing a weld defect, or a pipeline 
close to the sea with the same features, may be considered as the ideal candidate for this 
analysis. 
The result is given in Table 7.7 and Table 7.8 for the non-marine and marine 
environment respectively considering design fatigue factors DFF=1 and DFF=2.5. As 
fatigue loading is highly uncertain DFF=l-10 is recommended by DNV-RP-C203 [10]. 
Hence, from the analytic result obtained in Table 7.7 and Table 7.8, pressure fluctuation 
is not a concern for DFF=1 but becomes a concern when DFF=2.5 or higher order are 
considered, particularly in a marine environment. It may be noted that DFF=1 refers to a 
certain condition, whereas DFF=2.5 refers to low uncertainty in the loading condition. 
A comparison of results for the marine and non-marine environment as presented 
in Figure 7.8 indicates that the failure probability in the marine environment is much 
higher than for the non-marine environment, considering an identical loading condition. 
This depicts the effect of the marine environment on steel by a SN curve with reduced 
fatigue life and increased crack growth rate. Again the comparison may be made in Table 
7.7 for a different operating pressure. The reduction in operating pressure reduces the 
stress amplitude in the stress blocks while keeping the total number of cycles after rain 
flow counting apparently the same. For example, if compared in a stress block of ~cr=35 
MPa, the number of cycles for 17.825 MPa should be higher than that of 12.825 MPa. 
Again, if compared in a stress block of ~cr= 10 MPa, the number of cycles for 17.825 
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MPa should be lesser than that of 12.825 MPa. In both cases gross cycles apparently 
remain the same which is approximately 3.45 x 105 cycles. 
Table 7.7: Failure Probability in non-marine environment 
DFF Yr No of extreme values No of extreme values No of extreme values 
1x 106, 1x 106, 1x106, 
Gross cycles n=3.45x105, Gross cycles n=3.45x105, Gross cycles n=3 .4 5 x 105, 
11=17.82 MPa o= 0.94 MPa 11=15.82 MPa o= 0.84 MPa 11=12.82 MPa cr= 0.68 MPa 
Reliability Probability Reliability Probability Reliability Probability 
index, ~ of failure index, ~ of failure index,~ of failure 
(tentative) (tentative) (tentative) 
1 25 36.63 0 58.69 0 157.03 0 
30 34.21 0 54.18 0 147.48 0 
2.5 25 16.75 0 27.75 0 71.58 0 
30 10.81 0 18.52 0 51.69 0 
Table 7.8: Failure Probability in marine environment 
DFF Yr No of extreme values No of extreme values 1 x 10°, No of extreme values 
1 x 106, Gross cycles Gross cycles n=3.45x 105, 1 x 106, Gross cycles 
n=3.45xi05, DFF=2.5, DFF=2.5, 11=15.82 MPa cr= n=3.45xtoS, DFF=2.5, 
11=17.82 MPa cr= 0 .94 0.84 MPa 11= 12.82 MPa cr=0.68 
MPa MPa 
Reliability Probability Reliability Probability Reliability Probability 
index, ~ of failure index, ~ of failure index, ~ of failure 
1 25 9.68 0 (tentative) 15.06 0 (tentative) 34.02 0 (tentative) 
30 8.63 0 (tentative) 13.68 0 (tentative) 31.16 · 0 (tentative) 
2.5 20 5.27 6.7E-08 9.78 6.5E-23 25.48 0 (tentative) 
25 1.66 4.8E-02 5.05 2.2E-07 16.41 0 (tentative) 
30 -0.70 7.6E-Ol 2.13 1.6E-02 10.79 0 (tentative) 
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Figure 7.8: Comparison of marine and non-marine environment failure probability for 
DFF=2.5 
The management can therefore take a new strategy of mixed mode 
operation or 'hybrid operation'. In hybrid operation, initially the pipeline will be operated 
at high operating pressure, then a reduced operating pressure will be considered for 
operation. 
Careful observation of Figure 7.9 indicates the operators can take an advantage of 
low operating pressure to keep continue the operation after initial operation of ( 1-15) yrs. 
By using the Hybrid operation, with a mean of 17.82 MPa for the first 15 years and then 
adopting a low operating pressure (15.82 MPa) from 16 years, the operators can keep the 
risk minimal for up to 24th years, which is 1.1 E-4. This adds 2 years of safe life. Again if, 
12 .82 MPa is selected from the 16th year the operator is safe up to the 26th year which 
adds 4 years safe life. It may be noted that other issues may be considered as a threat at 
the same time such as an internal or external corrosion defect, or SCC, which are ignored 
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in this analysis. The interested reader may go through the author's other papers [16, 17] 
on probabilistic analysis ofthe internal and external corrosion defect. 
I '-0-. 
I '-0-. 
1E-09 
1E-18 -
1E-27 
1E-36 
1E-45 
1E-54 
1E-63 
1E-72 
1E-81 
[;1E-90 1E-99 
E-108 
1E-11 7 
1E-126 
1E-135 
1E-144 
1E-153 
1E-162 
--- ------ --- ---------------- ~~ !U!UU~ 
• • ! ~ 3 I 
• & B 
• a 
• 
. I 
I 
.. 
1 0'+------"'"~, 20 25 30 
1 Year 1 
1 -----------.·--:--·:::--:-~ 
0.001 
• • tJ. a 
1E-06 . . .. 
. . A 
1E-09 A 
. . 6 
1E-12 . • 
1E-15 . 6 
. 
r -18 . 6 
E-21 . 
6 
E-24 
• 
1E-27 . 
1E-30 
1E-33 
" 1E-36 
1E-39 
1E-42 
15 20 25 30 
I Year I 
6 Hybrid operat ion with 0-15 years 
with 17.82 Mpa and 15-30 years 
with 12.82 MPa 
• Operation with 17.82 MPa for 0-
30 years 
• Hybrid operation with 0 - 15 years 
w ith 17.82 Mpa and 15-30 years 
w ith 15.82 MPa 
r:. Hybrid operatio n with 0 -15 y ears 
with 17.82 Mpa and 15-30 years 
w ith 12.82 MPa 
• Opera tion w ith 17.82 MPa fo r 0-
30 years 
• Hybrid operation with 0-15 years 
with 1 7.82 M pa and 15-30 years 
w ith 1 5.82 MPa 
Figure 7.9: Fatigue failure probability of X 65 steel (logarithmic scale) 
It may be noted that the damage ratio calculated by the equivalent stress method 
as specified in step 3b of section 7.3 calculates the identical damage ratio as is calculated 
by step 3a. Again, in this process of the equivalent stress method, the inverse negative 
slope of the SN curve m', is calculated for marine and non-marine steel for crack defects. 
The value of the inverse negative slope of the SN curve, identified as m' = 2.94 and m' = 
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5.13 respectively for the marine and non-marine environment is given in the following 
Figure 7.1 0. The values become obvious when checked for X as a function of Y as m 
equation (7 .1) 
Inverse negative slope m' for non-marine 
environment 
2.5 ·- ·············-·-·········  
~ 1 5 +- ---''-0>.-.;:- --------1 
~ 
g> 1+--------"""- -----1 
-' 
0 +--~--~--~-~----1 
5 9 11 13 15 
Log N 
• series1 
- Linear (series 1) 
Inverse negative slope m' for marine environemt 
2.5 -··-···-------------, 
• 
~ 1 5 +- -- -"-"'.....- ------1 
~ 
"' 0 
-' 
5 6 9 10 
Log N 
• Series1 
- Linear (Series 1) 
Figure 7.10: Inverse negative slope, m', for marine and non-marine environment 
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7.6 Conclusion 
The analysis considered mainly (other than limited start up and shut down) the 
effect of variable amplitude loading (pressure fluctuation) on small weld. A model was 
developed for fatigue damage assessment for defected items for variable amplitude 
loading. Miner's rule and Paris law are simultaneously considered for failure assessment 
and the Rainflow counting method is considered for stress block and cycles counting. 
Thus, the damage is evaluated. The analysis confirm the general believe that non-marine 
environment is not a significant source of failure where marine environment could be a 
threat if pressure derating is not adopted for aged pipeline. 
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Integration of Failure Probabilities 
8.1 General 
The transportation pipelines are exposed to extreme operating and environmental 
conditions. The integrity of aged pipeline can be assessed by fitness for purpose or fitness 
for service. This is complex, time consuming and expensive procedure. In the alternative 
way the accidental failure can be minimized or avoided by considering the risk sources in 
the early stage of design. The risk-based design will consider potential risk sources, 
quantify them criticality, and finally, incorporate the potential risks in the designing of 
the process component i.e. pipeline. 
It may be noted that codes and standards were developed by classification 
societies which are currently being used in industry to ensure structural integrity of 
pipeline. However, this is not a comprehensive approach giving a complete picture of the 
risks of the process system. In general, the codes/standards suggest rather deterministic 
approach to ensure critical design parameters are met. Consideration of uncertainty of the 
risk sources in the design is important to ensure the long-term integrity of the process 
components. 
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The present work developed a unique methodology for risk-based design of a 
process component as described in Figure 3.1. The methodology considered risk to 
estimate the design parameters at the component level as well as the system level to 
ensure that the overall risk remains within the limit. Considering the probability and 
consequence of failure, the risk-based design (not reliability-based) thus, sees the 
complete picture and determines the design parameters. The scope of the work is 
comprised of assessing and incorporating different time dependent failure scenarios into 
the design consideration. The failure scenarios considered are: internal corrosion, external 
corrosion, stress corrosion cracking, fatigue failure due to start up/shut down and regular 
pressure fluctuation. It may be noted that time independent failure mechanisms such as 
third party damage, earth movement and material defects are not considered in the 
present risk -based design approach. 
The failure probability obtained for internal and external corrosiOn and other 
degradation mechanisms will be added to the risk-based design framework for overall 
risk estimation. Subsequently all individual component risks will be integrated using fault 
tree analysis to obtain overall risk of the system. 
The unified risk to individual components will be thus minimized by achieving 
the target safety level of the system. 
8.2 Results Obtained From Degradation Mechanism 
The present work focused on four major areas of time dependent degradation: 
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a) internal corrosion 
b) external corrosion 
c) stress corrosion cracking (SCC) and 
d) Corrosion fatigue (CF) of weld crack defect 
Pipe wall thinning due to internal corrosion and loss of pressure containment due 
to burst (i.e. leak or rupture) is considered a significant operational hazard for pipelines. 
The failure probability of a pipeline, with longitudinally oriented internal corrosion 
defects, due to burst from internal operating pressure, is estimated. 
Chapter 4 describes internal corrosion defect analysis, and is published in the 
Journal of Pressure Vessels and Piping [3]. The burst models used by design codes and 
standards [ 4-8] are considered for internal corrosion defect analysis. In the analysis, the 
burst pressure and operating pressure are considered in the limit state of the defected 
pipe. The defect is characterized in terms of defect depth and defect length. The defect 
depth is calculated considering the SwRI equation [1]. The defect length is considered as 
per the suggestion of Zimmerman et al [2] . The corrosion feature geometry is integrated 
within burst pressure models, which have been adopted by industry standards, codes and 
recommended practices. The first order second moment method and Monte Carlo 
simulation are considered for probability analysis. The two alternative methods 
virtually verify the predicted result. 
The results obtained by FOSM and Monte Carlo methods have been compared, 
and it is found they closely match one another. A relative ranking of conservatism in the 
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models has also been discussed. Based on the probabilistic assessment, recommendations 
are provided to assist designers in appropriate model selection. 
As external corrosion IS one of the dominant failure scenanos observed in 
offshore oil and gas pipeline, the study in Chapter 5, which has been published [9], 
investigates the probability of failure for the external corrosion defect. Different burst 
models were considered for assessment of failure probability. The study identified the 
cause of variability in probability of failure for the burst models. The variability is 
studied through sensitivity analysis of the parameters in the burst models. The study 
observed that different defect shape specifications (rectangular, parabolic) and different 
stress concentration factor derivations (different contributions of [) for burst pressure 
estimation are responsible for high variability in the probability of failure. It is important 
to reduce variability to ensure a unified risk-based design approach considering any 
codes/standards. 
Chapter 6 attempts to analyze transgranular stress corrosion cracking (TGSCC) 
probabilistically. The study characterized TGSCC flaws in terms of length and depth and 
evaluated the failure probability. The crack is evaluated by failure assessment diagram 
(FAD) based approaches: API 579 [10]/BS 7910 [11] or R6 approach [12]. The crack is 
also evaluated by the CSA Z662-07 [ 13] stress based approach. The authors also developed a 
strain based approach and the crack is evaluated with this approach. The considered models 
calculated the failure probability, which closely match. It may be noted that the R6 [9] 
approach calculates the least failure probability, which indicates that it is less conservative. 
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This is because the model assumes linear elastic fracture mechanics (LEFM) or plastic 
yielding in the resistance part of the limit state equation. 
Chapter 7 examines the susceptibility of failure due to fatigue loading for a small 
weld crack. The fatigue damage due to regular pressure fluctuation and startup shutdown 
loading were considered to evaluate damage by crack propagation. The Miner's rule and 
Paris law are considered for failure evaluation. Constant and variable amplitude loading 
are considered in the analysis with the bi-linear model in the Paris law equation. The 
developed model is tested for the marine and non-marine environment following the 
recommendation of BS 7910 [ ll]. The loading is considered as an extreme value of the 
operating pressure. Therefore, Rainflow counting is employed to count the number of 
cycles acting in the system. The analysis shows that with the given operating pressure the 
marine pipeline will cross the safety limit (probability of failure < 1 0"' -5) at 21 years with 
an initial weld defect of 0.5 mm. The analysis confirmed that the safe life of pipeline 
could be extended with lower operating pressure and hence it is recommended to adopt a 
lower operating pressure after 15 years of operation with a regular operating pressure. 
The individual failure probabilities have been assessed so far as discussed in 
Chapter 4 to Chapter 7. The individual failure probabilities now require to be integrated 
as the algorithm discussed in section 3.4. To make it simple, the failure events are 
assumed independent which indicates there exists no correlation between the failure 
events. 
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8.3 Integration of Probabilities 
For 25 years of operation, the failure probabilities of different degradation 
mechanisms in pipelines are given in 'Table 8. 1. The combined failure is calculated using 
the fault tree and is given in Figure 8.1. The top event probability is calculated as 
3.97x l0-3. The consequence of failure cannot be assessed with any unique method that 
determines identical value of consequences. Based on the assessment methodology and 
type of failure, the consequence varies significantly [ 14-16]. However, the consequence 
associated with this failure is assumed to be, $500 million considering both direct and 
indirect costs. The risk of pipeline failure at 25th years is $ 2,000,000. 
Table 8.1: Calculated failure probabilities of different degradation mechanisms of X65 
pipeline steel. 
The risk increases with the increase of consequences. Provided that the maximum 
allowable risk is $ 1 ,000,000, the risk of $2,000,000 is unacceptable which means design 
variables need to change to tighten the risk. It may be noted that the risk of $2,000,000 is 
calculated with the probability of failure of 3.97x 10-3. If the probability of failure is 
revised to 3.97x 10-5 by revising the design parameters and assumed the same 
consequence, the risk would come down to $20,000 which indicates a very low risk. 
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0=0.00026 
0=2.600e-4 
0=0.0036 
0=3.600e-3 
Figure 8.1: Top event of pipeline failure 
8.4 Conclusion 
0=2.98e-007 
0=2.980e-7 
0=0.00011 
0=1 .1 OOe-4 
The pipeline design with current specification is not safe provided the design is 
made for 25 years with maximum allowable risk is $ 1 ,000,000. Revised specification is 
required to curve down the risk. 
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Contribution and Future Research 
9.1 Contributions of the Present Work 
The author has made the following original contributions in the present work: 
• A risk-based design framework is developed for pipeline design. In the risk-based 
design the pipeline design parameters are justified based on risk instead of 
reliability. This is a shift towards a more realistic view of the failure scenario in 
the processing facility. A risk-based evaluation in the present study is in line with 
CSA Z 662-11 [ 1] and ISO 13623 [2] for individual risk assessment of particular 
degradation mechanisms. In the present study major time dependent degradation 
mechanisms are considered and integrated using Fault Tree Analysis (FTA). In 
the risk-based design of the present study the design parameters are directly 
linked with the end risk. Therefore the design parameters are subjected to 
adjustment to meet the target risk. 
• The key time dependent degradation mechanism of a pipeline is identified. In the 
non-marine environment internal corrosion and external corrosion are the most 
crucial degradation mechanisms compared, to stress corrosion cracking and 
215 
Chapter 9: Contribution and Future Research 
corrosion fatigue. In the marine environment corrosion fatigue is also a major 
concern. 
• The burst pressure models of recommended codes/standards or individual 
models are compared. A relative conservatism scale of codes and standards. 
DNV RP-Fl 01 [8] burst model is a good selection for integrity assessment of 
higher toughness steel pipeline, whereas other codes (CSA Z662 07 [7] and the 
ASME B3 1 G [9]) may be considered for integrity assessment of older steel 
pipeline. 
• 
CJ', 
Dimensionless parameter, hoop to yield/ultimate stress ratio, Y = , has 
CJ'Y or CJ'" 
the most significant effect on the failure function g(), followed by defect depth to 
d I 
thickness ratio, W = t, and defect length to pipeline diameter ratio, Z = D , in 
the burst models. The sensitivity for Y is rather consistent for all codes/standards, 
and does not vary significantly from one code to another. This indicates that it is a 
non-significant issue whether yield or ultimate strength is considered in the burst 
models. It seems that the dimensionless parameters W and Z are most responsible 
for the significant variation in failure probability (P1) as indicated in Figure 5.6. 
Further investigation identified that the different importance of 'Bulging' or 'Folias' 
factor is responsible for variation in estimated remaining strength. 
• The present study characterized TGSCC flaws in terms of length and depth and 
evaluated the failure probability. The failure probability is calculated by 
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considering the failure assessment diagram (FAD) and stress based burst models. 
The stress based burst model, such as CSA Z 662-1 1 [ I], is not particularly 
suitable for crack assessment, since originally the model was developed for defect 
assessment, not for cracks. 
• The work proposed a strain based model for defect assessment which predicts 
better than a stress based model. However, this still remains little conservative 
compared to the FAD based approach. 
• The study observed that weld defect crack in marine environment poses higher 
risk compared to the non-marine environment. The study also observed that 
pressure de-rating (mixed-mode operation) of a pipeline extends the design life by 
at least 2 years, keeping the risk still minimal (below l.OE-5) while operating for 
the first 15 years at 17.82 MPa and successively at an 11 % reduction in pressure. 
The safe life could be increased by up to 4 years if an 18% reduction in operating 
pressure is considered from the 161h years, while the design life is 30 years. 
The current industry practice is to keep a corroswn allowance in the design 
without a detailed estimation of expected corrosion growth in the form of either defects 
or cracks. The guidance 'fitness for purpose' or 'fitness for service' is considered for the 
assessment of the integrity of the pipeline when the pipeline ages. The assessment itself is 
a complex, time consuming and expensive effort which sometimes requires excavation. 
The repair may require a complete shut-down of the transportation system. 
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The present study considered the time dependent expected defect or crack within 
the design life and assessed the reliability of the pipeline and risk of its failure. The 
design parameters were ascertained based on allowable maximum risk within the design 
life. In contrast to reliability-based design, the risk-based design surfaces (floats up) with 
a complete picture of damage by simultaneous consideration of consequence and failure 
probability. 
9.2 Recommendations for Future Research 
Based on this work the following recommendations for future research are suggested. 
• The quantitative assessment of consequence of failure for a pipeline may be 
assessed for oil and gas pipelines separately considering different class 
location, transported fluid and pipeline design variables. The consequence 
may be multiplied to determine the realistic risk of the pipeline failure. 
• A dedicated risk matrix may be constructed for pipeline failure. 
• In the present study the corrosion growth rate is assumed constant for the 
design life. In reality the growth rate might be variable. Therefore, by 
considering a variable growth rate, the probability may be reassessed. 
• Other forms of time dependent failure mechanism may be considered such as 
time dependent denting or hydrogen induced cracking (HIC) for failure 
probability assessment. 
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• The other forms of loading conditions and limit states may be considered for 
probability assessment. For example, limit states other than the ultimate limit 
state (ULS) as considered in this study, the leakage limit state (LLS) or the 
serviceability limit state (SLS) may be considered in conjunction with 
different loading conditions. The different loading conditions other than the 
internal pressure, as considered in this study, may be chosen from Table 0.1 
Annex 0 of CSA Z662 1 1 [I J 
• Design economics may be considered as an important area of research. The 
other grades of pipeline steels may be considered and their time dependent 
degradation mechanisms may be identified. For example, in addition to X 65 
steel other available steels X40, X52, X70, X80, X1 00 may be considered and 
their failure probability may be calculated. The design decision will be based 
on the economics of risk. The steel which renders minimal risk will be finally 
selected for design. 
• Component failure may be calculated from complex defects instead of simple 
defects. Complex defects may be defined by the connection of defects. 
• The advancement, qualification, calibration and validation of the mechanistic 
models and mechanisms used in the study may be considered to provide better 
confidence and reduce uncertainty, particularly considering high strength high 
toughness steel. 
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